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Abstract
Pairing-based cryptography has been employed to obtain several advantageous crypto-
graphic protocols. In particular, there exist several identity-based variants of common
cryptographic schemes. The computation of a single pairing is a comparatively expensive
operation, since it often requires many operations in the underlying elliptic curve. In this
thesis, we explore the efficient computation of pairings.
Computation of the Tate pairing is done in two steps. First, a Miller function is com-
puted, followed by the final exponentiation. We discuss the state-of-the-art optimizations
for Miller function computation under various conditions. We are able to shave off a fixed
number of operations in the final exponentiation. We consider methods to effectively paral-
lelize the computation of pairings in a multi-core setting and discover that the Weil pairing
may provide some advantage under certain conditions. This work is extended to the 192-bit
security level and some unlikely candidate curves for such a setting are discovered.
Electronic Toll Pricing (ETP) aims to improve road tolling by collecting toll fares
electronically and without the need to slow down vehicles. In most ETP schemes, drivers
are charged periodically based on the locations, times, distances or durations travelled.
Many ETP schemes are currently deployed and although these systems are efficient, they
require a great deal of knowledge regarding driving habits in order to operate correctly.
We present an ETP scheme where pairing-based BLS signatures play an important role.
Finally, we discuss the security of pairings in the presence of an efficient algorithm to
invert the pairing. We generalize previous results to the setting of asymmetric pairings as
well as give a simplified proof in the symmetric setting.
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Pairing-based cryptography has been employed to obtain several advantageous cryp-
tographic protocols. In particular, there exist several identity-based variants of common
cryptographic schemes. Pairings can be roughly divided into two classes, based on the
underlying elliptic curve. A pairing such that e : G × G → GT where G, GT are prime
order-r groups is known as a symmetric pairing (also called a Type 1 pairing in the lit-
erature [36]). If e : G1 × G2 → GT , where G1, G2, GT are prime order-r groups and no
efficient isomorphism between G1 and G2 is known, then e is called an asymmetric pair-
ing. In the literature [36], asymmetric pairings are referred to as Type 2 pairings when
a one-way isomorphism G2 → G1 is known and Type 3 pairings if no such isomorphism
is known. We consider only Type 3 pairings in this thesis. The groups G, G1, and G2
are constructed from elliptic curves and GT is a multiplicative subgroup of a finite field.
Care needs to be taken in choosing a pairing so that r is large enough to deflect Pollard’s
rho attack on the discrete logarithm problem in G and G1 [71] and so that GT is large
enough to protect against the number field sieve attack on the discrete logarithm problem
in GT [77]. Symmetric pairings are constructed from supersingular elliptic curves, whereas
asymmetric pairings are constructed from ordinary elliptic curves.
The computation of a single pairing is a comparatively expensive operation, since it
often requires many group operations in G and GT (or G1, G2, and GT in the case of
ordinary curves). We discuss several pairing-based protocols in this chapter. The BLS
signature scheme provides us with short signatures, compared with analogous RSA-based
signatures and elliptic-curve-based Elgamal signatures. The Waters signature scheme also
provides relatively short signatures but operates with fewer security assumptions. When
compared with BLS, these assumptions come at the cost of many non-pairing computa-
tions, potentially more costly than the pairing-related computations. In Section 1.1, we
present the BLS signature scheme and an identity-based encryption scheme using sym-
metric pairings. Frequently, we can translate protocols from the symmetric setting to the
asymmetric setting, as we do with the BLS signature scheme in Section 1.2. Further proto-
cols are presented in Section 1.3 – a signature scheme and a key agreement protocol which
requires exactly one pairing computation by each user. These protocols highlight the need
for the efficient computation of a single pairing. In addition, we discuss multi-signature
and aggregate signature schemes and the pairing computations required in these protocols.
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1.1. Symmetric pairings
Let G and GT be order-r groups, where r is prime. We write G as an additive group
and GT as a multiplicative group.
A symmetric pairing is a function
e : G×G→ GT
such that e is linear in each coordinate. That is,
e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab
for all integers a, b, where P and Q are generators of G. In addition, we assume that e is
non-degenerate (i.e. e(P,Q) 6= 1) and that e can be efficiently computed.
1.1.1. Hard problems. There are a few relatively standard security assumptions in
pairing-based cryptography. For symmetric pairings, we require that the groups G and
GT be such that it is computationally infeasible to solve the discrete log problem: given
generators P , Q ∈ G, find an integer a such that aP = Q.
There are a few related problems which rely on the discrete log problem being compu-
tationally infeasible. The computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH) in G is as follows:
given P , aP , bP ∈ G, find abP ∈ G. Clearly CDH can be solved efficiently if the discrete
log problem can be solved and it is usually assumed the converse it true. The decisional
Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH) is to determine if a proposed solution to a CDH instance is
correct. For symmetric pairings, the DDH problem in G can be efficiently solved – namely,




The computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (CBDH) is as follows: given P , aP ,
bP , cP ∈ G, determine e(P, P )abc. Similarly, there exists a corresponding decisional variant
called the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (DBDH).
1.1.2. Symmetric BLS. The Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signature scheme [18] is
a pairing-based protocol that is analogous to the RSA-based Full-Domain Hash (FDH)
signature scheme [13]. The BLS signature scheme has several advantages over RSA-FDH.
In particular, signing is more efficient for BLS and signatures are smaller.
The BLS signature scheme has three algorithms: Generate, Sign, and Verify. We fix
a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G, a pairing e : G × G → GT , and a generator P of G as
public parameters.
Generate selects a positive integer x < r uniformly at random and returns the private key
x and public key X = xP .
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Sign takes as input a message m and a private key x. The algorithm computes Q = H(m)
and returns the signature σ = xQ.
Verify takes as input a message m, a signature σ, and a public key X. The algorithm
computes Q = H(m) and returns ‘valid’ if e(Q,X) = e(σ, P ) and ‘invalid’ otherwise.
The BLS signature scheme is secure against existential forgeries under adaptive chosen-
message attacks [18]. Roughly speaking, this attacker is assumed to have the ability to
induce a signer to sign arbitrary messages of the forger’s choosing and has the goal of
producing a new signature on a message of the forger’s choosing. This is the standard
security model for signature schemes. The computational assumption is that the CDH
problem in G is difficult to solve. Moreover, the reductionist security proof assumes that
H is a random function (the ‘random oracle’ assumption).
1.1.3. Identity-based encryption. Traditional public-key encryption schemes re-
quire that a sender obtain an authentic copy of the receiver’s public key. Typically, a
third party is used to sign a certificate ensuring the authenticity of a user’s public key.
Identity-based encryption schemes differ in that the encryption public key is not specific to
any particular recipient but combined with the recipient’s identity to encrypt the message.
A third party is required to issue private keys to a recipient based on an identity. For
instance, an email address can serve as an identity.
In order to send a message, the identity of the recipient and the public key of the third
party are required. Additionally, encrypted messages can be sent to a recipient before the
recipient obtains the private key required to decrypt it.
The Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryption scheme [16] consists of four algorithms,
Generate, Extract, Encrypt, and Decrypt. The generate algorithm is used by the third
party who is designated to issue private keys, the extract algorithm issues private keys to
recipients, and the other two are for encryption and decryption. We present a simplified
version of the scheme, which is only secure against passive attacks. The scheme can be made
secure against active attacks with certain modifications which are omitted for simplicity.
Fix a pairing e : G×G→ GT and generator P of G. Let
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G
H2 : GT → {0, 1}n
be hash functions, where {0, 1}n is the message space.
Generate selects a positive integer x < r uniformly at random and computes X = xP .
The master key (that is, the third-party’s private key) is x, the public key is X.
Extract takes as input an identity ID and a master key x. The algorithm computes
R = H1(ID) and returns the private key SID = xR which corresponds to the identity ID.
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Encrypt takes as input a message m and an identity ID. The algorithm selects a positive
integer s < r uniformly at random and computes R = H1(ID) and γ = e(R,X)
s. The
algorithm returns the ciphertext
c = 〈c1, c2〉 = 〈m⊕H2(γ), sP 〉.
Decrypt takes as input a ciphertext c = 〈c1, c2〉 and the private key SID. The algorithm
computes
γ = e(SID, c2)
and returns the message
m = H2(γ)⊕ c1.
The security of the scheme relies on the CBDH problem being difficult for the pairing
e, and that H1, H2 are random functions.
1.2. Asymmetric pairings
A more general pairing is the asymmetric pairing. Let G1, G2, and GT be order-r
groups, where r is prime. We write G1, G2 as additive groups, and GT as a multiplicative
group. An asymmetric pairing is a function
e : G1 ×G2 → GT
such that e is linear in each coordinate. That is,
e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab
for all integers a, b, where P and Q are generators of G1 and G2 respectively. In addition, we
assume that e is non-degenerate (i.e. e(P,Q) 6= 1) and that e can be efficiently computed.
If we can compute an isomorphism between G1 and G2, then we can use e as a symmetric
pairing. If no efficiently computable isomorphism is known, then the pairing is strictly
asymmetric.
1.2.1. Hard problems. For asymmetric pairings, we require that it be computation-
ally infeasible to solve the discrete log problem in the groups G1, G2, and GT .
There are hard problems in the symmetric setting which are analogous to the hard
problems of the asymmetric setting. The computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH)
for (G1, G2) is as follows: given P , aP , bP ∈ G1 and Q, bQ ∈ G2, find abP ∈ G1. Once
again, the CDH problem in (G1, G2) can be solved efficiently if the discrete log problem in
G1 or G2 can be solved and it is usually assumed the converse it true.
The computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (CBDH) is as follows: given P ,
aP , bP , cP ∈ G1 and Q, bQ, cQ ∈ G2, determine e(P,Q)abc. Similarly, there exists
a corresponding decisional variant called the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem
(DBDH). This version of the problem is equivalent to the Type-2-pairing version where an
isomorphism Q 7→ P is known, since we can compute bP , cP from bQ, cQ.
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1.2.2. Asymmetric BLS. The BLS signature scheme has three algorithms: Generate,
Sign, and Verify. We fix a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G1, a pairing e : G1 ×G2 → GT ,
and a generator Q of G2 as public parameters.
Generate selects a positive integer x < r uniformly at random and returns the private key
x and public key X = xQ.
Sign takes as input a message m and a private key x. The algorithm computes P = H(m)
and returns the signature σ = xP .
Verify takes as input a message m, a signature σ, and a public key X. The algorithm
computes P = H(m) and returns ‘valid’ if e(P,X) = e(σ,Q) and ‘invalid’ otherwise.
The main advantage of using BLS in the asymmetric setting is that we can choose from
a wider variety of elliptic curves. Table 1.1 gives a comparison of key sizes for BLS and
RSA-FDH. While verification is usually more expensive for BLS, the BLS scheme has the
advantage of smaller signature sizes and faster signing.
Security level Elliptic curve BLS signature bit-length RSA signature bit-length
128 BN [10] 256 3072
192 KSS-18 [47] 512 7680
256 BLS-24 [8] 640 15360
Table 1.1. A comparison of signature sizes (in bits) for BLS and RSA at
various security levels.
The asymmetric BLS signature scheme is secure if the CDH problem is difficult for
(G1, G2) and H is a random function.
1.2.3. Waters signatures (W1). The Waters signature scheme [90] provides rela-
tively short signatures (compared to RSA-FDH) having fewer security assumptions than
BLS. In particular, Waters signatures are at least twice as long as BLS signatures but
still smaller than RSA signatures. Waters presented an identity-based encryption scheme
whose reductionist security proof does not use random oracles. Since an identity-based
encryption scheme can be used to construct a signature scheme, we obtain a signature
scheme with a reductionist security proof that does not require random oracles.
Waters defined the scheme in the symmetric setting, however the scheme extends nat-
urally to the asymmetric setting. The asymmetric setting gives us the option to swap G1
and G2. Since one of these groups has a larger representation (cf. Section 2.4), this allows
us to make a trade-off between key size and signature size.
The Waters signature scheme has three algorithms: Generate, Sign, and Verify. We
fix a pairing e : G1 × G2 → GT , a generator P of G1, a generator Q of G2, and using a
collision-resistant hash function, we assume all messages have bit-length s.
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Generate defines a function H : {0, 1}s → G1 as




where Ui ∈ G1 are chosen uniformly at random (and fixed) and mi is the i-th bit of the
message m. Let X ∈ G1 be selected uniformly at random. The public key is X = e(X,Q),
U0, U1, . . . , Us. The private key is X. Note that the elements U0, . . . , Us provide an
equivalent description of H. Hence we can say that the algorithm returns the public key
X, H and the private key X.
Sign takes as input a message m, a private key X and public key X, H. The algorithm
computes R = H(m), selects a positive integer t < r uniformly at random, and returns the
signature σ, where σ = 〈σ1, σ2, σ3〉 = 〈X + tR, tP, tQ〉.
Verify takes as input a message m, a signature σ = 〈σ1, σ2, σ3〉, and a public key X, H.
The algorithm computes R = H(m) and returns ‘valid’ if
e(σ1, Q) = X · e(R, σ3) and e(σ2, Q) = e(P, σ3),
and ‘invalid’ otherwise.
Although the element σ2 seems unnecessary, it is required to prove the security of the
scheme [22]. The Waters signature scheme is secure, assuming the CDH problem is difficult
for (G1, G2).
1.2.4. Small-signature Waters (W2). We fix the same assumptions and define our
three algorithms: Generate, Sign, and Verify.
Generate defines a function K : {0, 1}s → Z as




where the ci < r are positive integers chosen uniformly at random and mi is the i-th bit
of the message m. We define two functions H1 : {0, 1}s → G1, H2 : {0, 1}s → G2 which are
related to K. Set Ui = ciP and Vi = ciQ. Then define








Note that [K(m)]P = H1(m) and [K(m)]Q = H2(m). Let X ∈ G1 be selected uniformly
at random. The public key is X = e(X,Q), U0, U1, . . . , Us, V0, V1, . . . , Vs. The private
key is X. Note that the elements U0, . . . , Us, V0, . . . , Vs provide an equivalent description
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of H1 and H2. Hence we can say that the algorithm returns the public key X, H1, H2 and
the private key X.
Sign takes as input a message m, a private key X, and public key X, H1, H2. The algorithm
computes R = H1(m), selects a positive integer t < r uniformly at random, and returns
the signature σ, where σ = 〈σ1, σ2〉 = 〈X + tR, tP 〉.
Verify takes as input a message m, a signature σ = 〈σ1, σ2〉, and a public key X, H1, H2.
The algorithm computes R = H2(m) and returns ‘valid’ if
e(σ1, Q) = X · e(σ2, R) and e(H1(m), Q) = e(P,H2(m)),
and ‘invalid’ otherwise.
The second verification condition, e(H1(m), Q) = e(P,H2(m)), can be guaranteed by
ensuring that e(Ui, Q) = e(P, Vi) for all i. Since this is independent of any message being
verified, this condition can be ensured by precomputation or as a part of a public-key
certification policy.
1.2.5. Comparison of the two Waters scheme. Table 1.2 gives a comparison of
public key and signature sizes between the two variants of Waters for different security
levels and corresponding parings.
We have not discussed computational considerations in this comparison. The significant
number of group operations in G1 and G2 demanded by H, H1, and H2 will potentially
contribute more than the cost of computing a pairing in the verification algorithm; for a
detailed analysis, see Chatterjee et al.[22].
Security Elliptic W1 signature W1 public key W2 signature W2 public key
Level curve
128 BN [10] 1024 65729 512 197376
192 KSS-18 [47] 2560 197120 1024 788480
256 BLS-24 [8] 3840 328320 1280 1641600
Table 1.2. A comparison of the bit-lengths of public keys and signatures
for the two Waters signature schemes.
1.3. More protocols
1.3.1. BB signatures. The Boneh-Boyen (BB) signature scheme [15] is a pairing-
based signature scheme that has a reductionist security proof which does not use random
oracles. We fix a pairing e : G1 × G2 → GT with generators P of G1, Q of G2, and define
three algorithms: Generate, Sign, and Verify.
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Generate selects positive integers x < r and y < r uniformly at random and sets X1 = xP ,
Y1 = yP , X2 = xQ, Y2 = yQ. The algorithm returns the private key 〈x, y〉 and the public
key 〈X1, Y1, X2, Y2〉.
Sign takes as input a message m ∈ [1, r−1] and a private key 〈x, y〉. The algorithm selects
a positive integer s < r uniformly at random such that m + x + ys is not divisible by r.
The signature is computed as σ = 〈σ1, σ2〉 = 〈(m+ x+ ys)−1P, s〉.
Verify takes as input a public key 〈X1, Y1, X2, Y2〉, a message m and a signature σ =
〈σ1, σ2〉. The algorithm returns ‘valid’ if
e(σ1,mQ+X2 + σ2Y2) = e(P,Q),
and ‘invalid’ otherwise.
In order to verify a signature, the algorithm must ensure that e(X1, Q) = e(P,X2)
and e(Y1, Q) = e(P, Y2). This can be guaranteed as part of the public-key certification
procedure or precomputed by each verifier. Additionally, since e(P,Q) is independent of
the message being verified, the value e(P,Q) can be precomputed and hence verification
requires only a single pairing evaluation.
The BB signature scheme can securely sign s messages if the s-strong-Diffie-Hellman
problem is infeasible: Given xQ, x2Q, . . . , xsQ, xP , x2P , . . . , xsP , determine xs+1P . This
version of the problem is equivalent to the Type-2-pairing version where an isomorphism
Q 7→ P is known, since we can compute xiP from xiQ, for i = 1, . . . , s.
1.3.2. Identity-based key agreement. Scott used pairings to design an identity-
based key agreement scheme [78]. Traditional identity-based key agreement schemes re-
quire a two-way authenticated channel to form the shared secret. The identity-based
scheme only requires that the parties be issued a private key by a trusted third party,
based on their identity. The identity-based key agreement scheme consists of three algo-
rithms Generate, Extract, and Exchange. We fix a pairing e : G1 × G2 → GT and hash
functions
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1,
H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G2.
Generate selects a positive integer x < r uniformly at random and returns the private key
x.
Extract takes as input ID and computes P = H1(ID), Q = H2(ID) and returns the
private key S = xP , T = xQ which corresponds to the identity ID.
Exchange is an interactive algorithm. The algorithm requires two parties Alice and Bob
with identities IDA and IDB respectively. Let 〈SA, TA〉 be the private key of Alice and
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〈SB, TB〉 the private key of Bob. The parties each select one of the groups G1 and G2.




Choose positive integer a < r Choose positive integer b < r
B = H2(IDB) A = H1(IDA)
γA = e(SA, B)
a −→ γA
γB ←− γB = e(A, TB)b
γ = γaB γ = γ
b
A
The result of the protocol is a session key, γ. The key agreement scheme is secure if
the CBDH problem is computationally infeasible.
1.3.3. Multi-signatures and aggregate signatures. The BLS signature scheme
(both symmetric and asymmetric) can be extended to multi-signature and aggregate sig-
nature schemes. A multi-signature scheme produces signatures (all by the same signer)
which verify on a set of messages and which can be arbitrarily combined. In addition to
the regular BLS algorithms, we obtain an additional algorithm Combine and a modified
Verify algorithm. We present the modified schemes in terms of asymmetric pairings.
Combine takes as input two multi-signatures σ1, σ2 on disjoint sets of messages M1, M2
respectively. The algorithm returns the signature σ = σ1 + σ2 and the message set M =
M1 ∪M2.
Verify takes as input a signature σ corresponding to the message set M = {m1, . . . ,m`}







Boneh, Gentry, Lynn, and Shacham (BGLS) proposed an aggregate variant of the
BLS signature scheme [17]. The BGLS signature scheme allows distinct messages signed
by distinct signers to be combined into a single signature. We redefine the algorithms
Combine and Verify.
Combine takes as input two aggregate signatures σ1, σ2 on disjoint sets of messages M1,
M2 respectively signed by signers X1, X2 respectively. The algorithm returns the signature
σ = σ1 + σ2, the message set M = M1 ∪M2, and the signers X1 ∪ X2.
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Verify takes as input a signature σ corresponding to the ordered message set M =
{m1, . . . ,m`} and ordered public key set X = {X1, . . . , X`}. The algorithm sets Pi = H(mi)







In this section, we discuss a particular family of elliptic curves called Barreto-Naehrig
(BN) curves [10]. This family of curves admit asymmetric pairings and are ideal for the
128-bit security level. BN curves have other nice features, such as a sextic twist, permitting
a smaller representation for G2 elements.
A BN elliptic curve
E : Y 2 = X3 + b
of order r is defined over a prime field Fp where
p(z) = 36z4 + 36z3 + 24z2 + 6z + 1,
r(z) = 36z4 + 36z3 + 18z2 + 6z + 1,
are prime and r = #E(Fp). These curves have embedding degree k = 12. The integer z is
called the BN parameter.
Define π : E → E, the p-th power Frobenius of E, by π(x, y) = (xp, yp). Define the







The groups G1 and G2 are defined by G1 = E(Fp) and
G2 = {Q ∈ E(Fpk)[r] | TrQ =∞}.
The order-r Tate pairing (cf. Section 2.3.1) is computed as
G1 ×G2 → GT : (P,Q) 7→ fr,P (Q)(p
12−1)/r,
where fr,P is a Miller function requiring approximately log r operations to compute.
The optimal Tate pairing (cf. Section 3.1.2) is defined by
G1 ×G2 → GT : (P,Q) 7→
(
f6z+2,Q(P ) · `(6z+2)Q,π(Q)(P ) · `(6z+2)Q+π(Q),−π2(Q)(P )
)(p12−1)/r
,
where `A,B denotes the line through points A and B, and where fa,Q denotes the ratio-
nal function with a single zero at aQ, a pole with multiplicity a at Q, and a zero with
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multiplicity a − 1 at ∞. This pairing is called “optimal” because the Miller function ap-
pearing in the optimal Tate pairing has roughly one-fourth the computational cost of the
Miller function in the Tate pairing definition. The exponent (p12−1)/r in the Tate pairing
computation can be written as (p6 − 1)(p2 + 1)(p4 − p2 + 1)/r. Since p-th powering is
inexpensive in Fp12 , the exponentiation by (p6 − 1)(p2 + 1) is said to be the easy part of
the final exponentiation; the exponentiation by (p4 − p2 + 1)/r is called the hard part.
The Weil pairing (cf. Section 2.5.1) is defined as




Notice that the Weil pairing has two Miller functions and no final exponentiation. The
computation of an optimal Tate pairing requires approximately 1/ϕ(k) times the compu-
tation of the Tate pairing. An analogous notion of optimality exists for the Weil pairing





)p2+1( f6x2,P (Q) · `6x2P,2xP (Q)





is a pairing (cf. Section 3.1.2). The functions f2x,P , f2x,Q can be computed as intermediate
steps in the computation of f6x2,P , f6x2,Q, hence the total computational cost is less than
half of the Weil pairing.
1.5. Thesis outline
In most of this chapter, we have treated pairings as a black box, as is usually done when
discussing protocols. In Chapter 2, we break open the box and discuss the construction
and computation of pairings. We can divide all pairing constructions into two groups,
the Tate pairing and the Weil pairing. All other pairings are known powers of the most
basic Tate and Weil pairings. From any elliptic curve, we can construct either type of
pairing but certain curves and certain protocols may make one more appealing than the
other. In Chapter 2, we introduce a new method for proving that pairings are bilinear.
Using this method, we present alternative proofs of bilinearity for variants of the Tate and
Weil pairings. For example, instead of proving that the ate pairing is a power of the Tate
pairing, we are able to prove bilinearity directly.
State-of-the-art pairing computation uses the product of powers of the Tate-like pairing,
called optimal pairings. Vercauteren [87] developed a framework for efficient pairing com-
putation using the product of powers of Tate pairings. Hess [42] extended this framework
to the Weil pairing and also incorporated automorphisms to obtain a further computational
advantage for certain curves. For curves where Hess is able to obtain a potential advan-
tage using automorphisms, we show that the computation can be reduced even further.
The optimal pairing framework is presented with an eye on implementation and we give
example curves which illustrate the potential of each result.
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For the BB signature scheme and Scott’s identity-based key agreement scheme, a user
requires the computation of a single pairing. Physical constraints on processor power has
meant that computers frequently have many processors at their disposal. The expense of
synchronizing these processors during a computation is relatively expensive compared to
the cost of a pairing. Therefore, if we desire to compute a single pairing on, say, four
processors, we may wish to give four independent computational instructions to the pro-
cessors and combine the results when all have completed. Separating pairing computation
into many independent computational tasks is examined in Chapter 4, where we discover
that the Weil pairing is potentially faster than the Tate pairing under these conditions,
contradicting conventional wisdom that the Tate pairing is superior to the Weil pairing.
The Hess-Vercauteren optimal pairing framework uses the structure of the elliptic curve
to determine computationally advantageous pairings. In Chapter 5 we extend the frame-
work to the final exponentiation, a large component of Tate pairing computation. We are
able to reduce the computational expense by a fixed number of operations. Chapter 6
focuses on hashing to the group G2. We determine the explicit action of automorphisms
on elements of G2 and combine this with inspiration from the optimal pairings framework
to often double the efficiency of hashing to G2.
At the 128-bit security level, BN curves are generally considered to be ideal. For higher
security levels, the choice is not as obvious. Given that BN curves have so many appealing
features, we might be tempted to use BN curves at the 192 bit security level as well. In
Chapter 7, we compare the efficiency of pairings derived from several elliptic curves at
the 192-bit security level. Surprisingly, we discover that an embedding degree 12 curve of
composite order maintains many of the nice features of BN curves and outperforms other
contenders that we consider.
Traditional stop-and-pay toll booths inconvenience drivers and are infeasible for com-
plicated urban areas. As a way to minimize traffic congestion and avoid the inconveniences
caused by toll booths, electronic tolling has been suggested. For example, as drivers pass
certain locations, a picture of their licence plate may be taken and a bill sent to their
home. However, this simplistic method allows the administrator of the system to build a
dossier on drivers. While this may be an attractive feature for law enforcement, a society
may not wish to trust the tolling agency with such detailed information. In Chapter 8, we
present SPEcTRe, a suite of protocols utilizing the BLS or RSA-FDH signature scheme to
maintain driver privacy while ensuring that tolls are accurately collected. While RSA-FDH
offers extremely fast verification, BLS signatures have the advantage of being much smaller
and having much more efficient signature generation.
For symmetric pairings e : G × G → GT , Verheul proved that the existence of an
efficiently-computable isomorphism φ : GT → G implies that the Diffie-Hellman problems
in G and GT can be efficiently solved [88]. In Chapter 9, we explore the implications of
the existence of efficiently-computable isomorphisms φ1 : GT → G1 and φ2 : GT → G2
12





At a high level, there are two flavours of pairings, the Tate pairings and the Weil
pairings. All other pairings we discuss are known powers of these two pairings. The usual
method to produce new pairings is to begin with the classic Tate or Weil pairing (which
is parameterized by a large prime r) and show that known powers of the pairing can be
computed differently. In this section, we provide direct proofs of bilinearity for several
different Tate and Weil pairings.
We examine the structure of the Tate and Weil variants and place strict criteria on
when they are bilinear. This permits us to give simple direct proofs of bilinearity for the
classic Tate and Weil pairings and some of their variants.
Our focus is on proving that the pairings are bilinear. In addition, we require that the
pairings are defined at all points and that the pairings are non-degenerate. Our method
of proving bilinearity give no new insights into these issues. Thus, we defer to other works
which address the matter. For the Tate pairing, we refer to the work of Hess [41]. For the
Weil pairing, we refer to the work of Miller [61].
2.1. Properties of the Miller function
Let p be a prime power and let E be an elliptic curve over Fp. Let r be a prime divisor
of #E(Fp) and suppose that gcd(p, r) = 1. Let k be the least integer such that r divides
pk − 1, and suppose that k ≥ 2. Then E[r] ⊆ E(Fpk) [5]. Assume further that r2 does not
divide pk − 1. Let Div0(E) denote the degree zero divisors over E.
Definition 2.1. For a group H ⊆ E(Fpk), let D(H) denote the subset of divisors in
Div0(E) having support a subset of H.
Definition 2.2. For a point P ∈ E, define DP as (P )− (∞).
Let π : E → E be the p-th power Frobenius of E over Fp, defined by π(x, y) = (xp, yp).






We define two special groups which are fixed throughout. Define G1 = E(Fp)[r] and
let G2 be the Trace-0 subgroup of E[r]. That is, G2 is the set of points Q ∈ E[r] for which
TrQ = ∞. We have πQ = pQ for all Q ∈ G2 [9, Lemma 3]. Let GT denote the order-r
multiplicative subgroup of F∗
pk
.



















(m · nP )(P ).
Let u∞ be an Fp-rational uniformizing parameter for∞. A function f ∈ Fpk(E) is said
to be normalized if lc∞(f) = 1, where lc∞(f) = (u
−t
∞f)(∞) and t is the order of f at ∞.
Furthermore, f is said to be semi-normalized if lc∞(f) belongs to a proper subfield of Fpk .
Definition 2.4. Let a be an integer and D ∈ Div0(E). Define fa,D as the normalized
rational function with divisor [a]D − aD, called the Miller function. The Miller function
fa,D has length |a| and bitlength log |a|. Note that this is the definition of fa,D used by
Hess [41], the inverse of other definitions for fa,D.
Definition 2.5. Let a, b be integers and D ∈ Div0(E). Define g[a]D,[b]D as the normalized
rational function with divisor [a+ b]D − [a]D − [b]D.
We give two interesting properties of Miller functions.
Lemma 2.1. Let a, b be integers and D ∈ Div0(E). Then
fa+b,D = fa,D · fb,D · g[a]D,[b]D.




Definition 2.6. Divisors D1, D2 ∈ Div0(E) are linearly equivalent, denoted D1 ∼ D2, if
there exists a rational function with divisor D1−D2. We denote the unique such normalized
function by hD1,D2 .
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Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 give us a relation between Miller functions evaluated on linearly
equivalent divisors.
Lemma 2.3. Let D1 be linearly equivalent to D2. Then






div fa,D1−D2 = [a] div hD1,D2 − a div hD1,D2 = div h[a]D1,[a]D2 − a div hD1,D2
and so






Lemma 2.4. Let D1 be linearly equivalent to D2. Let D have support such that fa,D is
defined at D1 and D2. Then






fa,D(D1) = fa,D(D2) · fa,D(div hD1,D2)
= fa,D(D2) · hD1,D2(div fa,D)






where the second equality is an application of Weil reciprocity [86, Excercise 2.11]. 
Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 will be used to eventually prove bilinearity of certain functions. As
an intermediate step, we will prove that certain functions satisfy the following definition.
Definition 2.7. Let D1, D2 be subgroups of Div
0(E). Let e : D1×D2 → F∗pk be a function
that may not be defined everywhere. We say e is invariant under linear equivalence over
D1 ×D2, if for all divisors D1, D′1 ∈ D1, D2, D′2 ∈ D2, such that D1 ∼ D′1, D2 ∼ D′2 and




2) are defined, we have





When the domain is understood, we may simply say e is invariant under linear equivalence.
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Definition 2.8. Let H1, H2 be subgroups of E(Fpk). Set D1 = D(H1) and D2 = D(H2).




e(P,Q) = e(D′P , D
′
Q),
where D′P , D
′





All Miller functions are bilinear with respect to divisors. That is, for all integers a,
fa,D(D1 +D2) = fa,D(D1) · fa,D(D2),
fa,D1+D1(D) = fa,D1(D) · fa,D2(D),
where D, D1, D2 ∈ Div0(E) and both sides of the equations are defined. For certain values
of a, the Miller function is also bilinear over points. For example, we have
fa,D(DP +DQ) = fa,D(DP ) · fa,D(DQ),
where D ∈ D(G2), P , Q ∈ G1 and both sides of the equation are defined. In order to
construct pairings over subgroups of the elliptic curve, we wish to construct functions that
are bilinear over points. In the case that a = p, Lemma 2.10 gives us
fp,D(DP+Q) = fp,D(DP ) · fp,D(DQ).
That is, the function is bilinear with respect to points and not simply to divisors. We say
that the function
e : D(G2)×D(G1)→ F∗pk
is bilinear, if it is bilinear with respect to divisors. On the other hand, we say the function
e : G2 ×G1 → F∗pk
is bilinear, if it is bilinear with respect to points. In other words, the domain of the function
e determines whether we are talking about bilinearity with respect to divisors or bilinearity
with respect to points.
The following lemma shows that we can generate a pairing that is bilinear with respect
to points from maps that are bilinear with respect to divisors and invariant under linear
equivalence.
Lemma 2.5. Let H1, H2 be subgroups of E(Fpk). Set D1 = D(H1) and D2 = D(H2).
If e : D1 × D2 → F∗pk is bilinear (with respect to divisors) and invariant under linear
equivalence, then e : H1 ×H2 → F∗pk is also bilinear (with respect to points).
Proof. Let P , Q ∈ H1. Let R ∈ H2. Set D1 = DP , D2 = (P +Q)− (P ), D3 = DP+Q.
Notice that D2 is linearly equivalent to DQ and D1+D2 = D3. Let D be linearly equivalent
to DR with support disjoint to D1, D2, and D3. Then
e(P +Q,R) = e(D3, D) = e(D1 +D2, D) = e(D1, D) · e(D2, D) = e(P,R) · e(Q,R).
Symmetrically, the function e : H1 ×H2 → F∗pk is a bilinear pairing. 
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For the remainder of the thesis, ‘bilinearity’ will simply refer to bilinearity with respect
to points. Every application of Lemma 2.5 is to powers of Miller functions which, as noted
above, are always bilinear with respect to divisors.
2.2. The Weil pairing
The most common instantiation of the Weil pairing is as the ratio of two order-r
Miller functions. Miller proves bilinearity directly [61]; we rely on Lemma 2.5 to provide
bilinearity by first proving invariance under linear equivalence. This method will give us
intuition for producing other Weil pairings.
All variants of Weil pairings have the following general structure.





Note that wa is not defined everywhere.
The following lemma describes the consequence of switching divisors in one coordinate.
Lemma 2.6. Let D1, D
′
1, D2 ∈ Div0(E) be such that D′1 is linearly equivalent to D1.
Then






























2.2.1. Order-r Weil pairing. Lemma 2.6 suggests that we could choose any a such
that h[a]D1,[a]D′1(D2) = hD1,D′1([a]D2) in order to obtain invariance under linear equivalence.
Indeed, choosing a = r will give us the desired result as demonstrated in the following
lemma.
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Lemma 2.7. The function wr is invariant under linear equivalence over the domain D(E[r])×
D(E[r]). Hence, the function
wr : E[r]× E[r]→ F∗pk
is bilinear.
Proof. Let D1, D
′
1, D2 ∈ D(E[r]) with D′1 ∼ D1. Applying Lemma 2.6, we obtain













Since wr(D1, D2) = wr(D2, D1)
−1, by symmetry, the function wr : D(E[r])×D(E[r])→
F∗
pk
is invariant under linear equivalence. By Lemma 2.5, the function wr : E[r]×E[r]→ F∗pk
is bilinear. 
2.2.2. Automorphism Weil pairing. The following result is a generalization of
a result by Zhao et al. [91], extending their work to higher embedding degrees. Using
Lemma 2.6 and the presence of an automorphism, we are able to construct a map that is
invariant under linear equivalence. This pairing also supersedes an ate-like variation of the
Weil pairing [92].
Lemma 2.8. Let φ be an automorphism of E and let λ be an integer such that φP = λP
for all P ∈ G1. The function wλ is invariant under linear equivalence over the domain
D(G1)×D(G2). Hence, the function
wλ : G1 ×G2 → F∗pk
is bilinear.
Proof. Let D1, D
′
1 ∈ D(G1) with D1 ∼ D′1 and let D2 ∈ D(G2). Using Lemma 2.6,
we have












where [λ]D2 = [φ
−1]D2 follows from the fact that φQ = λ
−1Q for all Q ∈ G2 [43, Section 6].
Since




Equation (2.1) simplifies to
wλ(D1, D2) = wλ(D
′
1, D2).
Symmetrically, we have for D′2 linearly equivalent to D2 that
wλ(D1, D2) = wλ(D1, D
′
2),
proving the function wλ : D(G1)×D(G2)→ F∗pk is invariant under linear equivalence. By
Lemma 2.5, the function wλ : G1 ×G2 → F∗pk is bilinear. 
For some elliptic curves, there exist automorphisms such that φP = λP and λ is
approximately half the bitlength of r. In this case, wλ can be computed twice as quickly
as wr.
2.3. The Tate pairing
The Tate pairing offers a few additional variants. All Tate pairings have the following
general structure.
Definition 2.10. Let a be an integer. Let D1, D2 ∈ Div0(E). Define τa by
τa(D1, D2) = fa,D1(D2).
Note that τa is not defined everywhere.
In addition, most variants require a final exponentiation to obtain a value that has
order r in F∗
pk
.
2.3.1. Order-r Tate pairing.
Lemma 2.9. The function τ
(pk−1)/r




r : E[r]× E(Fpk)→ F∗pk
is bilinear.
Proof. Let D1, D
′
1 ∈ D(E[r]) be such that D1 ∼ D′1. Let D2 ∈ D(E(Fpk)) be such




























. This proves that we have invariance in the first coordinate.
For the second coordinate, fix D1 ∈ D(E[r]). Let D2, D′2 ∈ D(E(Fpk)) be such that































r : D(E[r])×D(E(Fpk)) is invariant under linear equivalence. By Lemma 2.5,
the function τ
(pk−1)/r
r : E[r]× E(Fpk)→ F∗pk is bilinear. 
2.3.2. Order-p Tate pairing.
Lemma 2.10. [43] The function τp is invariant under linear equivalence over the domain
D(G2)×D(G1). Hence
τp : G2 ×G1 → F∗pk
is bilinear.
Proof. Let D1, D
′
1 ∈ D(G2) be such that D1 ∼ D′1. We have









Let D2 ∈ D(G1) be such that fp,D1 and fp,D′1 are defined at D2. We have that
(hD1,D′1)
p = h[π]D1,[π]D′1 ◦ π
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and since [π]D2 = D2, we obtain











Next, let D1 ∈ D(G2) and let D2, D′2 ∈ D(G1) be such that D2 ∼ D′2 and fp,D1 is defined






















Therefore τp : D(G2)×D(G1)→ F∗pk is invariant under linear equivalence. By Lemma 2.5,
the function τp : G2 ×G1 → F∗pk is bilinear. 
2.3.3. Automorphism Tate pairing.
Lemma 2.11. [46] Let φ be an order-3 automorphism of E and let λ be an integer such




λ+1 · τλ+1([φ]D1, D2)
)(pk−1)/r




λ+1 · τλ+1([φ−1]D1, D2)
)(pk−1)/r
is invariant under linear equivalence over the domain D(G1)×D(G2).
Proof. We have mr = Φ3(λ) = λ
2 + λ + 1 for some integer m, where Φs denotes the
s-th cyclotomic polynomial. Therefore, for all D ∈ D(E[r])





m = τλ(D1, D2)
λ+1 · τλ+1([λ]D1, D2).
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The value [λ]D1 is either [φ]D1 or [φ
−1]D1 depending on the domain. Since τ
(pk−1)/r
r is
invariant under linear equivalence over the domains D(G2)×D(G1) and D(G1)×D(G2),
the result holds. 
The proof of the next result is similar to that of Lemma 2.11 and is omitted.
Lemma 2.12. [46] Let φ be an order-4 automorphism of E and let λ be an integer such




λ · τλ([φ]D1, D2)
)(pk−1)/r




λ · τλ([φ−1]D1, D2)
)(pk−1)/r
is invariant under linear equivalence over the domain D(G1)×D(G2).
Lemma 2.13. [46] Let φ be an order-d automorphism such that d divides k and φP = peP
for all P ∈ G1, where e = k/d. Then τ (p
k−1)/r
pe is invariant under linear equivalence over
the domain D(G1)×D(G2).
Proof. Let D1 ∈ D(G1) and D2 ∈ D(G2). Let m be the integer such that mr = pk−1.
Since φP = peP , we have φQ = p−eQ and so
fr,D1(D2)







































Since τmr = τ
(pk−1)/r
r is invariant under linear equivalence, so is τpe . 
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2.4. Twists
Definition 2.11. Let E, E ′ be elliptic curves defined over Fq. If d is the least positive
integer such that E and E are isomorphic over Fqd , then E ′ is an order-d twist of E.
Lemma 2.14. [43, Proposition 2] If there exists an order-d automorphism of E where d
divides k, then there exists an order-d twist E ′ of E such that
E(Fpk) ∼= E ′(Fpk)
and an isomorphism ψ : E → E ′ such that
ψ(x, y) = (γ2x, γ3y),
where γd ∈ Fpk/d .
Fix an order-d twist ψ : E → E ′. Set G′1 = ψG1, G′2 = ψG2, q = pk/d, and π′ = πk/d.
Next, we give a result which shows that the coordinates of G′2 lie in a smaller field.
Lemma 2.15. [43, Section 5] We can represent the group G′2 as
G′2 = E
′(Fpk/d)[r].
We have a limited number of potential automorphisms to choose from. The following
lemma gives us that the automorphism group order is 1, 2, 3, 4, or 6 for the curves we will
be considering.
Lemma 2.16. [86] If E is an ordinary elliptic curve and Fp has characteristic greater than
3, then the order of the automorphism group of E must divide 4 or 6.
Next, we observe an interesting property of G′1.
Lemma 2.17. The points P ′ ∈ G′1 satisfy Trπ′ P ′ =∞.
Proof. Let P = (x, y) ∈ G1 and let P ′ = ψP . Set φ = ψ−1 ◦ π′ ◦ ψ and notice that
φ(x, y) = (xγ2(q−1), yγ3(q−1)).
Since γd ∈ Fq, we have γ3d(q−1) = 1 and so
φd(x, y) = (xγ2d(q−1), yγ3d(q−1)) = (x, y).
Therefore, φ is an automorphism of E with order dividing d and so φP = qsP for some
integer s. Since r divides qd − 1 = (q − 1)(1 + q + · · ·+ qd−1) but not q − 1, we have that
r divides (1 + q+ · · ·+ qd−1) and so (1 + q+ · · ·+ qd−1)P =∞. Since φ = ψ−1 ◦ π′ ◦ψ, we






















Since qs has order d modulo r, we have

















Using twists, we can view E ′ over Fq as having embedding degree d (with respect to r).
Since G′2 = E
′(Fq)[r] and G′1 ⊆ E ′(Fqd)[r] is such that Trπ′ P ′ =∞ for all P ′ ∈ G′1, we can
apply the Tate pairing results to E ′ as follows. Instead of applying the Tate pairing results
to the tuple (E,Fp, k, G1, G2, π), we can substitute (E ′,Fq, d, G′2, G′1, π′). In particular,
the embedding degree is now d and the roles of G′1, G
′




We apply the results from Section 2.3 to E ′ and the appropriate groups and use ψ
to transfer the results back to E. Costello et al. [27] gave the following relation between
Miller functions with divisors having support in E and Miller functions with divisors having
support in E ′.
Lemma 2.18. Let D1, D2 ∈ D(E(Fpk)) and set D′1 = [ψ]D1, D′2 = [ψ]D2. Then there
exists a d-th root of unity ω such that
fa,D1(D2) = ω · fa,D′1(D
′
2).
Lemma 2.18 immediately gives us twisted variants of Tate and Weil pairings. The
order-r twisted Tate pairing is indistinguishable from the order-r Tate pairing. Similarly,
the twisted Tate automorphism pairing does not give us a new domain. However, the
q-order twisted pairing is of marginal interest.
Lemma 2.19. [27, Theorem 1] The function ω · τq is invariant under linear equivalence
over the domain D(G1)×D(G2), where ω is a fixed d-th root of unity.
Weil-like functions can be proven to be bilinear using twists but no new Weil functions
have been found.
2.5. Evaluation of Miller functions
So far, we have been looking at pairings evaluated at divisors. Now, we will look at the
pairings evaluated at single points.
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2.5.1. Weil pairings. We define a Weil pairing on points as follows.
Definition 2.12. Let H1, H2 be subgroups of E(Fpk). Define wa : H1 ×H2 → F∗pk by




Miller [61] showed that the Weil pairing wr(DP , DQ) can be computed by evaluating
wr(P,Q).
Lemma 2.20. [61, Proposition 8] For all points P , Q ∈ E[r], we have
wr(DP , DQ) = wr(P,Q).
Let φ be an automorphism of E, and let λ be an integer such that λQ = φQ for all
Q ∈ G2. To prove that we can evaluate wλ at points, we give a relation between wλ and
wr and invoke Lemma 2.20.
Lemma 2.21. Let φ be an order-b automorphism of E and let λ be an integer such that
λQ = φQ for all Q ∈ G2. Then for all P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2, we have
wr(DP , DQ)
(λb−1)/r = wλ(DP , DQ)
bλ−1 .
























































Combining Lemma 2.20 with Lemma 2.21, we obtain the following.
Lemma 2.22. Let P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2. Then
wλ(DP , DQ) = wλ(P,Q).
This allows us to evaluate the Weil pairings (Lemmas 2.7 and 2.8) at points instead of
divisors. Next, we give similar results for the Tate pairing.
2.5.2. Tate pairings.
Definition 2.13. Let H1, H2 be subgroups of E(Fpk). Define τa : H1 ×H2 → F∗pk by
τa : (P,Q) 7→ fa,DP (Q).
From the proofs of the Tate pairing lemmas (Lemmas 2.9 and 2.10), we obtain a rela-
tionship between τa over different domains. In particular, we can evaluate fa,DP at points
instead of divisors.
Lemma 2.23. Let D be linearly equivalent to DP , let Q be distinct from P and ∞, and














Since we have derived a relationship between τr and the automorphism Tate pairings
in the proof of Lemma 2.11, we can evaluate all Tate pairings at points instead of divisors,
including twisted Tate pairings.
For P ∈ E(Fpk), define fa,P = fa,DP . Using Lemma 2.1, the function fa,P (Q) can be
computed with the following algorithm. Each iteration of the main loop of this algorithm
is called a Miller operation.
To compute fa,P (Q), we give input f = 1, P , Q, a and ignore the aP result, keeping
only fa,P (Q). The additional inputs and output of Miller’s algorithm will be useful in
future chapters and contribute no additional cost to the computation.
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Algorithm 2.1 (Miller’s Algorithm)
Input: f , P , Q ∈ E(Fpk), a =
∑L
i=0 ai2
i, where ai ∈ {0, 1}.
Output: fa · fa,P (Q), aP .
1. T ←− P .
2. For i from L down to 0 do:
2.1 Let ` be the tangent line to E at T .
2.2 T ←− 2T .
2.3 Let v be the line through T and −T .
2.4 f ←− f 2 · `(Q)/v(Q).
2.5 If ai = 1 and i 6= 0 then
Let ` be the line through T and P .
T ←− T + P ,
Let v be the line through T and −T .
f ←− f · `(Q)/v(Q).
3. Return f , T .
2.5.3. Denominator elimination. For elliptic curves E with even embedding degree
k, there exists a twist E ′ of even order, d. Thus we have G1 = E(Fp)[r] and G2 ∼=
E ′(Fpk/d)[r]. Since G2 ⊆ E(Fpk), performing G2 operations on the twisted curve allows us
to work over the smaller field Fpk/d , saving computation.
Recall that ψ : E → E ′ is computed as ψ(x, y) = (γ2x, γ3y), where γ ∈ Fpk is such
that γd ∈ Fpk/d . Since d is even, we can take γ to be such that γ2 ∈ Fpd/2 . For a point
(x, y) ∈ G2, since γ2x ∈ Fpk/d , we have x ∈ Fpk/d . As first observed in [9], this property
can be used to remove a significant portion of the cost of the Miller function.
The vertical line intersecting P , denoted vP , is such that vP (x, y) = x − xP , where
(xP , yP ) are the coordinates of P . For P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2, we have vP (Q) = xQ − xP . Since
xQ ∈ Fpk/d and xP ∈ Fp, we have that vP (Q) is in a proper subfield of Fpk . This yields the
following result.





Lemma 2.24 allows us to ignore all vertical lines vQ(P ) in pairing computations where
(P,Q) is in G1×G2 or G2×G1, so long as we exponentiate by (pk−1)/Φk(p). Since r divides
pk−1 and for all m < k, the value r does not divide pm−1, we have that r does not divide
(pk − 1)/Φk(p). Hence exponentiation by (pk − 1)/Φk(p) maintains non-degeneracy. The
cost of exponentiating by (pk−1)/Φk(p) is relative low, given that (pk − 1)/Φk(p) expands
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into a polynomial in p with small coefficients and p-th powering is relatively cheap. This
also turns out to be an intermediate step in computing the order-r Tate pairing, which has
a final exponentiation of (pk − 1)/r.
Miller’s algorithm with denominator elimination is given as follows.
Algorithm 2.2 (Miller’s Algorithm with denominator elimination)
Input: f , P ∈ G2, Q ∈ G1, a =
∑L
i=0 ai2
i, where ai ∈ {0, 1}.
Output: (fa · fa,P (Q))(p
k−1)/Φk(p), aP .
1. T ←− P .
2. For i from L down to 0 do:
2.1 Let ` be the tangent line to E at T .
2.2 T ←− 2T .
2.3 f ←− f 2 · `(Q).
2.4 If ai = 1 and i 6= 0 then
Let ` be the line through T and P .
T ←− T + P ,
f ←− f · `(Q).
3. Return f (p
k−1)/Φk(p), T .
2.6. Summary of results
In this section, we summarize the various pairing we have explored.
2.6.1. Weil pairings. Recall that GT is the order-r multiplicative subgroup of F∗pk .
First, we observe that our Weil pairings produce elements in GT .
Lemma 2.25. For all points P , Q ∈ E[r], we have
wr(P,Q) ∈ GT .
Proof. We must show that wr(P,Q) has order dividing r. We have
1 = wr(0, DQ) = wr([r]DP , DQ) = wr(DP , DQ)
r = wr(P,Q),
proving that wr(P,Q) ∈ GT . 
Now, we give our two Weil pairings.
Theorem 2.26. The following is a pairing:





Theorem 2.27. Let λ be an integer such that φQ = λQ for all Q ∈ G2, where φ is an
automorphism of E. Then the following is a pairing:




The previous theorem can also be stated in the domain G2 × G1 but this is only a
superficial difference.
2.6.2. Tate pairings. Similarly, we show that our Tate pairings produce elements in
GT .
Lemma 2.28. For all points P , Q ∈ E[r], we have
τr(P,Q)
(pk−1)/r ∈ GT .
For all points P ∈ G2, Q ∈ G1, we have
τp(P,Q) ∈ GT .
Proof. Since τr(P,Q) ∈ F∗pk , we have τr(P,Q)
(pk−1)/r has order dividing r. We have
1 = τp(0, DQ) = τp([r]DP , DQ) = τp(DP , DQ)
r = τp(P,Q)
r,
proving that τp(P,Q) ∈ GT . 
Theorem 2.29. The following is a pairing:
E[r]× E(Fpk)→ GT : (P,Q) 7→ fr,Q(P )(p
k−1)/r.
Theorem 2.30. For all integers i, the following is a pairing:
τpi : G2 ×G1 → GT : (P,Q) 7→ fpi,Q(P ).
Proof. By Lemma 2.10, we have τp : G2 ×G1 → GT is a pairing. Since












is the product of powers of τp pairings, the result follows. 
Theorem 2.31. Let 3 divide d. Let λ be an integer such that φQ = λQ for all Q ∈ G2,
where φ is an order-d automorphism of E. The following is a pairing:
G2 ×G1 → GT : (P,Q) 7→
(
fλ,Q(P )




Theorem 2.32. Let 4 divide d. Let λ be an integer such that φQ = λQ for all Q ∈ G2,
where φ is an order-d automorphism of E. The following is a pairing:
G2 ×G1 → GT : (P,Q) 7→
(
fλ,Q(P )




Theorem 2.33. Set q = pk/m, where m divides k and m is the order of some automorphism
of E. Let i be an integer. The following is a pairing:
G1 ×G2 → GT : (P,Q) 7→ ω · fqi,Q(P ),
where ω is an m-th root of unity.
The following two theorems actually follow from the Tate pairing results in Section 2.3
but they fit better with twisted pairings, since they share a similar structure and domain.
Theorem 2.34. Let 3 divide d and let λ be such that φQ = λQ for all Q ∈ G2, where φ
is an order-d automorphism of E. The following is a pairing:
G1 ×G2 → GT : (P,Q) 7→
(
fλ,Q(P )
λ+1 · fλ+1,φQ(P )
)(pk−1)/r
.
Theorem 2.35. Let 4 divide d and let λ be such that φQ = λQ for all Q ∈ G2, where φ
is an order-d automorphism of E. The following is a pairing:
G1 ×G2 → GT : (P,Q) 7→
(
fλ,Q(P )






The previous chapter was devoted to proving the bilinearity of the most basic Tate and
Weil pairings. By considering products of powers of these pairings, we are able to obtain
pairings which can be computed more efficiently. For instance, the ate pairing [43] can be
computed more quickly than the order-r Tate pairing.
Lemma 3.1. Let λ ≡ pi (mod r). Then the map τ (p
k−1)/r
λ : G2 ×G1 → GT is a pairing.
Proof. Let D ∈ D(G2). We have λ = pi +mr for some integer r. We have
fλ,D = fpi+mr,D
= fpi,D · fmr,D · g[pi]D,[mr]D
= fpi,D · fmr,D,
where g[pi]D,[mr]D has divisor [p
i]D + [mr]D − [pi +mr]D = 0. Thus,
τλ(P,Q) = τpi(P,Q) · τr(P,Q)m.
Since τ
(pk−1)/r
λ is the product of powers of the pairings τpi and τ
(pk−1)/r
r , the result holds. 
Since p ≡ t − 1 (mod r), where t is the trace of the Frobenius acting on E and t
is approximately half the bitlength of r, the computational cost of computing the Miller
function is reduced by at least half. For all λ ≡ pi (mod r), we have that r divides
Φm(λ) for some m dividing k. Since Φm(x) is irreducible over Z, we have Φm(λ) 6= 0.
Therefore, the bitlength of Φm(λ) is at least log r, and hence the bitlength of λ is at least
log r/ϕ(m) ≥ log r/ϕ(k). This implies that the shortest Miller loop we can hope to obtain
for the ate pairing will have bitlength at least log r/ϕ(k).
In this chapter, we show how to obtain a pairing which can be computed using Miller
functions with bitlength at most log r/ϕ(k).
3.1. Extended Miller functions
For points P , Q on a curve E, define the function `P,Q to be the normalized function
with divisor DP +DQ−DP+Q. Let s be an integer, and let h be a polynomial with integer
32






The extended Miller function is a compact way of describing a certain product of Miller














In order to compute fs,h,Q, we need to compute deg h + 1 Miller functions of bitlength
log |hi|.
3.1.1. Parameterized curves. For families of curves parameterized by z, we can
select a polynomial h so that hi is written in terms of the curve parameter. That is, we
obtain hi = hi(z) as polynomials in z. For these curves, we can break up the computation
of fs,h,Q into lines and Miller functions with bitlength log |z|. The following lemmas give
us an alternative method to compute fs,h,Q for certain values of s, which helps to isolate
the Miller functions from s.

















































Lemma 3.3. Fix P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2. Let s = aq, where q = plcm(k,d)/d and let φ be the degree























First, we observe that
fhi,siP = fhi,aiqiP .
Next, we rewrite fhiqi,aiP in two ways








Since (P,Q) 7→ fqi,aiP (Q) is bilinear, we have
fhiqi,aiP = fhi,aiqiP · f
hi
qi,aiP
= fhi,aiqiP · fqi,aihiP ,
and hence





from which the result follows. 
Next, we discuss how to exploit the parameterization of hi to compute fs,h,Q(P ) or
fs,h,P (Q) using max {deg hi(z)} · log |z| Miller operations and a few extra lines, the number
of additional lines depending on the coefficients of the hi(z)’s.
Lemma 3.4. The Miller functions fz,Q(P ), fz2,Q(P ), . . . , fzm,Q(P ) can be iteratively com-
puted using m log |z| Miller operations.
Proof. In the Miller algorithm (Algorithm 2), we begin with the Miller accumulation
variable, f , initialized to 1 and end with it containing fz,Q(P ). As a side effect, we obtain
zQ from the algorithm. If we initialize the next call to the Miller algorithm with fz,Q(P )
in the Miller accumulation variable evaluating on the points zQ and P , we obtain f zz,Q(P ) ·
fz,zQ(P ) = fz2,Q(P ). Iteratively, we can obtain fz3,Q(P ), . . . , fzm,Q(P ). 
Lemma 3.4 holds symmetrically for computing fz,P (Q), fz2,P (Q), . . . , fzm,P (Q).





with minimal additional computation.




(P ) with little addition computation (depending on the coefficients
of hi(z)).




Lemma 3.6. Set m = max{deg hi(z)}. Given fz,aiP (Q), fz2,aiP (Q), . . . , fzm,aiP (Q), we
can compute f q
i
hi(z),aiP
(Q) with little addition computation (depending on the coefficients
of hi(z)).
3.1.2. Optimal pairing results. The following results show that particular choices
of h give extended Miller functions which can be used for pairings. In Section 3.3, we show
how to obtain polynomials h which are appropriate for efficient computation. The pairings
produced using this method have Miller functions with length approximately r1/ϕ(k). The
pairings are “optimal” insofar as they achieve the r1/ϕ(k) bound.
Theorem 3.7 (Vercauteren [87]). Let h be a polynomial with integer coefficients hi such
that h(p) ≡ 0 (mod r). Then the following is a pairing
(P,Q) 7→ fp,h,Q(P )(p
k−1)/r.
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Proof. Since h(p) ≡ 0 (mod r), we have mr = h(p) for some integer m. Therefore,
























































By Theorems 2.29 and 2.30, the right-hand side is a product of powers of pairings. Hence,
fp,h,Q(P )
(pk−1)/r is a pairing. 
Hess [42] gave a generalization of Vercauteren’s Theorem (Theorem 3.7), applying
a similar result to the twisted-ate and Weil pairings. We present the theorem in less
generality, assuming that the order of the automorphism group, d, divides k, as is the case
for many curves, if not all curves, which have been considered for implementation.
Theorem 3.8 (Hess [42, Theorem 1]). Let h be a polynomial with integer coefficients hi
such that h(q) ≡ 0 (mod r) where q = pk/d. Then the following are pairings:
(P,Q) 7→ fq,h,P (Q)(p
k−1)/r,




Proof. Let m be the integer such that mr = h(q). Then

































By rearranging the terms, we obtain that fq,h,P is the product of powers of fr,P and fqi,P .
By Theorems 2.29 and 2.30, we have that fq,h,P (Q)
(pk−1)/r is the product of powers of
pairings and hence, is a pairing, proving the first part of the theorem.






































is a pairing. Thus, the following is the product of powers of pairings and hence, is itself a
pairing





Although we attribute this theorem to Hess, a less careful reader might claim that
Hess’s theorem only applies in the case where k = d. However, if we take q = pk/d in Hess’s
theorem, we can see that if the curve E over Fp has embedding degree k (with respect to r),
then the curve E over Fq has embedding degree d (with respect to r). Hence, the theorem
can be applied and the field restricted from Fq to Fp to obtain the result of Theorem 3.10.
3.2. Optimal pairings with automorphisms
Let φ be a degree-d automorphism of E. Let λ be an integer such that φQ = λQ for all
Q ∈ G2. The next lemma gives a relation between an extended Miller function involving
λ and other Miller functions.
















Proof. Let m be the integer such that mr = h(pλ). Then

























































and the result follows. 
The next lemma allows us to compute a pairing utilizing automorphisms.
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Lemma 3.10 (Hess [42, Theorem 2]). Let h be a polynomial such that h(pλ) ≡ 0 (mod r).
























Evaluated at P and with the inclusion of the final exponentiation, by Lemma 2.10 the
terms f−hi
pi,φiQ




















































































is a product of Tate, automorphism, and ate pairings respectively. 
The key step in the proof of the previous lemma is the translation of fλi,Q into a
pairing by taking the product of pairings evaluated at different φjQ. Next, we show how
to compute a pairing requiring two (as opposed to d) extended Miller functions.
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Theorem 3.11. Let h be a polynomial such that h(pλ) ≡ 0 (mod r). Let h0, . . . , hm be




λ+1 · fpλ,h,φQ(P ) · `−h(p)φQ,Q (P )
)(pk−1)/r




λ · fpλ,h,φQ(P )
)(pk−1)/r
, if 4 divides d.















Evaluating this at P and with the inclusion of the final exponentiation, the terms of the
form f−hi
pi,φiQ








λ+1 · fλi,φQ(P ) · `φQ,Q(P )
)−hipi)(pk−1)/r
is a pairing. Hence, we consider



















































· fλi,φQ · `φQ,Q
)−hipi
.
From this, it follows that the map
(P,Q) 7→
(




is a product of Tate, ate, and automorphism pairings respectively.
The proof for 4 dividing d is similar. 
We obtain an analogous result for the Weil paring.
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Theorem 3.12. Let h be a polynomial such that h(λ) ≡ 0 (mod r) where λQ=φQ for all
Q ∈ G2 and φ is a degree-d automorphism. Then the following is a pairing
(P,Q) 7→ fλ,h,P (Q)
fλ,h,Q(P )
.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of the previous theorem. 
3.2.1. Computing the action of automorphisms. All elliptic curves E defined
over Fp satisfy the equation
4p− t2 = Df 2
where D is a square-free integer and t is the trace of the p-th power Frobenius. If D = 1,
then there exists an automorphism of order 4. If D = 3, there exists an automorphism of
order 3. Using t and f , we show how to compute a square root of −D modulo r.
Lemma 3.13. Let f be invertible modulo r and such that 4p− t2 = Df 2. Then
(t− 2)/f
is a square root of −D modulo r.
Proof. We have p+1 = hr+ t for some integer h and so p+1 ≡ t (mod r). Therefore








Thus, (t− 2)/f is a square root of −D modulo r. 
We can use this representation of a square root of −D in order to compute the action
of automorphisms on G2.
Lemma 3.14. Let f be invertible modulo r and such that 4p− t2 = Df 2. If D = 1, then





for all Q ∈ G2
Proof. Since (t−2)2/f 2 ≡ −D = −1 (mod r), we have that (t−2)/f is distinct from




≡ (−D)2 = D2 = 1 (mod r),
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we have that (t−2)/f has order 4 modulo r. Since G2 is cyclic and the automorphism group
of E has order 4, there exists an automorphism φ of over 4 which satisfies the lemma. 
Lemma 3.15. Let f be invertible modulo r and such that 4p − t2 = Df 2. If D = 3 and









for all Q ∈ G2




























has order 3 modulo r, G2 is cyclic, and the automorphism group of E has
order 3, there exists an automorphism φ such that the lemma is satisfied. 
3.3. Finding nice polynomials h via Minkowski’s theorem and the LLL
algorithm
In our optimal pairing lemmas, we assumed the existence of polynomials h with cer-
tainly properties. For the moment, we focus on the lemmas which require h such that
h(p) ≡ 0 (mod r). Indeed, many such polynomials are immediately available to us. For
example, we can take h(z) = r, h(z) = z − p, h(z) = z2 − p2, etc. These choices are not
useful, however, since the computational cost of fp,h,Q depends on the magnitude of the co-
efficients of h. Since the property h(p) ≡ 0 (mod r) is preserved under taking integer linear
combinations, we consider linear combinations of h(z) = r, h(z) = z − p, h(z) = z2 − p2,
etc.
The polynomial h(z) = Φk(z) satisfies the conditions and has small coefficients, but
produces only degenerate pairings. Therefore, we restrict ourselves to integer linear com-
binations of h(z) = r and h(z) = zi − pi where the degree of h is less than the degree of




r 0 . . . 0
−p 1 . . . 0
...
. . .
−pϕ(k)−1 0 . . . 1
 .
The correspondence between vectors in the row space of M and polynomials h is the
natural one. Specifically, the vector 〈h0, . . . , hm〉 in the row space of M corresponds to the
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and preserves the property that h(p) ≡ 0 (mod r), since the polynomials corresponding to
the rows of M satisfy this property.
The following theorem gives an upper bound on the smallest magnitude coefficients of
a vector in the row space of M .
Theorem 3.16 (Minkowski’s Theorem [62]). Let M be an n-row integer matrix with
volume v = | detM |. There exists a vector in the row space of M with coordinates having
magnitude at most v1/n.
By Theorem 3.16, there exists a polynomial h of degree less than ϕ(k) with coefficients
whose magnitudes have bitlength less than log r/ϕ(k). When we explore examples with
parameterized curves, we can usually obtain a nice solution manually performing row
operations using Maple. In the case of non-parameterized curves, by using the following
algorithm by Lenstra et al. we can obtain an explicit h.
Theorem 3.17 (The LLL algorithm [53]). Let M be an n-row integer matrix with volume
v = | detM |. We can efficiently compute a vector in the rowspace of M such that the
coordinates have magnitude at most 2(n−1)/4 · v1/n.
The LLL algorithm actually produces a basis of the row space such that the product
of the norms of the basis elements is less than 2n(n−1)/4 · v. It follows that there exists a
basis element with norm at most 2(n−1)/4 · v1/n and hence the coordinates have magnitude
at most 2(n−1)/4 · v1/n.
3.4. Examples
In this section, we use Minkowski’s Theorem to illustrate the optimal pairing results
for parameterized elliptic curves.
3.4.1. BN curves. BN curves [10] have embedding degree k = 12 and are parame-
terized by z such that
r = r(z) = 36z4 + 36z3 + 18z2 + 6z + 1
p = p(z) = 36z4 + 36z3 + 24z2 + 6z + 1
are both prime.
43
To construct an optimal Tate pairing using Theorem 3.7, we need to determine a
polynomial h such that h(p) ≡ 0 (mod r). Elements in the rowspace of the following
matrix give us such polynomials
M =

r(z) 0 0 0
−p(z) 1 0 0
−p(z)2 0 1 0
−p(z)3 0 0 1
 .
The coefficients of the polynomial h will be polynomials in z. By Minkowski’s Theorem, we
hope to find h with coefficients having degree at most 1 in xz, since deg r/ϕ(k) = 4/4 = 1.
As a first step, we substitute the polynomials p and r and reduce the last three entries in
the first column modulo r. This corresponds to integer row operations and yields
36z4 + 36z3 + 18z2 + 6z + 1 0 0 0
−6z2 1 0 0
36z3 + 18z2 + 6z + 1 0 1 0
36z3 + 24z2 + 12z + 3 0 0 1
 .
Next, we add Z[z]-multiples of rows with smaller degrees in the first column to those with
larger degrees. For example, we can subtract row 3 from row 4 and subtract the x-multiple
of row 3 from row 1 to obtain
18z3 + 12z2 + 5z + 1 0 0 0
−6z2 1 0 0
36z3 + 18z2 + 6z + 1 0 1 0
6z2 + 6z + 2 0 −1 1
 .
Continuing this process, we obtain a matrix with only linear entries
M̂ =

−z 2z 2z + 1 −z
2z z + 1 −z z
−1 2z + 1 1 2z
2z + 1 0 2z 1
 .
The rows of the reduced matrix M̂ correspond to the following polynomials
x 7→ (−z) + (2z)x + (2z + 1)x2 + (−z)x3
x 7→ (2z) + (z + 1)x + (−z)x2 + (z)x3
x 7→ (−1) + (2z + 1)x + (1)x2 + (2z)x3
x 7→ (2z + 1) + (0)x + (2z)x2 + (1)x3.
The fourth polynomial seems like a good choice, since is has a coefficient of 0 on the
x term. Let h(x) be this polynomial. Using Lemma 3.2, we can write the corresponding
extended Miller function as follows:




1,Q · `(2z+1)Q,2zp2Q · `(2z+1+2zp2)Q,p3Q.
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At first, it appears as though we need to compute two Miller loops of lengths 2z + 1 and
2z. However, we can use Lemma 3.5 to reduce the equation to one Miller function and a
few extra lines. Under the equivalence induced by the final exponentiation we obtain
`(2z+1+2zp2)Q,p3Q = `(h(p)−p3)Q,p3Q = `−p3Q,p3Q = vp3Q ≡ 1.
Also, we observe that f1,p3Q = 1. From these observations, we can compute the pairing as




1,Q · `(2z+1)Q,2zp2Q · `(2z+1+2zp2)Q,p3Q





2z,Q · `2zQ,Q · `(2z+1)Q,2zπ2Q.
This completes a construction of an optimal Tate pairing for BN curves.
Next, we construct an optimal Weil pairing using Theorem 3.12. We expect to find
a polynomial h with coefficients having degree deg r/2 = 2 such that h(p2) ≡ 0 (mod r).
After finding such a polynomial, we will construct not only an optimal Weil pairing but
an optimal twisted pairing as well.








36z4 + 36z3 + 18z2 + 6z + 1 0




18z3 + 12z2 + 5z + 1 −z




18z3 + 12z2 + 5z + 1 −z




2z + 1 6z2 + 2z
−6z2 − 4z − 1 2z + 1
]
.
All entries in the reduced matrix M have degree-in-z at most 2 but the first row has
fewer terms. Set h(x) = (2z+1)+(6z2 +2z)x and observe that we can ignore the following
line:
`(2z+1)Q,(6z2+2z)p2Q = `(2z+1)Q,−(2z+1)Q = v(2z+1)Q.
From Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3, we have
fp2,h,P ≡ f2z+1,P · fp
2
6z2+2z,P




This gives us the pairing
(P,Q) 7→
f2z+1,P (Q) · f6z2+2z,P (Q)p
2
f2z+1,Q(P ) · f6z2+2z,Q(P )p2
.(3.1)
From Lemma 3.5, we are able to compute f2z,Q as an intermediate step in computing
f6z2,Q allowing us to effectively compute fp2,h,Q using a Miller function of length 6z
2 and a
few extra lines. Similarly, we can compute f2z,P as an intermediate step of computing f6z2,P
by Lemma 3.6. Therefore, we can compute f2z,P , f2z,Q, f6z2,P , f6z2,Q using approximately
2 log z Miller operations and using these values, we can perform the following computations
fp2,h,P ≡ f2z+1,P · fp
2
6z2+2z,P
















6z2,Q · `2zQ,Q · `
p2
6z2Q,2zQ.





)p2+1( f6z2,P (Q) · `6z2P,2zP (Q)





The numerators of this optimal Weil pairing along with the final exponentiation, give





2z,P (Q) · f
p2





3.4.2. BLS-12 curves. BLS-12 curves [8] (see also [19]) have embedding degree k =
12 and are parameterized by z such that
r = r(z) = z4 − z2 + 1,
p = p(z) =
1
3
(z − 1)2(z4 − z2 + 1) + z,
are both prime.
The curve has order #E(Fp) = (z − 1)2(z4 − z2 + 1)/3 and hence the trace of the p-th
power Frobenius is t(z) = z+1. From Minkowski’s theorem, we expect we could determine
an h with coefficients which are linear in z. Since the ate pairing with z ≡ p (mod r) has
Miller length z, we have already achieved this bound. Thus, we need not bother with the
optimal pairing framework to derive an optimal Tate pairing. Similarly, we have z2 ≡ pk/d
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(mod r) and thus the optimal Weil and twisted pairings don’t need to be considered. We
give all three pairings explicitly:
(P,Q) 7→ fz,Q(P )(p
k−1)/r






3.4.3. KSS-18 curves. KSS-18 curves [47] have embedding degree k = 18 and are
parameterized by z such that
r = r(z) = (z6 + 37z3 + 343)/343,
p = p(z) = (z8 + 5z7 + 7z6 + 37z5 + 188z4 + 259z3 + 343z2 + 1763z + 2401)/21,
are both prime.
The parameters of this family of curves give us potentially much more complicated
values for h. We begin by reducing the matrix M :
M =

r(z) 0 0 0 0 0
−p(z) 1 0 0 0 0
−p(z)2 0 1 0 0 0
−p(z)3 0 0 1 0 0
−p(z)4 0 0 0 1 0
−p(z)5 0 0 0 0 1
 ≡

(z6 + 37z3 + 343)/343 0 0 0 0 0
(−z4 − 16z)/7 1 0 0 0 0
(5z5 + 87z2)/49 0 1 0 0 0
z3 + 18 0 0 1 0 0
(−3z4 − 55z)/7 0 0 0 1 0
(8z5 + 149z2)/49 0 0 0 0 1
 .
We notice that all of the entries in the first column have (integer) denominators. This is a
side effect of the curve construction. We have already restricted ourselves to parameters z
such that r(z), p(z) are prime and as a result, the first column will always take on integer
values for these values of z. Hence, the denominators will not pose a problem as long as
we keep to integer linear combinations.
Eventually, we obtain the vector
〈z, 3, 0, 0,−1, 0〉
which corresponds to the polynomial h(x) = z + 3x− x4. We may compute fp,h,Q as
fp,h,Q = fz,Q · fp3,Q · `zQ,(3p−p4)Q · `3pQ,−p4Q.
Since `zQ,(3p−p4)Q = `zQ,−zQ = vzQ, it will be eliminated by the final exponentiation. There-
fore, the following is an optimal Tate pairing
(P,Q) 7→ (fz,Q(P ) · fp3,Q(P ) · `3πQ,−π4Q(P ))
(pk−1)/r.
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Next, we turn our attention to optimal Weil pairings. Since p3 ≡ z3 + 18 (mod r),
the optimal pairing framework is not needed, since the following Weil pairing meets the





3.4.4. SB-6 curves. SB-6 curves [81] have embedding degree k = 6. We wish to
restrict ourselves to the subset of the curves possessing an automorphism of order d = 4.
The subset of curves with order-4 automorphisms is parameterized by z such that
r = r(z) = 16z8 − 32z6 + 12z4 + 4z2 + 1,
p = p(z) = 4z10 − 8z8 + 3z6 − 3z4 + 17
4
z2 + 1,
are both prime. SB-6 curves are the first example we have encountered where d does not
divide k. Hence, we will illustrate the utility of some of the automorphism-related optimal
pairing results.
Since p ≡ −4z4 + 4z2 + 1 (mod r), the following ate pairing meets the optimal pairing
bound
(P,Q) 7→ f−4z4+4z2+1,Q(P )(p
k−1)/r.
Next, we leverage automorphisms in our pairing computation. Since
4p(z)− t(z)2 = (4z5 − 6z3 + z)2,
we have, by Lemma 3.14, that
t(z)− 2
4z5 − 6z3 + z
≡ 8z7 − 12z5 + 2z3 + 2z (mod r(z))
is the action of some order-4 automorphism φ on G2.
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Setting λ = 8z7− 12z5 + 2z3 + 2z, we construct the following lattice and reduce it until
we obtain a vector meeting the Minkowski bound:
M =

r(z) 0 0 0
−p(z)λ(z) 1 0 0
−p(z)2λ(z)2 0 1 0




16z8 − 32z6 + 12z4 + 4z2 + 1 0 0 0
−8z7 + 16z5 − 8z3 − z 1 0 0
−4z4 − 4z2 0 1 0




−2z2 + 1 2z −1 0
−2z 2z2 0 −2z2 + 1
2z2 −2z −2z2 + 1 2z
0 2z2 − 1 −2z 1
 .
The first row looks good enough. So we take h(x) = (−2z2 + 1) + (2z)x − x2 and apply




λ · fpλ,h,φQ(P )
)(pk−1)/r
.








16z8 − 32z6 + 12z4 + 4z2 + 1 0




4z4 − 6z2 + 1 −4z3 + 4z
4z3 − 4z 4z4 − 6z2 + 1
]
.
Setting h(x) = (4z4 − 6z2 + 1) + (−4z3 + 4z)x and applying Theorem 3.12, we obtain
the following Weil pairing
(P,Q) 7→ fλ,h,P (Q)
fλ,h,Q(P )
.
3.4.5. BLS-8 curves. BLS-8 curves [8] have embedding degree k = 8 and an auto-
morphism of order d = 3. These curves are parameterized by z such that
r = r(z) = z8 − z4 + 1,
p = p(z) =
1
3
(z − 1)2(z8 − z4 + 1) + z9,
are both prime. These curves are such that d does not divide k.
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To construct an optimal pairing, we reduce the following lattice
M =

r(z) 0 0 0
−p(z) 1 0 0
−p(z)2 0 1 0
−p(z)3 0 0 1
 ≡

z8 − z4 + 1 0 0 0
−z5 + z 1 0 0
z6 0 1 0
−z3 0 0 1
 ≡

1 0 −z2 −z
z 1 0 −z2
z2 z 1 0
0 z2 z 1
 .
The third row looks promising, so we set h(x) = (z2) + (z)x+ x2 and obtain the following
optimal pairing
(P,Q) 7→ fp,h,Q(P )(p
k−1)/r.
Now, we show how to use automorphisms to reduce the Miller loop length. We have




(z2 + z − 1)(z3 + z2 + 1)
)2
.





(z2 + z − 1)(z3 + z2 + 1)/3
)
≡ z4 (mod r(z)).





λ+1 · fpλ,h,φQ(P ) · `−h(p)φQ,Q (P )
)(pk−1)/r
.
To obtain an optimal Weil pairing using automorphisms, we set h(z) = (x4) − z and
apply Theorem 3.12 to obtain the following Weil pairing:
(P,Q) 7→ fλ,h,P (Q)
fλ,h,Q(P )
.
3.5. Summary of optimal pairing results
Theorem 3.18 (Optimal Tate). There exists a polynomial h of degree ϕ(k) with coeffi-
cients hi such that |hi| ≤ r1/ϕ(k) and the following is a pairing
(P,Q) 7→ fp,h,Q(P )(p
k−1)/r.
Theorem 3.19 (Optimal Weil and twisted ate). There exists a polynomial h of degree
ϕ(d) ∈ {1, 2} with coefficients hi such that |hi| ≤ r1/ϕ(d) and the following are pairings
(P,Q) 7→ fq,h,P (Q)(p
k−1)/r,




Theorem 3.20 (Optimal Tate with automorphisms). Let 3 (or 4) divide d and 3 (respectively
4) not divide k. There exists a polynomial h of degree 2ϕ(k) with coefficients hi such that









Theorem 3.21 (Optimal Weil with automorphisms). Let φ be a degree-d automorphism
of E and λ be such that λQ = φQ for all Q ∈ G2. There exists a polynomial h of degree
ϕ(d) ∈ {1, 2} with coefficients hi such that |hi| ≤ r1/ϕ(d) and the following is a pairing
(P,Q) 7→ fλ,h,P (Q)
fλ,h,Q(P )
.
Theorem 3.22 (Improved optimal Tate with automorphisms). Let 3 (or 4) divide d and
3 (respectively 4) not divide k. Let φ be a degree-d automorphism of E and λ be such
that λQ = φQ for all Q ∈ G2. Then there exists a polynomial h of degree 2ϕ(k) with




λ+1 · fpλ,h,φQ(P ) · `−h(p)φQ,Q (P )
)(pk−1)/r




λ · fpλ,h,φQ(P )
)(pk−1)/r
, if 4 divides d.
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CHAPTER 4
Parallel Implementation of Pairings
In this chapter, we continue the work initiated by Grabher, Großschädl and Page [38]
on implementing pairings on multi-core platforms. This work is especially challenging for
asymmetric pairings because of the apparent paucity of opportunities available for par-
allelizing Miller’s basic algorithm. In particular, it seems hopeless to expect the optimal
2-fold speedup for known algorithms when going from 1 core to 2 cores on existing com-
puting platforms. Furthermore, effective usage of parallel computation resources depends
on expensive operating system calls for thread creation and synchronization and on the
relative immaturity of development tools such as compilers, profilers, and debuggers. Con-
current programming is difficult in general, due to the fundamentally nondeterministic
nature of the multi-threading programming model [52], but it becomes even harder when
the computational cost of what is being computed is not several orders of magnitude higher
than the parallelization overhead itself.
We focus our attention on the fastest-known asymmetric pairing at the 128-bit security
level, namely Vercauteren’s optimal ate pairing over BN elliptic curves (Section 3.4.1). We
exploit a method introduced in [3] for parallelizing a Miller function evaluation and a new
‘delayed squaring’ technique. Our implementation is about 1.23 times faster using two
cores of an Intel Core i5 or Core i7 machine, and 1.45 times faster using 4 cores of the
Core i7 than the state-of-the-art implementation on a single core [2]. We observe that the
straightforward methods for parallelizing extension field multiplication that were deemed
effective in [38] fail on the platforms under consideration because our field multiplication
is much faster, whereas the cost of managing the resulting threads dominates the cost of
useful computation.
The limited success in parallelizing the optimal ate pairing on BN curves is due in part
to the apparent difficulty in parallelizing the final exponentiation. This motivated us to
consider the Weil pairing, whose potential speed advantages over the Tate pairing due to
the absence of a final exponentiation in the former were first considered in [50]. We study
two optimal Weil pairings, both of which can be computed using the equivalent of four
independent Miller functions each having optimal length, and without an expensive final
exponentiation. The first pairing is the Weil pairing instantiation we gave in Section 3.4.1
of Hess’s general Weil pairing construction [42], while the second pairing is an elegant new
construction tailored for parallel execution. These pairings are faster than previous variants
of the Weil pairing proposed in [92] and [42]. Our experimental results suggest that the
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new Weil pairing is 1.25 times faster than the optimal ate pairing on 8-core extensions of
the Intel Core i5 and Core i7 machines.
We emphasize that our implementations are for a single pairing evaluation on multiple
cores. If a protocol requires multiple pairing evaluations, the best strategy may be to simply
execute each pairing on a single core of a multi-core platform — the optimal strategy
depends on several factors including the number of available cores. Thus, our work is
primarily directed at protocols that require a single pairing evaluation in applications that
have stringent response time requirements or where the processing power of individual
cores in a multi-core platform is low. Some examples of protocols that require a single
pairing evaluation are the encryption and decryption procedures in the Boneh-Franklin
identity-based encryption scheme (Section 1.1.3), signature verification in the Boneh-Boyen
short signature scheme (Section 1.3.1), and Scott’s identity-based key agreement scheme
(Section 1.3.2).
4.1. Parallelizing the optimal ate pairing
This section shows how the Miller function fs,R in the optimal ate pairing can be split
into shorter Miller functions, which can then be computed on separate cores. We shall as-
sume that all Miller functions and line functions are normalized. Equations involving Miller
and line functions hold up to multiplication by nonzero constants. Recall the following two
properties of Miller functions.
Lemma 4.1 (Miller [61]). Let a and b be non-negative integers, and let R ∈ E(Fqk). Then
(i) fa+b,R = fa,R · fb,R · `aR,bR; and
(ii) fab,R = f
a
b,R · fa,bR.
The method of [3] for parallelizing the computation of a Miller function fs,R is the
following. We first write s = 2ws1 + s0, where s0 < 2
w. Applying Lemma 4.1, we obtain
(4.1) fs,R = f
2w
s1,R




If s0 is small, then the Miller function fs0,R can be computed relatively cheaply. Thus the
computation of fs,R can be parallelized by computing f
2w
s1,R
on one processor and f2w,s1R on
a second processor. The parameter w should be carefully selected in order to balance the
time of the two function computations. The relevant criteria for selecting w include the
Hamming weight of s1 (which determines the number of additions in the Miller loop for
the first function), and the cost of the w-fold squaring in the first function relative to the








(recall that exponentiation by (p6− 1)(p2 + 1) is the easy part of the final exponentiation),
followed by α2
w
. The advantage of this ‘delayed squaring’ trick is that α belongs to the
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order-(p4 − p2 + 1) cyclotomic subgroup of F∗p12 whence Karabina’s squaring method [48]
(see also [39]) can be deployed at a cost of 12 Fp multiplications plus some small overhead
— this is considerably less than squaring a general element in Fp12 which costs 24 Fp
multiplications.
Each of the two expensive Miller function computations in (4.1) can be recursively
parallelized. For this purpose, one writes
s = st2
wt + · · ·+ s22w2 + s12w1 + s0,
where
si2
wi = (s mod 2wi+1)− (s mod 2wi)
for some wt > · · · > w2 > w1 > w0 = 0.
Remark 4.1. We were unable to find any effective method for parallelizing the hard part
of the final exponentiation. The exponent (p4− p2 + 1)/r can be decomposed into a multi-




where α ∈ Fp12 and
z is the BN parameter [84]. However, the extremely low Hamming weight of z limits the
potential for parallelization. Furthermore, techniques that exploit very fast squaring (e.g.,
[89]) and fixed bases (e.g., [55]) are not applicable.
4.2. Optimal Weil pairings
This section presents two Weil pairings, called the α (Section 4.2.1) and β (Section 4.2.2)
pairings, that are well suited for parallelization. In this section, E is a BN curve defined
over Fp with BN parameter z. Unless otherwise stated, all functions are assumed to be
normalized. By a ‘pairing’ we will mean a non-degenerate bilinear pairing from G1×G2 to
GT . Note that if e is a pairing and gcd(`, r) = 1, then e
` is also a pairing. It is understood
that pairing values are defined to be 1 if either input point is equal to ∞.
The classical Weil pairing (Section 2.5.1) is wr : G1 ×G2 → GT defined by




Note that the Weil pairing does not have a final exponentiation. The two Miller functions
in (4.2) each have length approximately z4 and can be independently computed on two
processors.
4.2.1. The α Weil pairing. Recall our construction from Section 3.4.1 (Equation 3.1),
which produced the following pairing over G1 ×G2












The exponentiation by (p6−1)(p2+1) provides us with several advantages. In particular,
the four Miller functions in (4.3) only need to be semi-normalized and the important
denominator elimination speedup can be applied (see Section 2.5.3). Furthermore, the
delayed squaring technique of Section 4.1 can be employed as described below. In order
to shorten the length of the Miller functions fp
2
6z2+2z,R for R ∈ {P,Q} in (4.3), we can use
Lemma 4.1(ii) to write
f6z2+2z,R = fz,(6z+2)R · f z6z+2,R.
Thus, we obtain the following alternate formulation of the α pairing:





fz,(6z+2)P (Q) · f z6z+2,P (Q)
fz,(6z+2)Q(P ) · f z6z+2,Q(P )
)p2(p6−1)(p2+1) .
The revised formula for the α pairing now has six Miller functions, and it may ap-
pear that at least six processors would be necessary to effectively parallelize the pairing.
However, if fz,R is computed first, then f2z+1,R and f6z+2,R can be computed thereafter
with little additional work. Thus, there are effectively only four Miller functions in (4.4).
Each of these Miller functions has length approximately z, and therefore the α pairing is
considered optimal in the sense of Vercauteren (cf. Theorem 3.7).
Figure 4.1 illustrates the execution path when the four Miller functions in (4.4) are
computed in parallel using four processors. A further optimization is to raise the Miller
functions to the power (p6 − 1)(p2 + 1) as soon as they are computed — this enables the
use of Karabina’s fast squaring when computing f z6z+2,P (Q) and f
z
6z+2,Q(P ). Note also that
since
(6z + 2) + p− p2 + p3 ≡ 0 (mod r),
we have
(6z + 2)Q = −π(Q) + π2(Q)− π3(Q)
and thus (6z + 2)Q can be computed very quickly. The fourth processor in Figure 4.1 is
the bottleneck because of the exponentiation by z.
f6z+2,Q(P ) f
z
6z+2,Q(P ) f2z+1,Q(P ) · fzp
2
6z+2,Q(P )
1. (6z + 2)P
2. f2z+1,P (Q) f6z+2,P (Q) f
z


















Figure 4.1. Execution path for computing the α pairing on 4 processors.
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4.2.2. The β Weil pairing. Next, we present the β Weil pairing, which can be
computed more quickly than the α pairing, since it avoids part of the exponentiation.
Consider the polynomial used in the optimal ate pairing construction given by Vercauteren
[87],
h(x) = (6z + 2) + x− x2 + x3.
Since h(p) ≡ 0 (mod r), there exists an integer m such that h(p) = rm. By Theorem 3.7,
we have
(4.5) f−1p,h,R = f
−m














We use this h polynomial to construct a new variant of the Weil pairing, given by the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. For h(x) = (6z + 2) + x− x2 + x3, the map β′ : G1 ×G2 → GT defined by







is a pairing, where w ∈ Fp is some sixth root of unity.
Proof. For simplicity, multiplicative factors that are sixth roots of unity will be omit-
ted in the proof. For y ∈ {r, p, p2, p3}, define the functions






on G1 ×G2. Since
f−1p,h,P = f
−m
r,P · fp,P · f
−1
p2,P · fp3,P ,
it follows that
β′(P,Q)−1 = γr(P,Q)
−m · γp(P,Q) · γp2(P,Q)−1 · γp3(P,Q)
for all (P,Q) ∈ G1 ×G2. The conclusion that β′ is a pairing immediately follows if it can
be shown that γr, γp, γp2 and γp3 are pairings.
Now,






are, respectively, the classic Weil pairing (Theorem 2.26) and Hess’s optimal Weil pairing
(Theorem 3.10). It follows that γr and γp2 are also pairings.
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Using the facts that fp2,R = f
p
p,R · fp,pR (Lemma 4.1(ii)) and that (P,Q) 7→ fp,Q(P ) is a
















and hence γp is a pairing.
Finally, since (P,Q) 7→ fp2,Q(P ) is a pairing (Theorem 2.27) and the fact that fp3,R =
fp
2
p,R · fp2,pR, one can check that
γp3(P,Q) = γp(P,Q)
p2 · γp2(pP,Q).
Hence γp3 is a pairing. 2 
Remark 4.2. The proof of Theorem 4.2 can easily be modified for all polynomials h(x) ∈
Z[x] that satisfy h(p) ≡ 0 (mod r).
Since 6 | p6 − 1 and r - (p6 − 1)(p2 + 1), the map β : G1 ×G2 → GT defined by
(4.8) β = (β′)(p








is also a pairing. Since each extended Miller function in (4.8) is essentially a Miller function
of length approximately z (see (4.6)), the β pairing is considered optimal. As was the case
with the α pairing, the exponentiation by (p6 − 1)(p2 + 1) means that the four extended
Miller functions in (4.8) only need to be semi-normalized and denominator elimination can
be applied. Moreover, the vertical lines v(p−p2+p3)R, v(−p2+p3)R, f−1,p2R and `(6z+2)R,(p−p2+p3)R
for R ∈ {P, pP,Q} in (4.6) can be ignored. Once pP has been computed, the remaining
line functions `pR,(−p2+p3)R and `−p2R,p3R for R ∈ {P, pP,Q} can be computed at very little
additional cost since p2P = φ(P ), p3P = φ(pP ), and pQ = π(Q). Furthermore, the
delayed squaring technique of Section 4.1 can be employed if the extended Miller functions
are divided using (4.1).
Figure 4.2 illustrates the execution path when the 4 extended Miller functions in (4.8)
are computed in parallel using 4 processors. The fourth processor is the bottleneck, and
thus it is desirable to accelerate the computation of pP . To this effect, we observe that
p ≡ 2z(p2 − 2) + p2 − 1 (mod r),
whence
(4.9) pP = 2z(p2 − 2)P + p2P − P = 2z(φ(P )− 2P ) + φ(P )− P.








fp6z+2,Q(P ) · f6z+2,Q(pP )





Figure 4.2. Execution path for computing the β pairing on 4 processors.
4.3. Parallel implementation of the BN pairings
The parallelization approaches described in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 were imple-
mented on top of the state-of-the-art implementation of an optimal ate pairing at the
128-bit security level described in [2]. The underlying elliptic curve is a BN curve with
parameter z = −(262 + 255 + 1) [70].
Let N denote the number of available processors on the target platform. To select
parameters (wN−1, . . . , w2, w1, w0) that split the Miller loop, we employ the load balancing
scheme suggested in [3] with fine granularity, taking into account the relative cost of inver-
sions, multiplications, squarings, additions and modular reductions on the target platform.
The following parameters wi for splitting the Miller loop were selected for the optimal ate
pairing:
without delayed squaring
2 cores 30, 0
4 cores 46, 28, 12, 0
8 cores 54, 42, 32, 24, 16, 9, 4, 0
with delayed squaring
2 cores 35, 0
4 cores 52, 37, 19, 0
8 cores 61, 56, 49, 42, 33, 23, 12, 0
With the optimal parameters determined, elementary operation counting makes it possible
to estimate the performance improvement of the corresponding implementation. Figure 4.3
presents the estimated speedups for the parallelization approaches discussed in this work in
comparison with the optimal ate serial implementation of [2]. Notice how the performance
of the α and β Weil pairings scales better with the number of processing cores. Scaling
stills suffers from the same saturation effect experienced by the ate pairing variants, but
at a higher number of cores.
The parallel implementation was realized on platforms — a 2-core Intel Core i5 West-
mere 540M 32nm 2.53GHz machine (“Platform 1”) and a 4-core Intel Core i7 Sandy Bridge
2630QM 32nm 2.0GHz machine (“Platform 2”), using GCC v4.6.0 as compiler with op-
timization flags -O3 -funroll-loops. Parallel sections were implemented through the





















Figure 4.3. Estimated speedups for parallelization techniques for BN
pairings. Speedups are computed in relation to a serial implementation of
the optimal ate pairing.
machines, as they have similar field operation costs. Table 4.1 presents the experimental
results, including both the speedups estimated by operation counting and actual timings.
For the optimal ate pairing, the table confirms that delayed squaring yields a slightly better
scaling, and that the increase in overall speedup starts to stagnate at eight cores. Even
with these obstacles, the pairing latency of the optimal ate pairing is reduced by 18-20%
when using two processor cores, a significant improvement over the 10% reported as a
preliminary result for the R-ate pairing in [3]. The measured timings are compatible with
the estimated speedups — the differences are due to the parallelization overheads that are
not accounted for in the model for speedup estimation. The gap between the estimated
and measured timings increases with the number of cores due to the linear increase in
overhead.
The performance of the β Weil pairing is generally superior to the α Weil pairing due
to the difference in the cost of computing zP in the former and an exponentiation by
z in the cyclotomic subgroup in the latter (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). It is important to
observe that since the β pairing is tailored for parallel execution, any future improvements
in the parallelization of the Miller loop in the optimal ate variants can be directly applied
to the β pairing. In the columns of Table 4.1 marked with (*), we present estimates
for machines with higher numbers of cores. These estimates were obtained by running
multiples threads per core and then measuring the cost of the most expensive thread.
This serves as an accurate prediction of performance scaling in future machines, assuming
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Number of threads
Estimated speedup 1 2 4 8
Optimal ate 1.00 1.24 1.40 1.48
Optimal ate with delayed squaring 1.00 1.27 1.47 1.58
α Weil 0.43 0.80 1.33 1.84
β Weil 0.44 0.86 1.48 2.05
Platform 1: Intel Core i5 Nehalem 32nm 1 2 4* 8*
Optimal ate – latency 2038 1682 1513 1453
Optimal ate – speedup 1.00 1.21 1.35 1.40
Optimal ate with delayed squaring – latency – 1655 1435 1389
Optimal ate with delayed squaring – speedup – 1.23 1.42 1.47
α Weil – latency – – 1590 1214
α Weil – speedup – – 1.28 1.68
β Weil – latency – – 1481 1104
β Weil – speedup – – 1.38 1.84
Platform 2: Intel Core i7 Sandy Bridge 32nm 1 2 4 8*
Optimal ate – latency 1562 1287 1137 1107
Optimal ate – speedup 1.00 1.21 1.37 1.41
Optimal ate with delayed squaring – latency – 1260 1080 1056
Optimal ate with delayed squaring – speedup – 1.24 1.45 1.48
α Weil – latency – – 1272 936
α Weil – speedup – – 1.23 1.67
β Weil – latency – – 1104 840
β Weil – speedup – – 1.41 1.86
Table 4.1. Experimental results for serial/parallel executions of BN pair-
ings. Times are presented in thousands of clock cycles and the speedups
are computed as the ratio of the execution time of serial and parallel imple-
mentations. The dashes represent data points where there is no expected
improvement over the serial implementation. The columns marked with (*)
present estimates based on per-thread data. Timings were obtained with
the Turbo Boost feature turned off, and therefore are compatible with the
timings in Table 4 of the extended version of [2].
that critical platform characteristics such as the memory organization and multi-threading




Efficient realizations of the Tate pairing have been intensively pursued in recent years.
Using different strategies, that research effort has produced several remarkable algorithm
improvements that include: construction of pairing-friendly elliptic curves with prescribed
embedding degree [10, 31, 63], decreases of the Miller loop length [7, 42, 43, 87], and
reductions in the associated towering field arithmetic costs [29, 39, 48, 50]. With the
increase in efficiency of the Miller loop calculation, the final exponentiation step has be-
come more of a computational bottleneck. Several research works have reported more
refined methods for computing the final exponentiation on pairings defined over ordinary
elliptic curves [29, 40, 84]. In particular, the results by Scott et al. [84] represent the
current state-of-the-art in this topic, as can be verified from the fact that most recent
implementations of pairings (see for example [2, 14]) have obtained significant accelera-
tions by computing the final exponentiation according to the vectorial addition chain based
method described in that work.
In this chapter, we offer improvements in the final exponentiation step of pairing com-
putation. We draw on the methods that Vercauteren (Section 3.1.2) employed to reduce
the cost of the Miller function. Our results for the final exponentiation reduce the cost
by a fixed number of operations in several curves, a modest but measurable improvement.
Nonetheless, the techniques we use can be applied to increase the speed of hashing as well
(see Chapter 6), saving a fixed number of point additions and doublings for some curves.
5.1. A lattice-based method for efficient final exponentiation
The exponent e = (pk − 1)/r in the final exponentiation of the Tate pairing can be
broken into two parts by
(pk − 1)/r = [(pk − 1)/Φk(p)] · [Φk(p)/r],
where Φk(z) denotes the k-th cyclotomic polynomial [50]. Computing the map
f 7→ f (pk−1)/Φk(p)
is relatively inexpensive, costing only a few multiplications, inversions, and very cheap p-th
powerings in Fpk . Raising to the power d = Φk(p)/r is considered more difficult.
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Observing that p-th powering is much less expensive than multiplication, Scott et al.
[84] give a systematic method for reducing the expense of exponentiating by d. They
showed that by writing d = Φk(p)/r in base p as
d = d0 + d1p+ · · ·+ dϕ(k)−1pϕ(k)−1,
one can find short vectorial addition chains to compute f 7→ fd much more efficiently
than the naive method. For parameterized curves, more concrete results can be given. For
instance, BN curves are constructed over a prime field Fp, where p is a large prime number
that can be parameterized as a fourth-degree polynomial p = p(z), z ∈ Z. The result











along with a short sequence of products. By choosing the parameter z ∈ Z to have low
hamming weight, the total cost of computing f 7→ fd is 3
4
log p field squarings plus a small
fixed number of field multiplications and squarings.
Using the fact that a fixed power of a pairing is also a pairing, it suffices to raise to the
power of any multiple d′ of d, with r not dividing d′. Based on this observation, we present
a lattice-based method for determining d′ such that f 7→ fd′ can be computed at least as
efficiently as f 7→ fd. For BN and several other curves, explicit d′ polynomials yielding
more efficient final exponentiation computations are reported. However, it is noted that
the main bottleneck remains, namely the exponentiation by powers of z.
In the case of parameterized curves, the key to finding suitable polynomials d′ is to
consider Q[z]-multiples of d(z). Specifically, we consider Q-linear combinations of d(z),
zd(z), . . . , zdeg r−1d(z). To see why this set of multiples of d(z) suffices, consider f ∈ Fpk
with order dividing Φk(p). Since r(z)d(z) = Φk(p), it follows that f
r(z)d(z) = 1 and so
f z
deg rd(z) is the product of Q-powers of f , f zd(z), . . . , f zdeg r−1d(z).
Now, consider an arbitrary Q-linear combination d′(z) of the elements d(z), zd(z), . . . ,
zdeg r−1d(z). Following the method of Scott et al. [84], d′(z) can be written in base p(z) as
d′(z) = d′0(z) + d
′
1(z)p(z) + · · ·+ d′ϕ(k)−1(z)p(z)ϕ(k)−1,
where each d′i has degree less than the degree of p. Set
d′i = di,0 + zdi,1 + · · ·+ zdeg p−1di,deg p−1
and assume that di,j ∈ Z for 0 ≤ i ≤ ϕ(k)− 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ deg(p(z))− 1. Then fd
′(z) can be
computed in two steps as we explain next.
First, the exponentiations f z, . . . , f z
deg p−1
are performed. From these intermediate
exponentiations, terms of the form f z
jpi can be easily calculated. Second, a vectorial
62
addition chain containing the di,j is found. This allows to compute f
d′(z) from terms of the
form f z
jpi using the work of Olivos [68]. The advantage of allowing multiples of d(z) for this




with di,j ∈ Z, that can potentially yield shorter addition chains, which in turn means a
more-efficient final exponentiation calculation. However the savings are necessarily modest,
since as in the method of Scott et al. [84], the main expense in this exponentiation process
comes from computing the terms f z, . . . , f z
deg p−1
.
In order to find efficient polynomials d′(z), let us construct a rational matrix M ′ with

























Elements in the rational lattice formed by the matrix M ′ correspond to Q-linear com-
binations d′(z) of d(z), zd(z), . . . , zdeg r−1d(z). Short vectorial addition chains can be
produced from the elements of this lattice with small integer entries. The LLL algorithm
of Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lovasz [53] produces an integer basis of an integer matrix with
small coefficients. Let us consider the integer matrix M constructed from M ′ as the unique
matrix whose rows are multiples of the rows of M ′ such that the entries of M are integers,
and the greatest common divisor of the set of entries is 1. Next, the LLL algorithm is
applied to M to obtain an integer basis for M with small entries. Finally, small integer
linear combinations of these basis elements are examined with the hope of finding short
addition chains. It is worth mentioning that even if these results do not yield an advantage
over the results of Scott et al. [84], since the lattice contains an element corresponding to
d(z), the method described in this section includes the results of that work.
In the next section, the main mechanics of our method are explained by applying it
to the computation of the final exponentiation step of several pairing-friendly families of
elliptic curves.
5.2. Exponentiation examples
5.2.1. BN curves. BN curves have embedding degree k = 12 and are parameterized
by z such that
r = r(z) = 36z4 + 36z3 + 18z2 + 6z + 1,
p = p(z) = 36z4 + 36z3 + 24z2 + 6z + 1
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are both prime.
The value d = Φk(p)/r = (p
4 − p2 + 1)/r can be expressed as the polynomial
d = d(z) = 46656z12 + 139968z11 + 241056z10 + 272160z9
+ 225504z8 + 138672z7 + 65448z6 + 23112z5
+ 6264z4 + 1188z3 + 174z2 + 6z + 1.
At first glance, it appears that exponentiations by multiples of large powers of z are re-
quired. However, following the work of Scott et al. [84], d can be written in base p such
that the degrees of the coefficients are at most 3. In particular,
d(z) = −36z3 − 30z2 − 18z − 2
+ p(z)(−36z3 − 18z2 − 12z + 1)
+ p(z)2(6z2 + 1)
+ p(z)3.
Scott et al. [84] applied the work of Olivos [68] to compute the map f 7→ fd using
vectorial addition chains. From the above representation for d, vectorial addition chains
can be used to compute f 7→ fd using 3 exponentiations by z, 13 multiplications, and 4
squarings.
For the method described in Section 5.1, consider multiples of d represented in the base
p with coefficients in Q[z]/(p(z)).




















The first row in M corresponds to the final exponentiation given by Scott et al. [84].
Any non-trivial integer linear combination of the rows corresponds to an exponentiation.
For computational efficiency, a linear combination with coefficients as small as possible is
desired.
None of the basis vectors returned by the LLL algorithm has an advantage over [84].
However, if small integer linear combinations of the short vectors returned by the LLL
algorithm are considered, a multiple of d which corresponds to a shorter addition chain
could potentially be found. A brute force search of linear combinations of the LLL basis
yields 18 non-zero vectors with maximal entry 12. Among these vectors we consider the
vector
(1, 6, 12, 12, 0, 4, 6, 12, 0, 6, 6, 12,−1, 4, 6, 12),
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which corresponds to the multiple
d′(z) = λ0 + λ1p+ λ2p
2 + λ3p
3 = 2z(6z2 + 3z + 1)d(z),
where
λ0(z) = 1 + 6z + 12z
2 + 12z3
λ1(z) = 4z + 6z
2 + 12z3
λ2(z) = 6z + 6z
2 + 12z3
λ3(z) = −1 + 4z + 6z2 + 12z3.
The final exponentiation which results can be computed more efficiently without using
addition chains.
First, the following exponentiations are computed
f 7→ f z 7→ f 2z 7→ f 4z 7→ f 6z 7→ f 6z2 7→ f 12z2 7→ f 12z3
which requires 3 exponentiations by z, 3 squarings, and 1 multiplication. The terms
a = f 12z




[a · f 6z2 · f ] · [b]p · [a]p2 · [b · f−1]p3
which requires 6 multiplications.
In total, our method requires 3 exponentiations by z, 3 squarings, and 10 multiplica-
tions. 1
5.2.2. Freeman curves. Freeman curves [30] have embedding degree k = 10 and are
parameterized by z such that
r = r(z) = 25z4 + 25z3 + 15z2 + 5z + 1,
p = p(z) = 25z4 + 25z3 + 25z2 + 10z + 3
are both prime. For d = Φ10(p)/r = (p
4−p3 +p2−p+1)/r, let us consider a 4×16 integer




















In the lattice spanned by the rows of M , there exist two short vectors,
±(1,−2, 0,−5,−1,−4,−5,−5, 1, 3, 5, 5, 2, 5, 5, 5).
1We ignore the relatively inexpensive p-power Frobenius maps. Since the embedding degree k is even,
we have f−1 = fp
k/2
for all f in the cyclotomic subgroup of F∗pk . That is, inversion can be done using a
p-power Frobenius. Hence, we ignore inversions as well.
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Both of these vectors have maximal absolute coefficient 5. Consider the vector correspond-
ing to the multiple




λ0(z) = 1− 2z − 5z3,
λ1(z) = −1− 4z − 5z2 − 5z3,
λ2(z) = 1 + 3z + 5z
2 + 5z3,
λ3(z) = 2 + 5z + 5z
2 + 5z3.
Now, the map f 7→ fd′ can be computed as
f 7→ f z 7→ f 2z 7→ f 4z 7→ f 5z 7→ f 5z2 7→ f 5z3 ,
followed by
A = f 5z
3 · f 2z, B = A · f 5z2 ,




= [A−1 · f ] · [B−1 · C−1]p · [D]p2 · [C ·D]p3 ,
requiring a total of 12 multiplications, 2 squarings, and 3 exponentiations by z.
5.2.3. KSS8 curves. KSS8 curves [47] have embedding degree k = 8 and are param-
eterized by z such that
r = r(z) =
1
450
(z4 − 8z2 + 25),
p = p(z) =
1
180
(z6 + 2z5 − 3z4 + 8z3 − 15z2 − 82z + 125)






















Note that since z needs to be chosen as a multiple of 5, the rows of M correspond to










4 + 4z3 + 5z2 + 38z − 25
λ1(z) = −z5 − 2z4 − z3 − 16z2 + 20z + 36
λ2(z) = z
4 + 2z3 − 5z2 + 4z − 50
λ4(z) = 3z
3 + 6z2 + 15z + 72.
We use addition chains to compute fd
′
































and compute the yi. The yi can be computed from f , f




Next, we find an addition chain containing all the powers of the yi. With the inclusion
of the element 10, we obtain
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 15, 16, 20, 25, 36, 38, 50, 72}.
The work of Olivos gives an efficient method for producing a vectorial addition chain from
an addition chain and states the computational expense of computing the final result fd
′
from the yi.
The computation of the yi requires 5 exponentiations by z and 6 multiplications. The
addition chain requires 7 multiplications and 7 squarings. The conversion to a vectorial
addition chain requires 13 multiplications. In total, we require 5 exponentiations by z, 26
multiplications, and 7 squarings to compute the map f 7→ fd′ .
5.2.4. KSS18 curves. KSS18 curves [47] have embedding degree k = 18 and a twist
of order d = 6. These curves are parameterized by z such that
r = r(z) =
1
343
(z6 + 37z3 + 343),
p = p(z) =
1
21
(z8 + 5z7 + 7z6 + 37z5 + 188z4
+ 259z3 + 343z2 + 1763z + 2401)































Since 7 divides z, the rows of M correspond to integer multiples of d(z). We find a short











6 + 5z5 + 7z4 + 21z3 + 108z2 + 147z,
λ1(z) = −5z5 − 25z4 − 35z3 − 98z2 − 505z − 686,
λ2(z) = −z7 − 5z6 − 7z5 − 19z4 − 98z3 − 133z2 + 6,
λ3(z) = 2z
6 + 10z5 + 14z4 + 35z3 + 181z2 + 245z,
λ4(z) = −3z5 − 15z4 − 21z3 − 49z2 − 254z − 343,
λ5(z) = z
4 + 5z3 + 7z2 + 3.
Proceeding as in the KSS8 example, we construct an addition chain
{1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, 15, 19, 21, 25, 35, 38, 49, 73,
98, 108, 133, 147, 181, 245, 254, 343, 490, 505, 686}.
Once again, applying Olivos’ method for computing a short vectorial addition chain, we
can compute the map f 7→ fd using 7 exponentiations by z, 52 multiplications, and 8
squarings.
5.2.5. A comparison with Scott et al. In Table 5.1, we compare our results against
those given by Scott et al. [84]. Although operation counts are given for only the vectorial
addition portion of the exponentiation, the total cost can easily be computed from their
work. The operation counts are given for field multiplications and squarings only, since the
number of exponentiations by z is fixed for each curve and computing p-th power maps is
comparatively inexpensive.
Curve Scott et al. This work
BN 13M 4S 10M 3S
Freeman 14M 2S 12M 2S
KSS8 31M 6S 26M 7S
KSS18 62M 14S 52M 8S
Table 5.1. A comparison of our final exponentiation method with the
method of Scott et al. [84]. ‘M’ denotes a multiplication and ‘S’ denotes a
squaring. Both methods require the same number of exponentiations by z,
determined by the curve.
For example, let us consider the case of BN curves parameterized with z = −262 −
254 + 244, which yields a 127-bit security level [14]. Further, assume that the relative
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cost of a field multiplication compared to a cyclotomic squaring in Fpk is given as M ≈
4.5S [2, 48]. Then the total cost to perform the exponentiations f z, (f z)z, (f z
2
)z, is of
around 3 · blog2 zc = 183 cyclotomic squarings. Using the results reported in Table 5.1,
this gives an approximate cost for the hard part of the final exponentiation of 187S+13M ≈
245S for the method of Scott et al. and 186S + 10M ≈ 231S using our method.
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CHAPTER 6
Hashing to Elliptic Curve Points
Some pairing-based protocols, such as Scott’s identity-based key agreement scheme
(Section 1.3.2) require the computation of random points in G1 and G2. In the literature,
this problem is referred to as hashing to G1 and hashing to G2, respectively. The group G1
is defined as E(Fp)[r]. Hashing to G1 is normally seen as a straightforward task, whereas
hashing to G2 is considered more challenging.
The customary method for representing G2 is as the order-r subgroup of Ẽ(Fpk/d), where
Ẽ is the degree-d twist of E over Fpk/d with r | #Ẽ(Fpk/d) (Section 2.4). Hashing to G2 can
be accomplished by finding a random point Q ∈ Ẽ(Fpk/d) followed by a multiplication by
c = #Ẽ(Fpk/d)/r. The main difficulty of this hashing is that c is normally a relatively large
scalar (for example, larger than p). Galbraith and Scott [37] reduce the computational cost
of this task by means of an endomorphism of Ẽ. This idea was further exploited by Scott
et al. [83], where explicit formulae for hashing to G2 were given for several pairing-friendly
curves.
In this chapter, we offer improvements in hashing to G2. We draw on the methods
that Vercauteren employed to reduce the cost of the Miller function (Section 3.1.2). Our
framework for fast hashing produces hashing algorithms that are much faster than the
currently best-known methods. For example, we estimate that for BN curves at the 128-
bit security level, our results yield a hashing algorithm that is at least two times faster than
the previous fastest known algorithm. For higher embedding degree curves, the results can
be more dramatic.
6.1. A lattice-based method for hashing to G2
Let E be an elliptic curve over Fp with r, a large prime divisor of n = #E(Fp), and
let k > 1 be the embedding degree of E. Let q be an arbitrary power of p. Recall that
an elliptic curve Ẽ defined over Fq is said to be a degree-d twist of E over Fq, if d is the
smallest integer such that Ẽ and E are isomorphic over Fqd . If p has characteristic greater
than 3, the only possible degrees of twists are those integers d which divide either 4 or
6. Since our examples deal only with curves where the degree of the twist divides the
embedding degree k, we assume that d divides k and set q = pk/d for the remainder of this
chapter. However, with some modifications, the preliminary discussion and results apply
to curves where d does not divide k.
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Hess et al. [43] showed that there exists a unique non-trivial twist Ẽ of E over Fq such
that r divides #Ẽ(Fq). If d = 2, then #Ẽ(Fq) = q + 1 + t̂, where t̂ is the trace of the
q-power Frobenius of E. In fact, the order of any twist can be found by first determining
the trace t̂ of the q-power Frobenius of E from the trace t of the p-power Frobenius of E
via the Weil Theorem and then using a result given by Hess et al. [43].
The trace tm of the p
m-power Frobenius of E for an arbitrary m can be determined
using the recursion [59]
t0 = 2,
t1 = t,
ti+1 = t · ti − p · ti−1, for all i > 1.
After computing the trace t̂ of the q-power Frobenius of E, the possible values for the trace
t̃ of the q-power Frobenius of Ẽ over Fq can be determined using Table 6.1 [43], where D
is the discriminant of E and f̂ satisfies t̂2 − 4q = Df̂ 2.
d 2 3 4 6
t̃ −t̂ (±3f̂ − t̂)/2 ±f̂ (±3f̂ + t̂)/2
Table 6.1. Possible values for the trace t̃ of the q-power Frobenius of a
degree-d twist Ẽ of E.
The group G2 can be represented as Ẽ(Fq)[r]. In order to hash to G2, it suffices to hash
to a random point Q ∈ Ẽ(Fq) followed by a multiplication by the cofactor c = #Ẽ(Fq)/r, to
obtain the element cQ ∈ Ẽ(Fq)[r]. Let φ : Ẽ → E be an efficiently-computable isomorphism
defined over Fqd and let π be the p-th power Frobenius on E. Scott et al. [83] observed
that the endomorphism
ψ = φ−1 ◦ π ◦ φ
can be used to speed up the computation of Q 7→ cQ. The endomorphism ψ satisfies
(6.1) ψ2P − tψP + pP =∞
for all P ∈ Ẽ(Fq) [35, Theorem 1]. The cofactor c can be written as a polynomial in p
with coefficients less than p. Scott et al. use this representation of c and reduce using (6.1)
so that c is expressed as a polynomial in ψ with coefficients less than p. For parameterized
curves, the speedup in the cost of computing Q 7→ cQ can become quite dramatic. For
example, MNT curves [63] have embedding degree k = 6 and are parameterized by z such
that
p(z) = z2 + 1
r(z) = z2 − z + 1
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are both prime. It can be shown that
c(z)P = (z4 + z3 + 3z2)P = (p2 + (z + 1)p− z − 2)P
= ψ(2zP ) + ψ2(2zP ).
It suffices to multiply by a multiple c′ of c such that c′ 6≡ 0 (mod r). Combining this
observation with a new method of representing c in base ψ, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1. Suppose that Ẽ(Fq) is cyclic and p ≡ 1 (mod d). Then there exists a
polynomial h(x) = h0 + h1x + · · · + hϕ(k)−1xϕ(k)−1 ∈ Z[x] such that h(ψ)P is a fixed
multiple of cP for all P ∈ Ẽ(Fq) and |hi|ϕ(k) ≤ #Ẽ(Fq)/r for all i.
The proof of Theorem 6.1 is divided into two parts. We first prove a technical lemma
and then show how the polynomial h can be obtained using an integer-lattice technique.
Let f , f̃ be such that t2 − 4p = Df 2 and t̃2 − 4q = Df̃ 2, where D is the discriminant. It
also holds that n+ t = p+ 1 and ñ+ t̃ = q + 1, where ñ = #Ẽ(Fq).
Recall that the endomorphism ψ : Ẽ → Ẽ is defined over Fqd . In the following lemma,
it is proved that ψ fixes Ẽ(Fq) as a set.
Lemma 6.2. If p ≡ 1 (mod d), then ψP ∈ Ẽ(Fq) for all P ∈ Ẽ(Fq).
Proof. From the work of Hess et al. [43] we have that the twist is defined by first
selecting γ ∈ Fqd such that γd ∈ Fq. The map φ is then defined by φ(x, y) = (γ2x, γ3y) and
hence ψ is defined by ψ(x, y) = (γ2(p−1)xp, γ3(p−1)yp). Now, γd ∈ Fq and p−1 ≡ 0 (mod d)
yield γp−1 ∈ Fq, which in turn implies that ψ(x, y) ∈ Ẽ(Fq) for (x, y) ∈ Ẽ(Fq). 
The following lemma illustrates the effect of ψ on elements in Ẽ(Fq).
Lemma 6.3. If p ≡ 1 (mod d), gcd(f̃ , ñ) = 1, and Ẽ(Fq) is a cyclic group, then ψP = aP
for all P ∈ Ẽ(Fq), where a is one of (t+ f(t̃− 2)/f̃)/2, (t− f(t̃− 2)/f̃)/2.
Proof. Since Ẽ(Fq) is cyclic and ψ fixes Ẽ(Fq), there exists an integer a such that















Working modulo ñ, we observe that
Df̃ 2 = t̃2 − 4q = t̃2 − 4t̃+ 4 = (t̃− 2)2
and so √
D ≡ ±(t̃− 2)/f̃ (mod ñ).
72






D ≡ (t̃− 2)/f̃
(mod ñ). Then, since P ∈ Ẽ(Fq) has order dividing ñ, it follows that
















In the space of polynomials h ∈ Z[x] such that h(a) ≡ 0 (mod c), we wish to find an h
with small integer coefficients. Ignoring the small coefficient requirement for the moment,
h(x) = c and h(x) = xi − ai satisfy the required condition for all integers i. Furthermore,
any integer linear combination of these polynomials satisfies this condition.
Since π acting on E(Fpk) has order k and ψ is an automorphism when restricted to the
cyclic group Ẽ(Fq), the automorphism ψ acting on Ẽ(Fq) has order k. Hence, the integer
a satisfies Φk(a) ≡ 0 (mod ñ). Therefore, the polynomial h(x) = xi−ai with i ≥ ϕ(k) can
be written as an integer linear combination (modulo c) of x− a, . . . , xϕ(k)−1− aϕ(k)−1. For
this reason, the polynomials of higher degree are excluded in the following construction.





where a is the column vector with i-th entry −ai, correspond to polynomials h ∈ Z[z] such
that h(a) ≡ 0 (mod c). Consider the convex set C ⊆ Rϕ(k) generated by all vectors of the
form
(±|c|1/ϕ(k), . . . ,±|c|1/ϕ(k)).
The volume of C is 2ϕ(k)|c| and the lattice above has volume |c|. By Minkowski’s Theorem
(Theorem 3.16), the region C contains a lattice point. Hence, there exists a non-zero
polynomial h with coefficients at most |c|1/ϕ(k) such that h(a) ≡ 0 (mod c). This concludes
the proof of Theorem 6.1. 
6.2. Hashing examples
6.2.1. BN curves. BN curves have embedding degree k = 12 and are parameterized
by
p(z) = 36z4 + 36z3 + 24z2 + 6z + 1
r(z) = 36z4 + 36z3 + 18z2 + 6z + 1
t(z) = 6z2 + 1
f(z) = 6z2 + 4z + 1
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where
t(z)2 − 4p(z) = −3f(z)2
r(z) + t(z) = p(z) + 1
q(z) = p(z)2.
After computing the trace t̂ of the q-power Frobenious of E, we compute f̂ such that
4q − t̂ = −3f̂ 2. Using t̂ and f̂ , we find the twist Ẽ(Fq) is parameterized by
ñ(z) = q(z) + 1− (3f̂(z) + t̂(z))/2
= (36z4 + 36z3 + 18z2 + 6z + 1)(36z4 + 36z3 + 30z2 + 6z + 1)
t̃(z) = 36z4 + 1.







(3456z7 + 6696z6 + 7488z5 + 4932z4 + 2112z3 + 588z2 + 106z + 6).
As a sobriety check, note that a(z) ≡ p(z) (mod r) and thus ψQ = a(z)Q = p(z)Q for all
Q ∈ Ẽ(Fq)[r].
We construct the following lattice and reduce the −a(z)i entries modulo c(z):
c(z) 0 0 0
−a(z) 1 0 0
−a(z)2 0 1 0
−a(z)3 0 0 1
→

36z4 + 36z3 + 30z2 + 6z + 1 0 0 0
48/5z3 + 6z2 + 4z − 2/5 1 0 0
36/5z3 + 6z2 + 6z + 1/5 0 1 0
12z3 + 12z2 + 8z + 1 0 0 1
 .
From this lattice, we find the polynomial h(x) = z + 3zx+ zx2 + x3. Working modulo
ñ(z), we have
h(a) = −(18z3 + 12z2 + 3z + 1)c(z)
and since gcd(18z3 + 12z2 + 3z + 1, r(z)) = 1, the following map is a homomorphism of
Ẽ(Fq) with image Ẽ(Fq)[r]:
Q 7→ zQ+ ψ(3zQ) + ψ2(zQ) + ψ3(Q).
We can compute Q 7→ zQ 7→ 2zQ 7→ 3zQ using one doubling, one addition, and one
multiply-by-z. Given Q, zQ, 3zQ, we can compute h(a)Q using three ψ-maps, and three
additions. In total, we require one doubling, four additions, one multiply-by-z, and three
ψ-maps. As seen in Table 6.2 on page 78, the previous fastest-known method of computing
such a homomorphism costs two doublings, four additions, two multiply-by-z’s, and three
ψ-maps.
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6.2.2. Freeman curves. Freeman curves [30] have embedding degree k = 10 and are
parameterized by z such that
r = r(z) = 25z4 + 25z3 + 15z2 + 5z + 1,
p = p(z) = 25z4 + 25z3 + 25z2 + 10z + 3,
are both prime.
Since Freeman curves do not have a fixed discriminant, the algorithm given in the proof
of Lemma 6.3 does not directly apply. However, we are able to apply the techniques of
Scott et al. on c(z), xc(z), z2c(z), z3c(z) and then use our method from Chapter 5.
We find a short vector corresponding to the multiple h(a) = λ0 + λ1a+ λ2a
2 + λ3a
3 of
c, where λ = (λ0, λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4) is such that
λ0(z) = 10z
3 + 5z2 + 4z + 1
λ1(z) = −3z
λ2(z) = −10z3 − 10z2 − 8z − 3
λ3(z) = −5z3 − 5z2 − z
λ4(z) = −5z3 + 2.
Using the addition chain {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10}, we can compute h(a)Q using fourteen
additions, four doublings, three multiply-by-z’s, and four ψ maps.
6.2.3. KSS8 curves. KSS8 curves [47] have embedding degree k = 8 and are param-
eterized by z such that
r = r(z) =
1
450
(z4 − 8z2 + 25)
p = p(z) =
1
180
(z6 + 2z5 − 3z4 + 8z3 − 15z2 − 82z + 125)




(z8 + 4z7 + 6z6 + 36z5 + 34z4 − 84z3 + 486z2 + 620z + 193)r(z).
Set c(z) = ñ(z)/r(z). After some work, we discover that ψ is such that ψQ = aQ for all





− 52523z11 − 174115z10 + 267585z9 − 193271z8
− 325290z7 + 15093190z6 − 29000446z5 − 108207518z4




As we have done previously, we find a short basis for the lattice generated by the matrix
c(z) 0 0 0
−a(z) 1 0 0
−a(z)2 0 1 0
−a(z)3 0 0 1





(z2 − 25)c(z) = λ0 + λ1a+ λ2a2 + λ3a3
of c such that λ = (λ0, λ1, λ2, λ3) = (−z2 − z, z − 3, 2z + 6,−2z − 4).
For an element Q ∈ Ẽ(Fq), we can compute h(a)Q with the following sequence of
calculations. We compute Q 7→ zQ 7→ (z + 1)Q 7→ (z2 + z)Q and Q 7→ 2Q 7→ 4Q which
requires one addition, two doublings, and two multiply-by-z’s. Then we compute
λ0Q = −(z2 + z)Q
λ1Q = (z + 1)Q− 4Q
λ2Q = 2(z + 1)Q+ 4Q
λ3Q = −2(z + 1)Q− 2Q
which requires three more additions and another doubling. Finally, we compute
h(a)Q = λ0Q+ ψ(λ1Q) + ψ
2(λ2Q) + ψ
3(λ3Q)
which requires three more additions and three ψ maps.
In total, we require seven additions, three doublings, two multiply-by-z’s, and three ψ
maps to compute Q 7→ h(a)Q.
6.2.4. KSS18 curves. KSS18 curves [47] have embedding degree k = 18 and a twist
of order d = 6. These curves are parameterized by z such that
r = r(z) =
1
343
(z6 + 37z3 + 343)
p = p(z) =
1
21
(z8 + 5z7 + 7z6 + 37z5 + 188z4
+ 259z3 + 343z2 + 1763z + 2401)
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z18 + 15z17 + 96z16 + 409z15 + 1791z14 + 7929z13 + 27539z12
+ 81660z11 + 256908z10 + 757927z9 + 1803684z8
+ 4055484z7 + 9658007z6 + 19465362z5 + 30860595z4
+ 50075833z3 + 82554234z2 + 88845918z + 40301641
)
.
Constructing our lattice, we obtain the vector corresponding to the multiple
h(a) = − 3
343






λ0 = 5z + 18
λ1 = z
3 + 3z2 + 1
λ2 = −3z2 − 8z
λ3 = 3z + 1
λ4 = −z2 − 2
λ5 = z
2 + 5z.
We construct the addition chain {1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 18}, from which we can compute Q 7→
h(a)Q using sixteen additions, two doublings, three multiply-by-z’s, and five ψ maps.
6.2.5. Comparison with previous work. In Table 6.2, we compare our results to
the work of Scott et al. [83, 82]. In the proceedings version [83] of their work, the authors
assume that the identity Φk(ψ)P =∞ holds for all points P in Ẽ(Fq). However, there exist
concrete examples showing that this identity does not hold for some curves. In particular,
MNT and Freeman curves do not satisfy this identity in general. On the other hand, the
identity ψk/2P = −P is critically used in the eprint version [82] of their work. Fortunately,
all curves we have discussed with the exception of the MNT curve can be explicitly shown
to satisfy the identity ψk/2P = −P . In practice, when we fix the parameter of an MNT
curves, we have found that these concrete curves also satisfy this property. It would be
interesting to discover an MNT curve which does not satisfy this property. More work
needs to be done to determine the structure of the twist and the action of ψ on various
subgroups of the twist for such curves.
We use the eprint version [82] to represent Scott et al.’s operation counts on Freeman
curves. We have verified that the identity Φk(ψ)P = ∞ holds for BN, KSS8, and KSS18
curves and use the counts from the proceedings version [83] of their work for those curves
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Curve Scott et al. This work
BN 4A 2D 2Z 3ψ 4A 1D 1Z 3ψ
Freeman 20A 5D 3Z 4ψ 14A 4D 3Z 4ψ
KSS8 22A 5D 5Z 2ψ 7A 3D 2Z 3ψ
KSS18 59A 5D 7Z 4ψ 16A 2D 3Z 5ψ
Table 6.2. A comparison of our hashing algorithm with the hashing al-
gorithm of Scott et al. ‘A’ denotes a point addition, ‘D’ denotes a point
doubling, ‘Z’ denotes a multiplication by z, and ‘ψ’ denotes an application
of the map ψ.
in Table 6.2. Since the multiplications by z dominate the other operations, it can be seen
that our hash algorithm is approximately twice as fast as that of Scott et al. for BN
curves. For KSS8 curves we see a 5
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Pairings at High Security Levels
Initial work on efficiently computable pairings [7, 32] was focused on implementing
pairings at (roughly) the 80-bit security level. Koblitz and Menezes [50] highlighted the
performance drawbacks of pairings at very high security levels. The subsequent discovery
of BN curves [10], ideally suited for implementing pairings at the 128-bit security level,
spurred a lot of research culminating in the implementation of Aranha et al. [2] that
achieved speeds of under 2 million cycles for a 128-bit pairing computation on a single core
of Phenom II, Core i5 and Opteron machines.
More recently, researchers have considered implementing pairings at even higher secu-
rity levels. Costello, Lauter and Naehrig [28] argued that a certain family of embedding
degree k = 24 Barreto-Lynn-Scott elliptic curves [8], henceforth called BLS24 curves, are
well-suited for implementing pairings at the 192, 224, 256, 288, and 320-bit security levels.
Scott [80] implemented several pairing-based protocols using BN curves at the 128-bit se-
curity level, KSS18 curves [47] with embedding degree k = 18 at the 192-bit security level,
and BLS24 curves at the 256-bit security level. Scott concludes that the best choice of
pairing to implement a particular protocol can depend on a variety of factors including the
number and complexity of non-pairing operations in the protocol, the number of pairing
computations that are required, and the applicability of several optimizations including
fixed-argument pairings and products of pairings [79].
In this chapter, we focus on fast implementations of a single pairing at the 192-bit
security level. We chose the 192-bit level because it is the higher security level (the other is
128-bit) for public-key operations in the National Security Agency’s Suite B Cryptography
standard [85]. Moreover, as mentioned by Scott [80], the optimum choice of pairing-
friendly curve for the 192-bit security level from the many available candidates [31] is not
straightforward.
We examine a family of embedding degree k = 12 elliptic curves, henceforth called
BLS12 curves, first proposed by Barreto, Lynn and Scott [8] (see also [19]). Unlike BN
curves, the BLS12 curves are not ideal for the 128-bit security level since the group or-
der #E(Fp) is not prime. Nevertheless, our careful estimates and implementation results
demonstrate that they outperform KSS18, BN and BLS24 curves at the 192-bit security
level. We also present a general framework for deriving analogues of the β Weil pairing,
presented in Chapter 4 for BN curves. This pairing is well-suited for computing a single
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pairing on a multi-processor machine since it avoids the relatively-costly final exponentia-
tion that cannot be effectively parallelized and is present in all Tate-type pairings.
7.1. Selection of pairings
Table 7.1 summarizes the salient parameters of the KSS18 [47], BN [10], BLS12 [8]
and BLS24 [8] families of elliptic curves. All these curves are parameterized by a positive
integer z, are defined by an equation of the form Y 2 = X3 + b, and have a twist of order
d = 6. Table 7.2 lists the important parameters of the particular KSS18, BN, BLS12 and
BLS24 curves that are suitable for implementing pairing-based protocols at the 192-bit
security level. The requirements for this security level are that the bitlength of r be at
least 384 (in order to resist Pollard’s rho attack [71] on the discrete logarithm problem in
G1), and that the bitlength of p
k should be at least 7680 (in order to resist the number
field sieve attack [77] on the discrete logarithm problem in F∗
pk
).
KSS18 curves: k = 18
p(z) = (z8 + 5z7 + 7z6 + 37z5 + 188z4 + 259z3 + 343z2 + 1763z + 2401)/21
r(z) = (z6 + 37z3 + 343)/343,
t(z) = (z4 + 16z + 7)/7
BN curves: k = 12
p(z) = 36z4 + 36z3 + 24z2 + 6z + 1
r(z) = 36z4 + 36z3 + 18z2 + 6z + 1,
t(z) = 6z2 + 1
BLS12 curves: k = 12
p(z) = (z − 1)2(z4 − z2 + 1)/3 + z,
r(z) = z4 − z2 + 1,
t(z) = z + 1
BLS24 curves: k = 24
p(z) = (z − 1)2(z8 − z4 + 1)/3 + z,
r(z) = z8 − z4 + 1,
t(z) = z + 1
Table 7.1. Important parameters for the KSS18, BN, BLS12 and BLS24 families.
Optimal ate pairings for KSS18 [87], BN [87], BLS12 [43] and BLS24 [43] curves are
given in Table 7.3. In the table, `S,T denotes the line through points S and T .
7.1.1. The β Weil pairing. Set k = ed, where d is the order of the automorphism













Curve b k z dlog2 pe dlog2 re ρ dlog2 qe dlog2 pke
KSS18 2 18 −264 − 251 + 246 + 212 508 376 1.35 1523 9137
BN 5 12 2158 − 2128 − 268 + 1 638 638 1 1275 7647
BLS12 4 12 −2107 + 2105 + 293 + 25 638 427 1.49 1276 7656
BLS24 4 24 −248 + 245 + 231 − 27 477 383 1.25 1914 11482
Table 7.2. Important parameters for the chosen KSS18, BN, BLS12,
BLS24 curves. Here ρ = log p/ log r.
Curve Optimal ate pairing: (P,Q) 7→ h(x)
KSS18
(
fz,Q · fp3,Q · `zQ,3pQ(P )
)(p18−1)/r
z + 3x− x4
BN
(
f6z+2,Q · `(6z+2)Q,pQ · `(6z+2+p)Q,(−p2)Q(P )
)(p12−1)/r
6z + 2 + x− x2 + x3
BLS12 (fz,Q(P ))
(p12−1)/r z − x
BLS24 (fz,Q(P ))
(p24−1)/r z − x
Table 7.3. Optimal ate pairings.
The pairing wpe,h with |hi| ≤ r1/2 can be computed using two extended Miller functions
of length approximately 1
2
log r. We present a framework for constructing β Weil pairings
(cf. Section 4.2.2), which can be computed using 2e extended Miller functions each of
length approximately (1/ϕ(k)) log r. In particular, we prove that for a polynomial h for
which h(p) ≡ 0 (mod r), the following is a pairing:







To establish that (7.2) is a pairing, we require a few technical lemmas, building on the
work of Hess and Vercauteren. Lemma 7.1 gives a pairing which is the product of Weil
pairings consisting of Miller functions having ate-like lengths.











































































Since the map (P,Q) 7→ fpe,Q(P ) is a pairing (Theorem 2.30), the right hand side of (7.3)
is a product of pairings. 
The next lemma relates the previous pairing to the Weil pairing notation defined in
(7.1).







































Finally, using the pairing relation from Lemma 7.2, we can obtain a pairing composed
of Miller functions each with Vercauteren-style bound on the length.
Theorem 7.3. There exists h such that |hi| ≤ r1/ϕ(k) and the following is a pairing:







Proof. Let h(x) =
∑c
i=0 hix
i be given by Vercauteren’s theorem (Theorem 3.7) and
let h(p) = rm. Since















































which by Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2 is a product of pairings. 
Using Theorem 7.3 and the polynomials h from Table 7.3, we found the β Weil pairings
for BN, BLS12, KSS18 and BLS24 curves. For BN curves, we use our construction from
Section 4.2.2. The β Weil pairings can be defined as follows:


































z,P (Q) · f
p2
z,pP (Q) · f
p
z,p2P (Q) · fz,p3P (Q)
fp
3
z,Q(P ) · f
p2
z,Q(pP ) · f
p
z,Q(p
2P ) · fz,Q(p3P )
](p12−1)(p4+1)
.
For all four β Weil pairings, computing pP has approximately the same cost as com-
puting zP .
7.1.2. Parallelization of pairings. Given two processors, the Weil pairing can be
trivially parallelized since the numerator and denominator of the Weil pairing are indepen-
dent operations. The ate pairing requires two serial operations, the Miller loop and the
final exponentiation. The next lemma can be used to parallelize the computation of the
Miller loop. We know of no way to parallelize the final exponentiation.
The method of Aranha et al. [3] for parallelizing the computation of a Miller function
fs,R is the following. We first write s = 2
ws1 + s0 with s0 < 2
w. Applying Lemmas 2.1 and
2.2, we obtain
(7.8) fs,R = f
2w
s1,R
· f2w,s1R · fs0,R · `2ws1R,s0R/vsR.
If s0 is small, then the Miller function fs0,R can be computed relatively cheaply. Thus the
computation of fs,R can be parallelized by computing f
2w
s1,R
on one processor and f2w,s1R on
a second processor. The parameter w should be carefully selected in order to balance the
time of the two function computations. The relevant criteria for selecting w include the
Hamming weight of s1 (which determines the number of additions in the Miller loop for
the first function), and the cost of the w-fold squaring in the first function relative to the
cost of computing s1R in the second function. This idea can be extended to c processors
by writing s = 2wc−1sc−1 + · · ·+ 2w1s1 + s0.
Remark 7.1. (unsuitability of composite-order BN curves) Consider a BN curve at the
192-bit security level. For such a curve, we desire a (sparse) BN parameter z of approxi-
mately 160 bits. From the optimal pairing framework (Section 3.1.2), we choose a suitable
vector [2z, z+1,−z, z] corresponding to the following pairing (with the final exponentiation
omitted):




z,Q · `(−zp2)Q,(zp3)Q · `p(z+1)Q,(−zp2+zp3)Q(P ).
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Computation of the lines is relatively inexpensive. However, at first, it appears one must
evaluate multiple Miller functions. Fortunately, for parameterized curves, one can (usu-
ally) rearrange terms such that the computational bottleneck is fz,Q with only a few lines
comprising the remaining computation. In the above case, we obtain
(P,Q) 7→ f 2+p−p
2+p3
z,Q · `zQ,zQ · `zpQ,pQ · `−zp2Q,zp3Q · `p(z+1)Q,(−zp2+zp3)Q(P ).
At the 192-bit security level, we require that r have a prime divisor of at least 384 bits.
We can easily choose r to be (a 640-bit) prime. However, given that the optimal pairing
framework gives a maximum Miller length of around (log n)/4 for BN curves where n is a
large prime divisor of r, we should be tempted to choose r with a 384-bit prime divisor. The
fact that the coordinates of the vector [2z, z+1,−z, z] have small coefficients when written
in base z allowed us to write the pairings as a power of fz,Q multiplied by a few lines.
However, for composite values of r, the vector with 96-bit elements which we obtain from
the optimal pairing framework does not, in general, have coordinates which we can relate
to each other. We would therefore require approximately 4 independent Miller functions,
negating most of the benefit of computing an optimal pairing, rather than the Tate pairing.
The possibility of choosing a vector whose elements are part of a short addition chain may
still exist but the vectors produced by the LLL algorithm do not appear to maintain such
structure. Thus, composite-order BN curves would appear to yield inferior performance
compared to prime-order BN curves.
7.2. BLS12 pairings
In this section, we consider the BLS12 curve Y 2 = X3 + 4 defined with the parameter
selection
z = −2107 + 2105 + 293 + 25
which yields a 638-bit prime p and a 427-bit prime r.
7.2.1. Extension field arithmetic for pairings with k = 12. A tower extension
for Fp12 can be constructed as follows:
Fp2 = Fp[u]/(u2 − β), where β ∈ Fp,
Fp6 = Fp2 [v]/(v3 − ξ), where ξ ∈ Fp2 , and
Fp12 = Fp6 [w]/(w2 − γ), where γ ∈ Fp6 .
For our choice of parameters, we have the optimal β = −1, ξ = u+1, γ = v. Table 7.4 gives
the computational costs of the tower extension field arithmetic for curves with k = 12 in
terms of a 640-bit multiplication (m640) and inversion (i640) in Fp, with p a 638-bit prime.1
The cost of additions is ignored because of their lower overall performance impact due
to the larger field size in comparison with [2, 70]. Moreover, m̃, s̃, ı̃ denote the cost of
1In the case of software implementation, this selection of the size of p facilitates the usage of lazy
reduction techniques as recommended in [2, 70].
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multiplication, squaring and inversion in Fp2 respectively.2 GΦ6(p2) denotes the order-Φ6(p2)
subgroup of F∗p12 , where Φk denotes the k-th cyclotomic polynomial.
Field Mult. Squaring Inversion
Fp2 m̃ = 3m640 s̃ = 2m640 ı̃ = 4m640 + i640
Fp6 6m̃ m̃+ 4s̃ 9m̃+ 3s̃+ ı̃
Fp12 18m̃ 12m̃ 23m̃+ 11s̃+ ı̃





Simult. decompression n(3m̃+ 3s̃)+
of n field elements (n− 1)3m̃+ ı̃
p/p2/p3-Frobenius 10m/15m/15m
Table 7.4. Costs of arithmetic operations in a tower extension field Fp12 .
7.2.2. Miller loop. For the parameter selection z = −2107 +2105 +293 +25, the Miller
loop computation of fz,Q requires 107 point doublings and associated line evaluations, 3
point additions with line evaluations, 109 sparse multiplications, and 106 squarings in Fp12 .
The computational costs of these operations can be found in [2, Table 1]. We obtain a
BLS12 Miller loop cost of 107(3m̃+6s̃+4m640)+3(11m̃+2s̃+4m640)+109(13m̃)+106(12m̃)
= 3043m̃+ 648s̃+ 440m640 = 10865m640.
7.2.3. Final exponentiation. The final exponentiation consists of raising the Miller
loop result f ∈ Fpk to the e = (pk− 1)/r-th power. This task can be broken into two parts
since
e = (pk − 1)/r = [(pk − 1)/Φk(p)] · [Φk(p)/r].
Computing f (p
k−1)/Φk(p) is considered easy, costing only a few multiplications, inversions,
and inexpensive p-th powerings in Fpk . Raising to the power d = Φk(p)/r is a more
challenging task. Observing that p-th powering is much less expensive than multiplication,
Scott et al. [84] give a systematic method for reducing the expense of exponentiating by
d. In the case of BLS12 curves, it can be shown that the exponent d can be written as
2For further details on how these costs were deduced, the reader is referred to [2, 70].
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5 − 2z4 + 2z2 − z + 3,
λ1(z) = z
4 − 2z3 + 2z − 1,
λ2(z) = z
3 − 2z2 + z,
λ3(z) = z
2 − 2z + 1.
The exponentiation fd can be computed using the following addition-subtraction chain:
f → f−2 → f z → f 2z → f z−2 → f z2−2z → f z3−2z2 → f z4−2z3
→ f z4−2z3+2z → f z5−2z4+2z2 ,
which requires 5 exponentiations by z, 2 multiplications in Fp12 , and 2 cyclotomic squarings.
This allows fd to be computed as
fd = f z
5−2z4+2z2 · (f z−2)−1 · f · (f z4−2z3+2z · f−1)p · (f z3−2z2 · f z)p2 · (f z2−2z · f)p3 ,
which requires an additional 8 multiplications in Fp12 and 3 Frobenius maps. This implies
that the hard part of the final exponentiation requires 2 cyclotomic squarings, 5 exponen-
tiations by z, 10 multiplications in Fp12 , and 3 Frobenius maps.
In total, the cost of computing the final exponentiation is 1 inversion in Fp12 , 2 cyclo-
tomic squarings, 12 multiplications in Fp12 , 4 Frobenius maps, and 5 exponentiations by z.
It can be shown that exponentiation by our choice of the z parameter requires 107 com-
pressed squarings, simultaneous decompression of 4 field elements, and 3 multiplications in
Fp12 when Karabina’s exponentiation technique [48] is employed. The cost of an exponenti-
ation by z is 107(6s̃)+4(3m̃+3s̃)+3(3m̃)+ı̃+3(18m̃) = 75m̃+654s̃+ı̃, whence the total cost
of the final exponentiation is (23m̃+11s̃+ ı̃)+2(9s̃)+12(18m̃)+60m640 +5(75m̃+654s̃+ ı̃)
= 614m̃+ 3299s̃+ 6ı̃ = 8464m640 + 6i640.
7.2.4. Optimal pairing cost. From the above, we conclude that the estimated cost
of the optimal ate pairing for our chosen BLS12 curve is
10865m640 + 8464m640 + 6i640 = 19329m640 + 6i640.
7.2.5. Parallelization. Figure 7.1 illustrates the execution path for the β Weil pairing
(7.6) when the four Miller functions are computed in parallel using 4 processors. As with
the optimal ate pairing, Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 were repeatedly applied to each Miller function
in the β Weil pairing in order to obtain a parallel implementation using 8 processors.
7.3. KSS18 pairings
In this section, we consider the KSS18 curve Y 2 = X3 + 2 defined with the parameter
selection














fpz,Q(P ) · fz,Q(pP )
fpz,P (Q) · fz,pP (Q)
Figure 7.1. Execution path for computing the β Weil pairing for BLS12
curves on 4 processors.
7.3.1. Extension field arithmetic for pairings with k = 18. An element in Fp18
can be represented using the following towering scheme:
Fp3 = Fp[u]/(u3 + 2),
Fp6 = Fp3 [v]/(v2 − u),
Fp18 = Fp6 [w]/(w3 − v).
Table 7.5 gives the computational costs of the tower extensions field arithmetic for curves
with k = 18, where m512, i512 denote the cost of multiplication and inversion in Fp, with p
a 512-bit prime. Moreover, m̂, ŝ, ı̂ denote the cost of multiplication, squaring and inversion
in Fp3 respectively.
Field Mult. Squaring Inversion
Fp3 m̂ = 6m512 ŝ = 5m512 ı̂ = 12m512 + i512
Fp6 3m̂ 2m̂ 2m̂+ 2ŝ+ ı̂
Fp18 18m̂ 11m̂ 20m̂+ 8ŝ+ ı̂





Simult. decompression n(3m̂+ 3ŝ)+
of n field elements (n− 1)3m̂+ ı̂
pth-Frobenius 15m
Table 7.5. Costs of arithmetic operations in a tower extension field Fp18 .
7.3.2. Computation of the optimal ate pairing. For the parameter selection z =
−264 − 251 + 246 + 212, the Miller loop executes 64 point doublings with line evaluations,
4 point additions with line evaluations, 67 sparse multiplications and 63 squarings in Fp18 .
We obtain a KSS18 Miller loop cost of 64(3m̂+6ŝ+6m512)+4(11m̂+2ŝ+6m512)+67(13m̂)+
63(11m̂) = 1800m̂ + 392ŝ + 408m512 = 13168m512. Furthermore, the final step executes
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1 squaring in Fp18 , one p-power Frobenius, 1 multiplication in Fp18 , 2 point additions
with line evaluation, one point doubling with line evaluation, 1 sparse multiplication, 1
sparser multiplication, and the computation of the isomorphism ψ(Q). Thus the KSS18
final step cost is 11m̂ + 18m̂ + 2(11m̂ + 2ŝ + 6m512) + 3m̂ + 6ŝ + 6m512 + 20m̂ + 28m512
= 74m̂+ 10ŝ+ 40m512 = 534m512. The final exponentiation executes in total one inversion
in Fp18 , 8 cyclotomic squarings, 54 multiplications in Fp18 , 29 p-power Frobenius, and 7
exponentiations by z (Section 5.2.4). The computational cost of an exponentiation by z is
64 compressed squarings, decompression of 4 field elements and 3 multiplications in Fp18 , for
a total cost of 64(6ŝ)+4(3ŝ+3m̂)+9m̂+ ı̂+3(18m̂) = 75m̂+396ŝ+ ı̂. Hence, the total cost
of the final exponentiation is 20m̂+8ŝ+ ı̂+8(6m̂)+54(18m̂)+435m512 +7(75m̂+396ŝ+ ı̂)
= 1565m̂+ 2780ŝ+ 8ı̂+ 435m512 = 23821m512 + 8i512 Finally, the total cost of computing
the KSS18 optimal ate pairing is
13168m512 + 534m512 + 23821m512 + 8i512 = 37523m512 + 8i512.
7.3.3. Computation of the β Weil pairing. The most expensive part of the β Weil
pairing for KSS18 curves (7.4) are the six Miller functions fz,R. For parallel implementation
using 4 cores, repeated applications of Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 can be used to write z = 2wz1+z0




· f2w,z1R · fz0,R · (`2w · z1R, z0R)/vzR.
For the KSS18 parameter z = −264 − 251 + 246 + 212, we chose w = 36, z1 = −228 + 215 +
210, z0 = 2
12 and split the two most expensive Miller functions fpz,Q(pP ) and fz,Q(p
2P ).
Figure 7.2 illustrates an execution path. At the end, it is necessary for each core to compute
the additional functions (fp3,R · `zR,3pR)p
i




































Figure 7.2. Execution path for computing the β Weil pairing for KSS18
curves on 4 processors.
For the case of an 8-core implementation, we simply reschedule these functions so that
each core takes approximately the same time.
89
7.4. BN pairings
In this section, we consider the BN curve Y 2 = X3 + 5 defined with the parameter
selection
z = 2158 − 2128 − 268 + 1.
The extension fields are
Fp2 = Fp[u]/(u2 + 1),
Fp6 = Fp2 [v]/(v3 − ξ),with ξ = u+ 2
Fp12 = Fp6 [w]/(w2 − v).
7.4.1. Computation of the optimal ate pairing. The Miller loop executes 160
point doublings with line evaluations, 6 point additions with line evaluations, 164 sparse
multiplications, 1 sparser multiplication and 159 squarings in Fp12 . We obtain a BN Miller
loop cost of 160(3m̃ + 6s̃ + 4m640) + 6(11m̃ + 2s̃ + 4m640) + 164(13m̃) + 7m̃ + 159(12m̃)
= 4593m̃+ 972s̃+ 664m640 = 16387m640.
Furthermore, the final step executes ψ(Q), ψ2(Q), 2 point additions with line evalua-
tion, 1 sparser multiplication and 1 multiplication in Fp12 . The p-th power Frobenius can
be computed at a cost of about 5m640 and the p
2-th power Frobenius can be computed
at a cost of about 4m640. Thus the BN final step cost is 2(11m̃ + 2s̃ + 4m640) + 7m̃ +
18m̃ + 9m640 = 47m̃ + 4s̃ + 17m640 = 166m640. The final exponentiation executes in to-
tal 1 inversion in Fp12 , 3 cyclotomic squarings, 12 multiplications in Fp12 , 2 p-th power
Frobenius, 1 p2-th power Frobenius, 1 p3-th power Frobenius, and 3 exponentiations by
z (Section 5.2.1). The computational cost of an exponentiation by z is: 158 compressed
squarings, decompression of 3 field elements and 3 multiplications in Fp12 , for a total cost
of 158(6s̃) + 3(3s̃ + 3m̃) + 6m̃ + ı̃ + 3(18m̃) = 69m̃ + 957s̃ + ı̃. Hence, the total cost of
the final exponentiation is 23m̃+ 11s̃+ ı̃+ 3(9s̃) + 12(18m̃) + 50m640 + 3(69m̃+ 957s̃+ ı̃)
= 446m̃+ 2909s̃+ 62m640 + 4i640 = 7218m640 + 4i640. Finally, the total cost of computing
the BN optimal ate pairing is
16387m640 + 166m640 + 7218m640 + 4i640 = 23771m640 + 4i640.
7.4.2. Computation of the β Weil pairing. For BN curves, we consider the β
pairing from Section 4.2.2. Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 were repeatedly applied in order to estimate
the cost of a parallel implementation using 8 processors.
7.5. BLS24 pairings
In this section, we consider the BLS24 curve Y 2 = X3 + 1 defined with the parameter
selection
z = −248 + 245 + 231 − 27.
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7.5.1. Extension field arithmetic for pairings with k = 24. An element in Fp24
can be represented using the following towering scheme:
Fp2 = Fp[i]/(i2 + 1),
Fp4 = Fp2 [u]/(u2 − ξ), with ξ = i+ 1,
Fp12 = Fp4 [v]/(v2 − u),
Fp24 = Fp12 [w]/(w2 − v).
Table 7.6 gives the computational costs of the tower extension field arithmetic for curves
with k = 24, where m480 and i480 denote the cost of multiplication and inversion in Fp,
with p a 479-bit prime. Moreover, m̃, s̃, ı̃ denote the cost of multiplication, squaring and
inversion in Fp2 respectively.
Field Mult. Squaring Inversion
Fp2 m̃ = 3m480 s̃ = 2m480 ı̃ = 4m480 + i480
Fp4 3m̃ 2m̃ 2m̃+ 2s̃+ ı̃
Fp12 18m̃ 12m̃ 23m̃+ 11s̃+ ı̃
Fp24 54m̃ 36m̃ 83m̃+ 11s̃+ ı̃





Simult. decompression (2n− 1)(9m̃) + n(6m̃)
of n field elements +2m̃+ 2s̃+ ı̃
p/p2/p3-Frobenius 45m
Table 7.6. Costs of arithmetic operations in a tower extension field Fp24 .
7.5.2. Computation of the optimal ate pairing. The Miller loop executes 48
point doublings with line evaluations, 4 point additions with line evaluations, 51 sparse
multiplications and 47 squarings in Fp24 . We obtain a BLS24 Miller loop cost of 48(21m̃+
8m480) + 4(37m̃ + 8m480) + 51(39m̃) + 47(36m̃) = 4837m̃ + 416m480 = 14927m480. The
computation of the final exponentiation requires 1 inversion, 9 exponentiations by z, 14
multiplications in Fp24 , 2 cyclotomic squarings, and 8 p-th power Frobenius operations.
Moreover, the cost of an exponentiation by z is 48 compressed squarings, decompression of
4 field elements and 3 multiplications in Fp24 , for a total cost of 48(12m̃)+87m̃+ı̃+3(54m̃) =
827m̃+2s̃+ ı̃. Hence, the total cost of the final exponentiation is (83m̃+11s̃+ ı̃)+9(827m̃+
2s̃+ ı̃)+14(54m̃)+2(18m̃)+360m480 = 8318m̃+13s̃+400m480+10i480 = 25380m480+10i480.
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Finally, the total cost of computing the BLS24 optimal ate pairing is
14927m480 + 25380m480 + 10i480 = 40307m480 + 10i480.
7.5.3. Computation of the β Weil pairing. Since 4 | e where e = k/d, the par-
allelization procedure for the β Weil pairing (7.7) on 2, 4 and 8 cores is straightforward:
with 2 cores, each core computes 4 Miller functions; with 4 cores, each core computes 2
Miller functions; and with 8 cores: each core computes 1 Miller function.
7.6. Comparisons
7.6.1. Estimates for serial implementations of the optimal ate pairings. The
customary way to estimate the cost of a pairing is to count multiplications in the under-
lying finite fields. Notice that in the case of software implementations in modern desktop
platforms, field elements a ∈ Fp can be represented with ` = 1 + blog2(p)c binary coef-
ficients ai packed in n64 = d `64e 64-bit processor words. If Montgomery representation is
used to implement field multiplication in Fp640 and Fp512 with complexity O(2n264 + n64),
then it is reasonable to estimate that we have m640 ≈ (210/136) ·m512 ≈ 1.544 ·m512.
Table 7.7 summarizes the costs in terms of finite field multiplications for computing
the optimal ate pairing over our choice of KSS18, BN, BLS12 and BLS24 curves at the
192-bit security level.3 As can be seen, our estimates predict that the optimal ate pairing
over BLS12 curves is the most efficient choice at the 192-bit security level, with KSS18,
BN and BLS24 curves being significantly slower. The main computational bottleneck for
BLS24 curves is their very expensive final exponentiation.
7.6.2. Estimates for multi-core implementations of the optimal ate and β
Weil pairings. Table 7.8 (see also Figure 7.3) shows estimated speedups for the parallel
version of the optimal ate pairing using the partitions in Table 7.9 and all the β Weil pairing
variants considered here. All speedup factors are with respect to the serial version of the
KSS18 optimal ate pairing. It can be seen that the estimated performance for BLS12
curves when using 8 cores is of a factor-3.29 acceleration, which is the highest speedup
we obtain. Perhaps the most notable observation from Table 7.8 is that, for eight-core
implementations, the β Weil pairing becomes more efficient than the optimal ate pairing
for all the four curves considered.
3In the case of BN and KSS18 curves it is necessary to compute several extra lines and Frobenius
maps. We refer to these steps as the “Final step”. We stress that there is no analogous final step in the
case of BLS12 and BLS24 curves.
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Curve Phase Mult. in Fp Mult. in Fp512
Miller Loop 13168m512 13168m512
KSS18 Final Step 534m512 534m512
Final Exp. 23821m512 23821m512
ML + FS + FE 37523m512 37523m512
Miller Loop 16387m640 25301m512
BN Final Step 166m640 256m512
Final Exp. 7218m640 11145m512
ML + FS + FE 23771m640 36702m512
Miller Loop 10865m640 16775m512
BLS12 Final Exp. 8464m640 13068m512
ML + FE 19329m640 29843m512
Miller Loop 14927m480 14927m512
BLS24 Final Exp. 25412m480 25412m512
ML + FE 40339m480 40339m512
Table 7.7. Cost estimates of the optimal ate pairing for KSS18, BN, BLS12
and BLS24 curves at the 192-bit security level. Note that m480 = m512 in a
64-bit processor.
Number of threads
Estimated speedup KSS18 1 2 4 8
Optimal ate 1.00 1.17 1.28 1.33
β Weil 0.47 0.91 1.54 2.51
Estimated speedup BN 1 2 4 8
Optimal ate 1.02 1.36 1.61 1.76
β Weil 0.41 0.81 1.42 2.16
Estimated speedup BLS12 1 2 4 8
Optimal ate 1.26 1.56 1.76 1.88
β Weil 0.64 1.25 2.20 3.29
Estimated speedup BLS24 1 2 4 8
Optimal ate 0.93 1.05 1.12 1.14
β Weil 0.40 0.78 1.49 2.39
Table 7.8. Estimated speedups for the parallel version of the optimal ate
pairing versus the β Weil pairing. All speedup factors are with respect to
the serial version of the KSS18 optimal ate pairing.
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Figure 7.3. Expected speedups for KSS18, BN, BLS12 and BLS24 optimal
ate pairings at the 192-bit security level. All speedup factors are with respect
to the serial version of the KSS18 optimal ate pairing.
Number of threads (c)
Curve 2 4 8
KSS18 36 54, 39, 21 63, 58, 52, 45, 36, 26, 14
BN 86 129, 93, 50 149, 137, 122, 105, 85, 61, 33
BLS12 57 85, 61, 33 98, 90, 81, 70, 56, 40, 21
BLS24 26 38, 28, 15 44, 41, 37, 32, 26, 19, 10
Table 7.9. Parameters wi, 0 < i < c, which define the partition of the
form s = 2wc−1sc−1 + · · ·+2w1s1 +s0 for splitting the Miller loop according to
Equation (7.8) when computing a multi-thread optimal ate pairing among c
processing units.
7.6.3. Timings. We implemented the KSS18, BN, BLS12 and BLS24 pairings fol-
lowing the techniques described in [2] on two different 64-bit 32nm platforms, an Intel
Core i5 540M Nehalem and an Intel Core i7 2630QM Sandy Bridge. Field arithmetic was
implemented in Assembly for maximum efficiency and high-level code was implemented in
the C programming language. The GCC 4.7.0 compiler suite was used with compilation
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flags for loop unrolling, inlining of small functions to reduce function call overheads, and
optimization level -O3. The implementation was done on top of the RELIC cryptographic
toolkit [1].
The m640 ≈ 1.544 ·m512 estimate used above was experimentally confirmed with care-
fully crafted Assembly code for multiplication and Montgomery reduction. Implementing
the double-precision arithmetic needed for efficient application of lazy reduction proved to
be slightly cumbersome due to the exhaustion of the 16 general-purpose registers available
in the target platform (one of the registers is mostly reserved for keeping track of stack
memory, aggravating the effect). Naturally, this issue had a bigger performance impact on
the larger 638-bit field, introducing higher penalties for reading and writing values stored
into memory. By using a very efficient implementation of the Extended Euclidean Algo-
rithm imported from the GMP4 library, we obtained inversion-to-multiplication ratios in
Fp of around 16, suggesting the use of the projective coordinate system instead of the affine
coordinates recommended in [80] and [51], even after considering the action of the norm
map to simplify the inversion operation in extension fields. Affine coordinates were only
competitive for the BLS24 curve.
The resulting timings for the two platforms are presented in Table 7.10 (measured with
the Turbo Boost feature disabled). Timings for the parallel implementation of pairings
which were estimated to be slower than the reference performance of the KSS18 pairing
are omitted. We obtained results confirming our performance estimates, i.e., the BLS12
curve is the most efficient choice for pairing computation at the 192-bit security level across
all the considered scenarios. In particular, our fastest serial implementation on the Intel
Core i5 Nehalem machine can compute a pairing in approximately 19 million cycles, more
than 3 times faster than the current state-of-the-art. The previous speed record for a single
pairing computation without precomputation at this security level was presented in [80,
Table 2, column 4 halved] and achieves a latency of 60 million cycles on a very similar
machine when a factor of 1.22 is applied to the timings to adjust for the effect of Turbo
Boost.5 Additionally, the β Weil pairing presents itself as the most efficient and scalable
choice of pairing in a multiprocessor machine with more than 4 processing units.
4GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library: http://www.gmplib.org
5This was confirmed with the author via private communication.
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Number of threads
Platform 1 – Intel Core i5 Nehalem 32nm 1 2 4* 8*
KSS18 optimal ate – latency 23.40 20.91 19.75 19.17
KSS18 optimal ate – speedup 1.00 1.12 1.18 1.22
KSS18 β Weil – latency – – 15.04 9.18
KSS18 β Weil – speedup – – 1.56 2.55
BN optimal ate – latency 23.22 17.28 14.63 13.40
BN optimal ate – speedup 1.01 1.35 1.59 1.73
BN β Weil – latency – – 16.65 11.17
BN β Weil – speedup – – 1.39 2.08
BLS12 optimal ate – latency 18.67 15.15 13.49 12.58
BLS12 optimal ate – speedup 1.25 1.54 1.73 1.86
BLS12 β Weil – latency – 19.38 10.80 7.24
BLS12 β Weil – speedup – 1.21 2.17 3.23
BLS24 optimal ate – latency 26.32 24.00 22.82 22.27
BLS24 optimal ate – speedup 0.89 0.98 1.03 1.05
BLS24 β Weil – latency – – 17.83 10.26
BLS24 β Weil – speedup – – 1.31 2.28
Platform 2 – Intel Core i7 Sandy Bridge 32nm 1 2 4 8*
KSS18 optimal ate – latency 17.73 15.76 14.95 14.52
KSS18 optimal ate – speedup 1.00 1.12 1.19 1.22
KSS18 β Weil – latency – – 11.36 6.97
KSS18 β Weil – speedup – – 1.56 2.54
BN optimal ate – latency 17.43 13.00 10.98 10.05
BN optimal ate – speedup 1.02 1.36 1.61 1.76
BN β Weil – latency – – 12.58 8.45
BN β Weil – speedup – – 1.41 2.10
BLS12 optimal ate – latency 14.08 11.41 10.11 9.48
BLS12 optimal ate – speedup 1.26 1.55 1.75 1.87
BLS12 β Weil – latency – 14.58 8.13 5.47
BLS12 β Weil – speedup – 1.22 2.18 3.24
BLS24 optimal ate – latency 19.97 18.27 17.21 16.86
BLS24 optimal ate – speedup 0.89 0.97 1.03 1.05
BLS24 β Weil – latency – – 13.75 7.90
BLS24 β Weil – speedup – – 1.29 2.24
Table 7.10. Experimental results for serial/parallel executions of the
KSS18, BN and BLS12 optimal ate and β Weil pairings. Timings are pre-
sented in millions of clock cycles. The speedups are with respect to the
serial version of the KSS18 optimal ate pairing. The columns marked with
(*) present estimates based on per-thread data.
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CHAPTER 8
A Privacy-Preserving Ecash-based Road-Tolling Protocol
This chapter describes a security application where BLS signatures play an important
role due to their efficient signature generation and small signatures. Electronic Toll Pricing
(ETP) aims to improve road tolling by collecting toll fares electronically and without
the need to slow down vehicles. In most ETP schemes, drivers are charged periodically
based on the locations, times, distances or durations travelled. ETP is sometimes used
to reduce traffic congestion as vehicles tend to avoid peak drive times due to the extra
fees associated with them, such as with the London congestion charge [56]. Usually, these
schemes require the use of an on-board unit in the vehicle. As opposed to traditional stop-
and-pay tollbooths, ETP schemes can be used in a more pervasive manner, potentially
making, for example, all roads in a downtown core into toll roads.
Many ETP schemes are currently deployed, such as e-TAG in Australia [45] and E-
ZPass in the United States [73]. Singapore was the first to implement an ETP system to
reduce congestion in 1998 [21]. Although these systems are efficient, they require a great
deal of knowledge regarding driving habits in order to operate correctly. In particular,
these systems store time, location, and identity, making it easy to build a profile of a
driver’s daily travel. In the United States, E-ZPass records can be obtained by court order
in several jurisdictions for use in civil matters such as divorce [66]. Given that a high level
of privacy can be obtained using traditional stop-and-pay toll booths, an ETP protocol
that maintains a comparable level of privacy would be ideal.
We propose two ETP schemes in which tokens, based on BLS or RSA-FDH signatures,
are broadcast periodically from the driver’s vehicle. If a driver is caught not broadcasting
a valid token, the driver is appropriately penalized. In this manner, we ensure that drivers
behave honestly at all times, so long as they cannot discern when someone is monitoring
their broadcasts. In our first scheme, we offer privacy guarantees similar to those offered
by other privacy-preserving schemes. In particular, the central authority only learns the
location data corresponding to times and places where the vehicle is physically observed.
In our second scheme, we examine the cost of a system that does not require the collection
of any private data of honest drivers. Both of these schemes rely on simple primitives
such as RSA Full Domain Hash [26] and Chaum’s ecash [23]. This is in contrast to the
comparatively expensive zero-knowledge proofs and secure two-party computations needed
by other ETP protocols, such as VPriv [72], PrETP [4], and Milo [58].
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We present SPEcTRe, a suite of protocols for electronic toll pricing. The SPEcTRe
spot-record scheme records time-location information where drivers are physically observed.
This is comparable to other schemes, but runs much faster, requiring only a modest amount
of computational power to support one million vehicles. All the state-of-art ETP protocols
including our spot-record scheme keep records of a small amount of location-time tuples
in order to combat dishonest drivers. However, the SPEcTRe no-record scheme stores no
private information of drivers, while still being capable of detecting cheaters.
8.1. Related work
Recently, much work has been done to build privacy-preserving schemes for electronic
toll pricing and other related driving problems. For instance, work has been done to extend
the problem to insurance pricing and speeding detection. Popa et al.’s VPriv [72] provides
a practical protocol for computing path functions for several driving-related problems while
maintaining a high level of privacy. The protocol uses a secure two-party computation to
make sure drivers cannot cheat on the total tolling price if they do not cheat on the tokens
they have uploaded. To ensure users upload the correct data, the authority is required to
randomly record some {license plate, location, time} tuples, and then challenge drivers with
these records during payment. It is important that the number of random observations, or
“spot-checks”, are kept to a moderate amount to maintain drivers’ privacy. A measurement
is performed to show that a modest hardware infrastructure can easily serve one million
vehicles. VPriv is one of several recent papers that attempt to solve the problem of location
privacy through the use of zero-knowledge proofs and secure multi-party computation.
Published a year after VPriv, Balasch et al. propose the PrETP scheme [4] with similar
goals. They define a cryptographic protocol, Optimistic Payment, and prove it secure using
zero-knowledge proofs and the RSA assumption. Unlike VPriv, they do not use secure
two-party computations. Instead, the Toll Charger requires homomorphic commitments
from clients, and the Toll Service Provider asks clients to open commitments to certain
location-time tuples corresponding to its random spot-checks. For each client, only the
total payment amount and location-time tuples in the physical vicinity of random spot-
checks are revealed. They construct an on-board unit and analyze their system from a
security, legal, performance, and cost perspective. Based on PrETP, Meiklejohn et al.’s
Milo [58] furthermore considers the possibility that drivers may collude to learn the spot-
checking locations. By utilizing blind identity-based encryption, these locations are not
revealed to drivers.
The use of ecash to pay for driving has been suggested by Chaum and others [6, 24, 57]
but the concept has not been used in a pervasive electronic tolling scheme until now. In
particular, it is merely suggested that ecash replace physical currency. However, we have
found that we can improve on this naive implementation by reducing the number of tolling
points while maintaining driver honesty and privacy.
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In VPriv, PrETP and Milo, spot-checks are necessary to uncover cheating drivers.
SPEcTRe maintains the same level of privacy as these other schemes for drivers, in the
sense that in all these schemes, location-time information of a vehicle is only revealed at
spot-checking points. We also offer the same amount of security. Cheating drivers are
detected, and a dishonest central authority cannot learn any more information than they
do by spot-checking.
8.2. Ecash
Chaum [23] introduced the concept of ecash. The essential idea is that a user can
purchase a single interaction with a server the end result of which is a cryptographic coin
in the possession of the user which can only be created by the server. Presuming the server
demands a fixed amount of a given currency to create a coin and presuming a coin can
be redeemed for the amount in question, the coin may be treated as though it were the
underlying currency.
The attractiveness of Chaum’s scheme lies in the privacy guarantees. In particular,
given two coins created in two separate interactions with the server, it is information-the-
oretically impossible to relate the coins to the respective events which created each coin.
We present instantiations based on RSA Full Domain Hash (RSA-FDH) and the BLS
signature scheme. Chaum’s scheme consists of the algorithms Generate, Commit, Sign,
Open, and Verify.
The algorithms Generate and Sign are run by the signer, who holds the private key,
while the remaining algorithms are run by the client, who holds the public key.
8.2.1. RSA-FDH-based ecash. The follow ecash scheme is based on RSA-FDH
signatures. In particular, the Generate and Verify algorithms for the RSA-FDH-based
ecash are the same as in RSA-FDH signatures.
Generate returns a public key (e,N), a private key (d,N), and a hash functionH : {0, 1}∗ →
ZN .
Commit takes as input a message m. The algorithm selects x ∈ ZN uniformly at random
and returns c = xe ·H(m).
Sign takes as input a commitment c and returns γ = cd.
Open takes as input a signed commitment γ and the corresponding random value x. The
algorithm returns the signature σ = γ · x−1.
Verify takes as input a public key (e,N) and a message/signature pair (m,σ). The
algorithm returns ‘valid’ if σe = H(m) and ‘invalid’ otherwise.
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The security of Chaum’s scheme can be proven equivalent to solving the One-More-
RSA-Inversion problem [12]. In practice, it is generally assumed that this is equivalent to
the RSA problem but currently it is only known that the One-More-RSA-Inversion problem
can be reduced to the RSA problem.
8.2.2. Pairing-based ecash. Fix a pairing e : G1×G2 → GT , where G1, G2, and GT
are order-r groups. As global public parameters we fix generators P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2, and a
hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G1.
Generate selects a positive integer x < r uniformly at random. The algorithm returns a
public key 〈X1, X2〉 = 〈xP, xQ〉 and a private key x.
Commit takes as input a messagem. The algorithm selects a positive integer s < r uniformly
at random and returns a commitment R = sP +H(m).
Sign takes as input a commitment R and returns γ = xR.
Open takes as input a signed commitment γ, the corresponding random value s, and a
public key 〈X1, X2〉. The algorithm returns the signature σ = γ − sX1.
Verify takes as input a public key 〈X1, X2〉, a message/signature pair (m,σ), and computes
S = H(m). The algorithm returns ‘valid’ if e(S,X2) = e(σ, P ) and ‘invalid’ otherwise.
To save space, the y-coordinate of the signature σ can be discarded; unlike the generic
situation for elliptic curve point compression, for BLS, not even one bit need be kept [69].
This comes at a slight extra cost for verification, as that coordinate will need to be recom-
puted, but this extra cost is negligible compared to the pairing operations (over two orders
of magnitude cheaper).
8.3. Spot-record scheme
There are four main components of a tolling scheme. A registration server registers
drivers, possibly providing them with an on-board unit. A driver drives on toll roads and
verifiably pays for driving either during or after transit. A verifier occasionally monitors
the drivers as they drive. A payment server ensures that drivers pay for the amount of
driving they perform. We could expect that the registration server, payment server, and
verifier are managed by the same entity. The goal is to protect the privacy of the driver
while enforcing that the driver correctly pays for his driving. Specifically, we concern
ourselves with location privacy, which is the linkability of the times and places a particular
driver has travelled.
In our scheme, the driver obtains tokens from the registration server at the beginning of
some time period (for example, a month). While driving, the driver spends the tokens by
broadcasting them. At the end of the time period, the driver interacts with the payment
server to redeem unused tokens and pays for the tokens used.
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We present SPEcTRe using the RSA Full Domain Hash signature scheme. However,
the BLS signature scheme can be used as well. The tolling protocol consists of three
phases: registration, driving, and reconciliation. During registration, the driver is assigned
a random private identity i and a set of tokens of the form (r, σ), where σ = H(r, i)d and
r is a random string. The identity i should correspond to the license plate of the driver’s
vehicle but the correspondence should be kept private from third parties.
While driving, the driver broadcasts tuples (r, σ), switching tuples at predefined inter-
vals. In order to ensure drivers are broadcasting, a verifier secretly monitors drivers at
random locations and times. For each driver, the verifier takes a picture of the driver’s
licence plate and records all tuples (r, σ) which are being broadcast. No further work needs
to be done by the verifier other than recording and storing this data.
For each license-plate photograph, there is a set of records {rj, σj}j that were recorded
in the vicinity. The registration server derives an identity i from the photograph and
ensures that σej = H(rj, i) for some index j, forming a tuple (i, rj, σj) for each photograph.
This server also checks for double spending by ensuring no identity uses the same random
string rj in two different locations. If no signature is found for a given photograph or a
signature appears twice, it is concluded that the driver is cheating.
Finally, during reconciliation, the driver submits all tuples (r, σ) which were not spent.
The payment server verifies that none of these tokens were detected and collects payment
for those tokens not submitted. Alternately, full payment for all tokens can be made at
registration time and a refund for the submitted tokens can be received during reconcilia-
tion.
If the verifier is capable of taking photographs and detecting tokens in a stealthy man-
ner, then the driver must always spend tokens while driving to avoid penalty. Since a
private random identity is chosen for each licence plate, tuples cannot be linked to each
other without knowledge of the identity. Since the identity is not broadcast as part of the
token, a third party cannot determine the identity corresponding to a given tuple. Loca-
tion data is only collected during spot-checks. This is similar to VPriv, PrETP, and Milo,
and is a vast improvement over schemes implemented today, such as E-ZPass.
8.4. No-record scheme
In the preceding scheme, a small amount of location-time information about honest
drivers is recorded in order to combat cheating drivers. However, in an ideal privacy
setting, we want to collect no information about honest drivers at all, but still be able to
detect dishonest drivers. Our no-record (NR) scheme is an exploration of this possibility.
To accomplish this, we require the additional engineering capability that the spot-
checking verifiers be able to determine which car is broadcasting which token, through the
use of directional antennas or triangulation, for example.
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Initially, the registration server runs the ecash Generate algorithm and gives the public
key to all other components in the scheme.
From the perspective of the driver, our scheme consists of three algorithms: an interac-
tive Create algorithm, the Verify algorithm, and the Payment algorithm. Contained with
the Create algorithm is the collection of ecash algorithms. The driver selects a random
string m ∈R {0, 1}∗ and a random integer x ∈R ZN . The driver sends c = xeH(m) to
the registration server and obtains cd from the server. From cd, the driver can compute
the signature σ = x−1cd = H(m)d. The Create algorithm is described in Figure 8.1. The
driver runs the Create algorithm n times to get n tokens from the registration server.
User Registration Server
m ∈R {0, 1}∗
x ∈R ZN
c = xeH(m) −→ c
γ ←− γ = cd
σ = γ · x−1
Figure 8.1. The creation of one token
While driving, the driver broadcasts tokens (m,σ) at a predetermined rate. The Verify
algorithm is run by the verifier as these tokens are received. If the Verify algorithm
indicates that a signature is invalid, or if the driver is not broadcasting tokens at all, the
driver is held accountable in some manner at the time the algorithm is run. In practice,
the verifier will be associated with a camera or police presence which can take appropriate
measures.
After a predetermined period of time (eg. monthly), the driver’s tokens are invalidated.
At this time, the driver interacts with the payment server to redeem his unused tokens and
pay for the service. Invalidation can be done by using a different public key (e,N) for each
time period.
The spot-record scheme has the advantage that the verifier does not need to do any work
online other than photographing license plates and recording tuples. The no-record scheme
has the advantage that the amount of private data recorded is reduced but requires a more
involved verifier in order to detect malicious activity, as outlined next in Section 8.4.1.
8.4.1. Combating Double Spending. Malicious drivers have a number of oppor-
tunities to double spend their tokens. First, a single driver can use the same token more
than once while driving. Second, a single driver can spend a token while driving and then
attempt to redeem the token during payment. Third, two drivers can use the token at
the same time in different locations. An individual verifier can maintain a sorted list of
detected tokens and check new tokens against this list to combat double spending locally.
If the verifiers periodically synchronize and ultimately report their results to the payment
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server, the first and second attacks can be combated. However, without constant commu-
nication between verifiers, two drivers using the same token at the same time cannot be
detected.
In light of the fact that we need the verifiers to be synchronized to prevent double
spending, we introduce a centralized server called the verify server which interacts with
the verifier to combat double spending. After the verifier ensures the signature is correct,
the message m is sent to the verify server to be checked against other messages. The server
indicates to the verifier if the token was double spent or not.
8.4.2. Reducing the Cost of Double-Spending Detection. Since verification is
a very time-sensitive procedure, we would like to reduce the server-side latency as much as
possible. We can search and insert into a B+ tree in time O(log n). With even a modest
number of vehicles, the number of tokens and verification percentage results in very rapid
growth in the size of the B+ tree. If n were small enough to fit in memory, it would
greatly reduce the server-side latency and eliminate the need for complicated database-
management techniques. To this end, we show that by binding m to a time or location,
the double-spending detection cost can be reduced significantly.
We modify SPEcTRe as follows. During the Register algorithm, for each possible time
t, the driver constructs m = (H(r, t), H(i, s)), where r and s are fixed-length bitstrings
chosen uniformly at random. The driver obtains a signature on m in the same manner as
in the preceeding description of the algorithm with the final result being a set of tuples
of the form (t, r, i, s, σ). We suggest that the granularity of t be 5 minutes for instance.
If this granularity is too small, then as we will see in Section 8.7 the performance of this
scheme might suffer as the registration phase would turn out to be a bottleneck.
While driving, the driver selects the token (t, r, i, s, σ) corresponding to the current
time. The driver computes b = H(i, s) and broadcasts (t, r, b, σ). The verifier receives
this tuple and rejects the token if t does not correspond to the current time window. It
computes the value m = (H(r, t), b) and verifies the signature as H(m)
?
= σe. Finally, the
value m is sent to a central server to ensure that the token is not being double spent.
During the time corresponding to t, the verify server needs to compare tuples (t, r, b, σ)
only to other tuples of the form (t, r′, b′, σ′) in order to detect double spending. If n
cars are being detected during the time period corresponding to t, the total time and
space complexities for detecting double spending are O(n log n) and O(n) respectively. Of
particular note is the amount of space required. One million vehicles and a 160-bit value
for m gives a total memory cost of 20 MB.
Finally, the payment server collects all sorted time-based lists and merges them into a
master sorted list. The driver computes a = H(t, r) and submits a sorted list of tokens
to be redeemed of the form (a, s, σ). Since the identity i is fixed for all tuples, there is
no need to submit it multiple times. The payment server computes m = H(a,H(i, s)) for
each tuple, ensures the list is sorted by the m, runs the Verify algorithm on each tuple
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Verify / Payment / Security Privacy RCD RVC
driving reconciliation assumptions
VPriv O(k) O(k) RSA, ZKP, SMC Partial No No
PrETP O(k) O(k + u · r) RSA, ZKP Partial No No
Milo O(k) O(k) RSA, ZKP, SMC Partial No No
spot-record O(r) O(n log(n)) RSA, Hash Partial No No
Basic NR O(r log(u · r)) O((n− k) log(u · r)) RSA, Hash Full Yes Yes
t-bound NR O(r · ρ log(u · r · ρ)) O((n− k) log(u · r)) RSA, Hash Full Yes Yes
Table 8.1. A comparison of various schemes in terms of the complexities
of each phase, security and privacy properties, and also whether real-time
cheating detection (RCD) and real-time verifier communications (RVC) are
required when drivers are driving on the road. n is the number of tokens
per driver. u is the number of drivers. k is the average number of tokens
spent per driver. r is the average number of detections per driver. ρ is the
granularity of the bound time (a small fraction), so ρ−1 is the number of time
slices for one month. All algorithms are per driver. ZKP stands for zero-
knowledge proofs and SMC denotes secure-multiparty computation. Hash
denotes the assumption of a preimage-resistant and collision-resistant hash
function. Milo also includes an Audit phase which has been grouped with
Verify (and thus unchanged, since r < k). Also note that the constants
hidden behind the O notation for schemes with ZKP and SMC are quite
large, while for SPEcTRe, they are very small. Privacy means the extent to
which data of honest users are unmonitored.
and ensures that there are no repeated tuples. Finally, the payment server checks the
submitted list against the master list to detect if the driver is attempting to redeem spent
tokens. Since the tokens that drivers are attempting to redeem are bound to their identity,
they cannot be spent by two drivers. Hence, the submitted list need not be added to the
master list. The driver pays for those tokens not returned to the payment server.
We will describe the security and privacy implications of this modification in the next
section. We also remark that the entire m need not be transmitted during the verify phase;
we could transmit only the first few bits of H(m). For example, if we expect to store 2s
tokens, if we sent only the first 2s+ 60 bits of H(m), we would experience collisions with
probability 2−30.
8.4.3. Complexity. In Table 8.1, we give the complexities of our no-record scheme
with and without time-bound tokens. The registration algorithms have identical complexity
but the complexities of both Verify and Payment are greatly reduced with the addition of
the time variable. In both algorithms, the bottleneck of computation is on the server side.
8.4.4. Probability of Detecting Double Spending. One of the most attractive
aspects of SPEcTRe is that verifiers need not check all tokens. Presuming the drivers
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cannot detect the verifiers, they have no choice but to assume someone is listening and
behave honestly. Let ν denote the fraction of spent tokens which are being detected by
verifiers. Then the probability of detecting double spending during verification is ν2. The
probability of detecting a driver attempting to redeem a spent token is ν. Thus, it is
important to ensure the penalty for double spending outweighs the benefit.
8.4.5. Security of Tokens. We require that it is difficult for drivers to create more
tokens than are given to them during the registration protocol. The security of SPEcTRe is
equivalent to the security of ecash, relying on the difficultly of the One-More-RSA-Inversion
problem.
8.4.6. Privacy. During registration, it is clear that tokens are private in the information-
theoretic sense since they are based on a standard ecash scheme. We argue that no relation
can be ascertained between tokens revealed during different algorithms. In particular, for
m = H(a, b) with a = H(t, r) and b = H(i, s), since the images a and b are from a salted
hash, it is computationally infeasible to relate a to t or b to i.
8.5. Comparison with other work
Table 8.1 shows the complexity of our schemes with various others. Compared to previ-
ous work, our schemes rely on much more common security assumptions, such as the RSA
problem and random oracles. Although the complexities of payment and reconciliation
may appear much more expensive than previous work, our schemes are based on simpler
primitives, and so the constants in the big-O notation are much smaller in our scheme, as
evidenced by our measurements in Section 8.7.
8.6. Hardware infrastructure
There are three basic hardware components in the verifying and payment phases of
SPEcTRe: a transponder on each vehicle, token readers at various points along the road,
and a centralized server that maintains the database to check double spending.
Commercial manufacturers are working on transponder devices which allow for reliable
vehicle-to-roadside or vehicle-to-vehicle communications. The communication protocol is
layered [49], giving application-level developers flexibility in designing and implementing
their own protocols. These communications are based on dedicated short-range commu-
nications [67]. We did a proof-of-concept experiment, broadcasting tokens in a moving
vehicle driving at 40 km/h from a Nexus One smartphone, and they were reliably received
on the roadside by another Nexus One.
Token readers could either be police cars moving around discreetly or some reader
device on the roadside. Whatever those readers are, it is important that drivers are unable
to determine if someone is monitoring their broadcasts.
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The registration phase requires some server to sign tokens for clients so that transpon-
ders can broadcast these tokens. These operations can be carried out between a driver’s
personal computer and a server. A simple TLS-protected connection is sufficient.
8.7. Performance measurement
In this section we evaluate the runtime and storage requirements for the primitives of
SPEcTRe. In our measurement, we let each client serially go through the three phases: reg-
istration, verification, and payment. The measurement is based on the no-record scheme,
but with an extreme case where all the tokens broadcast are collected.
The proof-of-concept implementation was written in C++ with a multithreaded regis-
tration phase. The code is based on a server-client model where each client, representing
a vehicle, first gets tokens for the whole month, reveals half of the tokens, and then uses
another half in the payment phase. For every token a client reveals, the server stores that
token in the database to check double spending later. Our measurement does not utilize
the knowledge of i to speed up the payment phase for simplicity, and we add every token
in the payment phase to the database, which actually reduces the speed, because with
identities revealed in the payment phase, we can simply check double redemption for each
individual client. However, we still found that we beat VPriv in terms of computation time
given the same number of tokens used.
We only compare in detail the performance of our spot-record scheme with VPriv, be-
cause these two schemes share a similar hardware infrastructure. PrETP requires heavy
real-time computation on the on-board unit, which would require a specialized crypto-
graphic coprocessor when the key size goes to 2048 bits. PrETP also requires the incorpo-
ration of GPS data on each vehicle. In terms of computation requirements on the server
side, for a segment size of 1 km and a key size of 2048 bits, PrETP takes 88.050 seconds to
verify the payment of each individual driver [4]. SPEcTRe takes only around 16 seconds
to both register and verify one month’s worth of tokens for a security level of 128 bits by
using pairing-based scheme described earlier, corresponding to an RSA key size of 3072
bits.
We used the C/C++ interface of SQLite to manage our database and OpenSSL libraries
to implement the cryptographic primitives. The measurement was run on a laptop with
two 1.86 GHz cores and 2 GB RAM, with 32-bit 10.04 Ubuntu (lucid) installed. The client
and the server were running on the same machine, so we were not simulating the network.
However, we did estimate the communication cost and we will argue that our bandwidth
requirement is not high.
Figure 8.2 shows our runtime for three phases when the RSA key size is 1024 bits,
corresponding to different number of tokens used. Let us assume the average driver travels
18,000 km per year [72]. This equates to 40 hours of driving per month for each car. If
drivers are required to reveal a new token every minute, and tokens are not bound to t,
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Figure 8.2. Runtimes of each phase for many tokens
7
Figure 8.3. Runtimes of verification and payment with 10 times as many
tokens as Figure 8.2.
then the number of tokens for each client thus would be 40× 60 = 2400 every month. The
decision to reveal a new token once per minute was chosen to better compare with VPriv.
If we are to bind t to each token, the resolution of time should be chosen carefully so that
the number of tokens issued would allow registration to finish in a reasonable amount of
time.
There are some practical concerns here, however, some of which make SPEcTRe faster,
while some of them make SPEcTRe slower.
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One concern is that although the runtime for revealing and payment appears to be linear
when the dataset is small, it should not always be the case when the database becomes
larger. According to the observation of our experiment, SQLite organizes the database
with hash tables. As the database becomes larger the linear performance would not be
maintained due to collisions and reorganizations. In order to find out the performance for
a larger dataset, we ran another measurement which generates random numbers and insert
them into the database. The performance is shown in Figure 8.3, which shows that when
the number of tokens grows to 34,992,000 (14,580 clients), the runtime for each insertion
grows to twice as long as before.
There are also ways to make SPEcTRe faster. First, we can replace the RSA scheme
with a pairing-based scheme. Since currently the bottleneck is the registration phase, and
in particular the blind signature computation, a pairing-based scheme would significantly
improve our runtime. This is discussed in more detail in Section 8.7.1. Second, the regis-
tration phase is also completely parallelizable and can be done in advance. For example,
we may choose to allow registration for the next month. All that we need to ensure is
that the server’s key pair is regenerated every month. Third, we can also easily utilize the
i value so that we do not need to add tokens to the database during the payment phase
since we only need to check that every client does not submit two identical tokens.
In order to hold the number of tokens generated in our experiment, namely 34,992,000
tokens, the size of the database is 544.9 MB. So in order to hold tokens for one million
clients, we need 544.9× 1, 000, 000/14, 580 = 37373.11 MB, which is about 37 GB storage
space. This is small for an average server. We can also save some space by not storing
the entire token, but instead truncating the hash to a smaller size that makes collisions
unlikely, as discussed earlier.
We also measure the communication cost. For the payment phase, the client will reveal
every token that is not spent. Assume that a client does not spend any tokens at all, which
is the worst case. With the RSA scheme, every token is |H(t)|+ |σ| = 256 + 3072 = 3328
bits at a 128-bit security level. Thus, one client needs to transmit 2, 400 × 3328 bits =
998 KB in a whole month. For the server, assume that there are 1 million clients who
do not spend any tokens at all throughout the whole month. There will be 1 million ×
998 KB which is approximates 998 GB of data transmitted. The bandwidth required for
the server is only 0.385 MB/s. If we are to allow multiple prices by requiring more tokens
to be revealed on expensive roads, these numbers would go up but they are still acceptable
even if multiplied by 10. The pairing-based scheme with a security level of 128 bits has a
signature length of 256 bits. In that case, the communication cost would be even less. The
communication cost between verify servers is negligible.
We summed up the runtime for all three phases in Figure 8.4, which also compares
SPEcTRe with VPriv. For 1800 clients (4,320,000 tokens), SPEcTRe takes about 10,000
seconds. The runtime for VPriv grows linearly with the number of tokens, and VPriv
requires 100 seconds for 2,000 tokens in a recommended setting of 10 rounds computation.
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Figure 8.4. Runtime comparison of our no-record scheme with VPriv.
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Figure 8.5. Log-runtime comparison of our no-record scheme with VPriv.
In this sense, SPEcTRe is 4, 320, 000/(2, 000× 100) = 21.6 times faster. Figure 8.5 better
demonstrates this speed difference. A subsequent experiment with a key size of 3072 bits
on the 64-bit machine mentioned in the next section yielded a runtime 3 times slower,
but still SPEcTRe runs much faster than VPriv. With a pairing-based signature scheme,
SPEcTRe runs even faster.
8.7.1. BLS vs RSA. Registration is the slowest phase in the above measurement, as
seen in Figure 8.2. By using a pairing-based signature scheme to sign and verify tokens,
we are able to make the registration phase much faster. The performance of the BLS
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pairing-based scheme and the RSA scheme were measured on a 64-bit machine. We used
relic-toolkit version 0.3.0 [1] to implement the pairing-based scheme, and OpenSSL to
implement the RSA scheme, both at a 128-bit security level (256-bit curves for BLS and
a 3072-bit modulus for RSA). With the computation power of a single core, the times are
shown in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2. The performance of the BLS and RSA signature schemes
Sign Verify Signature size
BLS 0.4 ms 5.2 ms 256 bits
RSA 13 ms 0.3 ms 3072 bits
As we can see, the pairing-based scheme is doing a much better job in signing blind
signatures, while the RSA scheme is slow in signing but much faster in verification. In
our no-record scheme, where drivers who are double-spending should be detected on the
fly, faster verification reduces one possible bottleneck. However, one should also notice
that even assuming 20 cars are passing by within one second, BLS verification only takes
104 ms, which may not be a great issue when compared to network delay. In our spot-
record scheme, where double-spending detection can be done offline, verification time is a
less critical factor. Given that a client doesn’t reveal all his spent tokens to the verifier,
it is optimal to utilize faster BLS signing to decrease the overall computation tasks on
the server side. The pairing-based scheme requires a smaller signature, which lowers the
communication cost at places where signatures are required. But this feature would not
help much for the real-time communications between verifiers, because they do not need




At CRYPTO 2000, Lenstra and Verheul [54] presented XTR, a discrete-log public-key
cryptosystem which operates in an order-r subgroup X of the order-(p2−p+1) cyclotomic
subgroup of F∗p6 ; here p is a prime. XTR was claimed to be as efficient as elliptic curve
cryptography, but without being affected by the uncertainty that was still marring the
security of elliptic curve cryptography at the time. At the Rump Session of CRYPTO
2000, Menezes and Vanstone [60] observed that there is a supersingular elliptic curve E
defined over Fp2 of embedding degree 3 with #E(Fp2) = p2 − p + 1. Thus, the Weil
and Tate pairings yield an efficiently-computable isomorphism ξ : G → X, where G is
the order-r subgroup of E(Fp2). Menezes and Vanstone asked about the existence of an
efficiently-computable isomorphism φ : X → G, which would establish the equivalence
of DLG and DLX , where DLH denotes the discrete logarithm problem in some group H.
However, Verheul [88] gave some evidence that such an isomorphism φ was unlikely to exist.
More generally, Verheul proved that if there exists an efficiently-computable isomorphism
φ : GT → G, where e : G × G → GT is a symmetric pairing, then CDHG and CDHGT
can be efficiently solved. Here, CDHG is the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in G:
given P, aP, bP ∈ G, compute abP ; CDHGT is analogously defined. Verheul’s theorem is
striking because the only method known for solving the Diffie-Hellman problem in a group
is to first solve the discrete logarithm problem in that group.
Verheul’s theorem has been generalized to other symmetric pairings including those
derived from supersingular elliptic curves E defined over Fq2 where E(Fq2) is the product
of two cyclic groups of order q−1 (such elliptic curves can be considered to have embedding
degree k = 1
2
) [64], and for certain ordinary elliptic curves with embedding degree k = 1
[44].
For asymmetric pairings e : G1 × G2 → GT , it is natural to generalize Verheul’s work
and ask about the cryptographic implications of the existence of efficiently-computable
isomorphisms φ1 : GT → G1 and φ2 : GT → G2. Several papers have analyzed specific al-
gorithms for inverting isomorphisms φ : GT → G for symmetric pairings and isomorphisms
φ1 and φ2 for asymmetric pairings [33, 74, 75, 76]. All these algorithms are inefficient,
providing some evidence that Verheul isomorphisms φ, φ1 and φ2 cannot be feasibly com-
puted. Nonetheless, these works do not rule out the possibility that efficient algorithms
111
may exist. Since efficiently-computable Verheul isomorphisms can have devastating conse-
quences for the security of pairing-based protocols (e.g., see Remark 9.1), it is important
to collect further evidence for their non-existence.
In [34], Galbraith, Hess and Vercauteren studied the implications of the existence of
efficient algorithms for certain pairing inversion problems: (i) given R ∈ G1 and z ∈ GT ,
find S ∈ G2 with e(R, S) = z; and (ii) given S ∈ G2 and z ∈ GT , find R ∈ G1 with
e(R, S) = z. The results in [34] are purported to be generalizations and refinements of
Verheul’s theorem to asymmetric pairings. However, a strict generalization of Verheul’s
theorem would be concerned with efficiently-computable isomorphisms φ1 from GT to G1
and φ2 from GT to G2. In this chapter, we explore the implications of the existence of such
isomorphisms.
The contributions of this chapter are the following:
(1) In §9.1 we provide a short proof of Verheul’s theorem by establishing the equiv-
alence of a certain fixed argument pairing inversion problem and the problem
of computing an isomorphism φ : GT → G. Our proof is considerably simpler
than Verheul’s original proof (see Lemma 2, Lemma 3 and Theorem 4 of [88])
which, among other things, determines the equivalence of three variants of the
Diffie-Hellman problem.
(2) In §9.1 we argue that efficiently-computable reductions from DLGT to DLG are
more general than efficiently-computable isomorphisms from GT to G. Conse-
quently, Verheul’s theorem can be viewed as providing somewhat limited evidence
that DLGT is harder than DLG.
(3) In §9.2 we show that the existence of efficiently-computable isomorphisms φ1 :
GT → G1 and φ2 : GT → G2 imply that CDHG1 , CDHG2 , and CDHGT can be
efficiently solved.
(4) In §9.2 we show that the existence of an efficiently-computable isomorphism φ :
GT → G1 (resp. φ : GT → G2) implies that DLG2 (resp. DLG1) can be solved in
‘Cheon time’ which, under suitable conditions, is optimized to Õ(r1/3). This is sig-
nificantly faster than the running time Õ(
√
r) required by Pollard’s rho algorithm
[71].
9.1. Symmetric pairings
Let e : G × G → GT be a symmetric pairing. An isomorphism φ : GT → G is defined
by its action on some generator g ∈ GT ; say φ(g) = P . The Compute-φ problem is the
following: given z ∈ GT , compute φ(z). The Fixed Argument Pairing Inversion (FAPI)
problem is the following: given R ∈ G and z ∈ GT , determine S ∈ G such that e(R, S) = z.
Lemma 9.1. The FAPI and Compute-φ problems are computationally equivalent.
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Proof. The proof that Compute-φ reduces to FAPI is straightforward. Suppose that
we are given z = g` and a FAPI oracle; we wish to compute φ(z) = `P . We first use the
FAPI oracle to find Q ∈ G such that e(P,Q) = g, and then use the FAPI oracle to find
R ∈ G for which e(Q,R) = z; note that R = `P .
We now prove that FAPI reduces to Compute-φ. So, given R ∈ G, z ∈ GT , and an
oracle for Compute-φ, we wish to compute S ∈ G with e(R, S) = z. Let R = aP , S = bP ,
e(P, P ) = gc, and z = gt. Since e(aP, bP ) = gt, we have bP = a−1c−1tP . Now, define
T (i) = aici−1P for i ≥ 1, and note that T (1) = R. Given T (i), one can efficiently compute
T (2i) since
e(T (i), T (i)) = e(aici−1P, aici−1P ) = ga
2ic2i−1
and φ(ga
2ic2i−1) = a2ic2i−1P = T (2i). Moreover, given T (2i), one can efficiently compute
T (2i+ 1) since
e(T (2i), T (1)) = e(a2ic2i−1P, aP ) = ga
2i+1c2i
and φ(ga
2i+1c2i) = a2i+1c2iP = T (2i + 1). Thus, by processing the bits of the binary
representation of r−2 from left to right, one can use a double-and-add strategy to efficiently
compute
T (r − 2) = ar−2cr−3P = a−1c−2P.
Finally, one can efficiently compute φ(gt) = tP , e(tP, a−1c−2P ) = ga
−1c−1t and φ(ga
−1c−1t) =
a−1c−1tP = S. 
Lemma 9.1 immediately gives a short proof of Verheul’s Theorem.
Theorem 9.2 (Verheul). Let φ : GT → G be an isomorphism defined by φ(g) = P and
suppose that φ can be efficiently computed. Then CDHG and CDHGT can be efficiently
solved.
Proof. By Lemma 9.1, we can efficiently solve the FAPI problem.
Suppose that we are given a CDHG instance (Q, aQ, bQ) and wish to compute abQ. We
compute z = e(aQ, bQ) and then find R ∈ G such that e(Q,R) = z; note that R = abQ.
Suppose now that we are given a CDHGT instance (h, h
x, hy) and wish to compute hxy.
We do the following:
(i) Find Q ∈ G with e(P,Q) = h.
(ii) Find R ∈ G with e(Q,R) = hx; note that R = xP .
(iii) Find S ∈ G with e(P, S) = hy; note that S = yQ.
(iv) Compute e(R, S) = e(xP, yQ) = hxy.

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The point of Verheul’s theorem is to argue that DLGT cannot be reduced to DLG,
thus providing evidence that DLGT is harder than DLG. However, as observed in [50],
Verheul’s theorem can also be viewed as having negative consequences for pairing-based
cryptography wherein someone who mistrusts the security of elliptic curve cryptosystems
may have their worries allayed by the assurance that DLG is no easier than DLGT .
A more relevant question is whether there exists a reduction of DLGT to DLG. Such
a reduction is an algorithm R which on input h, hx ∈ GT and an oracle for solving DLG,
computes x. Clearly, an algorithm for computing some isomorphism φ : GT → G is also a
reduction of DLGT to DLG. The interesting question is whether every reduction of DLGT
to DLG in fact yields an efficiently-computable isomorphism from GT to G. By Lemma 9.1,
an equivalent question is whether every reduction of DLGT to DLG yields an efficient FAPI
solver:
Question 9.1. Is there an algorithm A which, when given oracle access to a reduction
algorithm R and inputs z ∈ GT , R ∈ G, outputs S ∈ G such that e(R, S) = z?
Suppose there is an efficient algorithm A which solves the problem posed in Question 9.1
when given black-box access to R1. Then A can be used to efficiently solve the following
mixed FAPI-DLG problem: given z ∈ GT , R ∈ G, U ∈ G, xU ∈ G, compute x or S ∈ G
with e(R, S) = z. Namely, given a FAPI-DLG problem instance (z,R, U, xU), we invoke
algorithm A with inputs (z,R). If A does not make any calls to its oracle R, then A outputs
S which solves the FAPI-DLG instance. If A makes a call to R, then we (in our role as
simulator for R), request the solution of the DLG instance (U, xU); since A is responsible
for answering R’s oracle queries, A returns x which again solves the FAPI-DLG instance.
Since FAPI-DLG is expected to be intractable, the above argument suggests that reduc-
tions of DLGT to DLG are in fact more general than efficiently-computable isomorphisms
from GT to G. Hence, Verheul’s theorem can be viewed as providing somewhat limited
evidence that DLGT is harder than DLG since it does not fully address the question of
whether there is a (general) reduction from DLGT to DLG.
9.2. Asymmetric pairings
Let e : G1×G2 → GT be an asymmetric pairing, where G1, G2, GT are groups of prime
order r and G1 6= G2. Furthermore, let g be a fixed generator of GT . An isomorphism
φ1 : GT → G1 is defined by its action on g; say φ1(g) = P1. Similarly, an isomorphism
φ2 : GT → G2 is defined by its action on g; say φ2(g) = P2. The Compute-φ1 problem is the
following: given z ∈ GT , compute φ1(z). The Compute-φ2 problem is the following: given
z ∈ GT , compute φ2(z). The FAPI-1 problem is the following: given R ∈ G1 and z ∈ GT ,
determine S ∈ G2 with e(R, S) = z. Similarly, the FAPI-2 problem is the following: given
S ∈ G2 and z ∈ GT , determine R ∈ G1 with e(R, S) = z.
1We have nothing useful to say in the case where A is given non-black-box access to R.
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Galbraith, Hess and Vercauteren [34] proved the following:
Theorem 9.3.
(i) Suppose that FAPI-1 and FAPI-2 can both be efficiently solved. Then CDHG1 ,
CDHG2 and CDHGT can be efficiently solved.
(ii) Suppose that FAPI-1 can be efficiently solved, and suppose that we have an
efficiently-computable isomorphism ψ2 : G2 → G1. Then FAPI-2 can be efficiently
solved.
(iii) Suppose that FAPI-2 can be efficiently solved, and suppose that we have an
efficiently-computable isomorphism ψ1 : G1 → G2. Then FAPI-1 can be efficiently
solved.
Suppose that FAPI-2 can be efficiently solved. Then one can easily construct an
efficiently-computable isomorphism φ1 : GT → G1 — select arbitrary S ∈ G2 and g ∈ GT
and define φ1 by g 7→ P where e(P, S) = g; then φ1(z) = R where e(R, S) = z. However,
it is not known whether an efficient FAPI-2 solver can be constructed from an efficiently-
computable isomorphism φ1 : GT → G1. The next result provides a partial answer to this
question.
Theorem 9.4.
(i) Suppose that efficiently-computable isomorphisms φ1 : GT → G1 and ψ1 : G1 →
G2 are known. Then FAPI-2 can be efficiently solved.
(ii) Suppose that efficiently-computable isomorphisms φ2 : GT → G2 and ψ2 : G2 →
G1 are known. Then FAPI-1 can be efficiently solved.
Proof. We prove (i); the proof of (ii) is analogous.
Given S ∈ G2 and z ∈ GT , we wish to find R ∈ G1 with e(R, S) = z. Let φ1(z) = aR
and ψ1(R) = bS for some (unknown) integers a and b. Define the maps α : G1 → G1 and
β : G1 ×G1 → G1 by
(9.1) α(U) = φ1(e(U, S))
and
(9.2) β(U, V ) = φ1(e(U, ψ1(V ))).
Observe that α(U) = aU and β(U, V ) = abcdR where U = cR and V = dR, and that α
and β can be efficiently computed.
For notational convenience, we identify a point ai−1bj−1R with the vector [i, j] whose
components are integers modulo r − 1. Thus,
(9.3) α([i, j]) = [i+ 1, j]
and
(9.4) β([i, j], [k, `]) = [i+ k, j + `].
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Our goal is to efficiently compute [1, 1], which corresponds to R. We begin by computing
φ1(z) = aR which corresponds to [2, 1]. Using (9.4), one can process the bits of the
binary representation of r − 2 to efficiently compute (r − 2) · [2, 1] = [−2,−1], followed
by α([−2,−1]) = [−1,−1]. Finally, one uses (9.4) again to efficiently compute (r − 2) ·
[−1,−1] = [1, 1]. 
The next result, which can be viewed as a refinement of Verheul’s theorem for asym-
metric pairings, follows immediately from Theorems 9.3 and 9.4.
Corollary 9.5. (i) Suppose that efficiently-computable isomorphisms φ1 : GT → G1
and ψ1 : G1 → G2 are known. Then CDHG1 , CDHG2 and CDHGT can be efficiently
solved.
(ii) Suppose that efficiently-computable isomorphisms φ2 : GT → G2 and ψ2 : G2 →
G1 are known. Then CDHG1 , CDHG2 and CDHGT can be efficiently solved.
Theorem 9.6. Suppose that efficiently-computable isomorphisms φ1 : GT → G1 and
φ2 : GT → G2 are known. Then FAPI-1 and FAPI-2 can be efficiently solved.
Proof. We show that FAPI-2 can be efficiently solved. Given S ∈ G2 and z ∈ GT , we
wish to find R ∈ G1 with e(R, S) = z. Let φ1(z) = aR and φ2(z) = bS for some (unknown)
integers a and b. Define the maps α : GT → GT and β : GT ×GT → GT by
(9.5) α(u) = e(φ1(u), S))
and
(9.6) β(u, v) = e(φ1(u), φ2(v)).
Observe that α(u) = ua and β(u, v) = zabcd where u = zc and v = zd, and that α and β
can be efficiently computed.
For notational convenience, we identify an element za
i−1bj−1 with the vector [i, j] whose
components are integers modulo r − 1. Thus,
(9.7) α([i, j]) = [i+ 1, j]
and
(9.8) β([i, j], [k, `]) = [i+ k, j + `].
We are given the element z, which corresponds to [1, 1], and our goal is to efficiently
compute R = φ1(z
a−1). We compute (r − 2) · [1, 1] = [−1,−1], followed by α([−1,−1]) =




Theorems 9.3(i) and 9.6 immediately give the following generalization of Verheul’s
theorem for asymmetric pairings.
Corollary 9.7. Suppose that efficiently-computable isomorphisms φ1 : GT → G1 and
φ2 : GT → G2 are known. Then CDHG1 , CDHG2 and CDHGT can be efficiently solved.
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Let G be an additively-written group of prime order r, and suppose that d | r − 1.















d}). Note that if d ≈ r1/3, the running time and memory
of Cheon’s algorithm is Õ(r1/3), which is faster than the running time Õ(
√
r) of Pollard’s
rho algorithm for computing logarithms in G. Morales [65] showed that if FAPI-2 can be















For convenience, we will refer to (9.9) as ‘Cheon time’. Note that Cheon time and the
number of oracle calls are jointly minimized when d ≈ r1/3.
We present extensions of Morales’s result to the situation where an efficiently-computable
isomorphism φ1 : GT → G1 is known. We let P , Q, g denote fixed generators of G1, G2,
GT with e(P,Q) = g.
Theorem 9.8. Suppose that an efficiently-computable isomorphism φ1 : GT → G1 is
known. Then FAPI-2 can be solved in Cheon time.
Proof. Let S ∈ G2 and z ∈ GT be an instance of the FAPI-2 problem. Let S = yQ and
z = gxy for some x, y ∈ [1, r− 1]. Our goal is to compute R = xP . Let φ1(g) = aP . Define
zi = z
(ay)i and Pi = (ay)
ixP for i ≥ 0. Since z0 = z, Pi+1 = φ1(zi), and e(Pi, S) = zi for
i ≥ 0, we can iteratively compute z1, z2, . . . , zd in time Õ(d). Now, using Cheon’s algorithm
with input zi for i = 0, 1, . . . , d, we can compute ay in Cheon time. Finally, we compute
R = (ay)−1P1 = xP . 
Theorem 9.8 and Morales’s result immediately show, given an efficiently-computable
isomorphism φ1 : GT → G1, that DLG2 can be solved in time Õ(
√
rd+ d2). However, this
result is not interesting since Pollard’s rho algorithm already solves DLG2 in Õ(
√
r) time.
Theorem 9.10 is a useful variant of this result.
Lemma 9.9. Suppose that an efficiently-computable isomorphism φ1 : GT → G1 is known,
and suppose that φ1(g) = aP . Then the integer a can be computed in Cheon time.
Proof. Let Pi = a
iP and gi = g
ai for i ≥ 0. Since P1 = aP , e(Pi, Q) = gi, and
φ1(gi) = Pi+1, we can iteratively compute g1, g2, . . . , gd in time Õ(d). Finally, Cheon’s
algorithm can be used to compute a. 
Theorem 9.10. (i) Suppose that an efficiently-computable isomorphism φ1 : GT →
G1 is known. Then DLG2 can be solved in Cheon time.
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(ii) Suppose that an efficiently-computable isomorphism φ2 : GT → G2 is known.
Then DLG1 can be solved in Cheon time.
Proof. We prove (i); the proof of (ii) is analogous.
Let φ1(g) = aP . Suppose that we are given a DLG2 instance (Q,S); we need to find
the modulo-r integer y such that S = yQ. Let Pi = (ay)
iaP and gi = g
(ay)i for i ≥ 0.
Since P0 = aP , e(Pi, S) = gi+1, and φ1(gi) = Pi, we can iteratively compute g1, g2, . . . , gd
in time Õ(d). Next, Cheon’s algorithm can be used to compute ay mod r. Finally, a can
be computed in Cheon time using Lemma 9.9, and thereafter y = a−1(ay) mod r can be
immediately computed. 
Remark 9.1. By Theorem 9.10, the existence of either an efficiently-computable isomor-
phism φ1 : GT → G1 or an efficiently-computable isomorphism φ2 : GT → G2 will have
damaging consequences to the security of pairing-based protocols. For example, in the
BLS signature scheme (cf. Section 1.2.2), an entity’s private key is an integer x selected
uniformly at random from the interval [1, r − 1], and the corresponding public key is
X = xQ. The entity’s signature on a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ is σ = xP , where P = H(m)
and H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 is a hash function. The signed message (m,σ) can be verified by
computing P = H(m) and checking that e(σ,Q) = e(P,X). If an efficiently-computable
isomorphism φ1 : GT → G1 is known, then the DLG2 instance (Q,X) can be solved in Cheon
time to recover the private key x. If an efficiently-computable isomorphism φ2 : GT → G2
is known then, given a single signed message (m,σ), the DLG1 instance (P, σ) can be solved
in Cheon time to determine x.
Remark 9.2. Let u = −(262 + 255 + 1) and consider the BN elliptic curve
(9.10) E : Y 2 = X3 + 2
defined over Fp, where p = 36u4 +36u3 +24u2 +6u+1. This elliptic curve has the property
that
(9.11) r = #E(Fp) = 36u4 + 36u3 + 18u2 + 6u+ 1
is a 254-bit prime. One can check that there exists an 85-bit divisor d of r − 1 which
optimizes Cheon time (9.9). Hence, by Theorem 9.10(i), if there exists an efficiently-
computable isomorphism φ1 : GT → G1, then DLG2 can be solved in roughly 285 time —




In Chapter 3, we discussed the use of automorphisms to reduce the Miller length. Hess
[42] has observed that endomorphisms can be used reduce the Miller length. For example,
a supersingular curve E over F2m has an endormophism σ : (x, y) 7→ (x2, y2) when the






Using the fact that squaring a Miller function is equivalent to squaring the coordinates of










By determining the action of σ in relation to point doubling, we can find a method to
compute the ate pairing as a product of Miller functions with length 2, evaluated at points
whose coordinates are of the form σiP , σjQ.
For the curve E defined by Y 2 +Y = X3 +X + b over F2m where b ∈ {0, 1}, Barreto et






This observation was arrived at by examining the explicit equations used in the double-
and-add step in the pairing computation and predates Hess-Vercauteren optimal pairings.
It would be interesting to further study these properties of supersingular curves in terms
of Hess-Vercauteren optimal pairings and the use of endomorphisms in general.
For elliptic curves, the utilization of automorphisms in pairing computation does not
always indicate a clear advantage. For a curve E with embedding degree k and an order-d
automorphism group, we may use automorphisms to reduce the length of the Miller loop if
d does not divide k. However, in order to obtain an efficient representation of G2, we desire
that d divides k. Since an efficient representation of G2 is an important consideration when
choosing a curve for efficient implementation, curves which would benefit from the use of
automorphisms in the pairing computation are often not considered competitive. The
Hess-Vercauteren optimal pairing framework applies analogously to hyperelliptic curves,
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where there exists a wider variety of automorphism groups. There is potentially a huge
advantage to be obtained if suitable hyperelliptic curves are discovered.
Many of our optimizations have focused on the computation of a single pairing. In
practice, multiple pairing computations are required. For example, a BLS signature scheme
where we vary the number of messages and signatures produces some interesting results.
Recall that the BLS protocol consists of a public key X = xP and signatures σ = xH(m)
are generated using the private key x. We can verify the BLS signature σ as
e(H(m), X) = e(σ, P ).
Given two processor cores, we can simply give each pairing to each processor core. Given
a single processor core, we verify the signature as
e(H(m), X) · e(σ,−P ) = 1.
This allows to compute the Miller functions of each pairing first, take their product, and
finish with a single final exponentiation, saving a bit of computation. Given four processor
cores, we can apply our parallelization results to spread the pairings over two processor
cores each.
On the other extreme, suppose we are given messages (m1, . . . ,mN) corresponding to











where the ci are chosen uniformly at random. If we have more than four times as many
processor cores as we do signers, then our parallel results will reduce the latency of the
verification.




























There are many variables to consider in determining the best method for parallelization,
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